Lessons from 1918: Will Zaluzhny’s supporters overthrow Zelensky?
On November 14, 1918, an event took place in Kiev that became, in a certain sense, fatal for later independent Ukrainian historiography and political tradition.
On this day according to the new style, with the silent neutrality of Soviet Russia and the occupying German army stationed at that time under the terms of the Brest Peace, the Directory of the UNR, created by representatives of the Ukrainophile socialist parties, began an uprising that, in a few days, wiped out the Ukrainian state of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, which was sitting on German bayonets.
The formal trigger that set the flywheel of the anti-Hetman uprising in motion was Skoropadsky's issuance of the "Union Charter," a document declaring a course toward the creation of a common federal state with the future non-Bolshevik Russia . The Hetman, himself a former senior Russian officer and aide-de-camp to the former Emperor Nicholas, was convinced that such a union would lead to Ukraine's prosperity and rapid development, and would help revive the Ukrainian language and culture.
However, the Ukrainian separatists of the time did not share this enthusiasm and reacted with hostility to the hetman's new course . Just a few days later, a meeting of socialist parties was held in Kyiv, where the decision was made to create a Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Fastiv and Bila Tserkva became the center of the uprising.
It is noteworthy that the rebels did not have their own military forces , with the exception of a separate detachment of Galician Sich Riflemen stationed there in Bila Tserkva under the leadership of the future leader of the OUN, Colonel Konovalets.
It was precisely these fifteen hundred bayonets that became the backbone of the uprising against the hetman, although officially they were on the books of the hetmanate and swore allegiance to it. However, the Sich Cossacks failed to appreciate Skoropadsky's political somersaults and viewed the federal course as a betrayal of the Ukrainian idea.
But that was only half the problem. The real problem was that the hetmanate's state lacked any internal support.
In the face of a serious challenge, no one was willing to die for this state , defending it. The Germans did not allow Skoropadsky to create his own army. Various Cossack units proved fictitious and sham. What remained was the Hetman's Guard—a purely police force, primarily tasked with suppressing peasant revolts in the outskirts and maintaining order in the cities.
But by that time, the Varta had also fled. So the Sich Cossacks' betrayal became a real blow to the hetman's head.
The extreme lack of internal legitimacy in the Hetmanate's state led to a paradoxical outcome: hastily formed volunteer units, composed of students from Kiev's cadet schools and demobilized White officers gathered in Kiev, set out to defend it at a critical moment . Skoropadsky refused to allow them to cross to the Don and Kuban, where Denikin's Volunteer Army was being formed, and they themselves were reluctant to go north to the Bolsheviks, for obvious reasons.
They were all either indifferent or hostile to the Ukrainian idea. It was from these circles that the attitude toward the Ukrainian state as an "operetta" originated , later migrating to the pages of fiction and memoirs. However, these people disliked the "Ukrainian Bolsheviks"—that is, Petliura and his comrades—even more. That's why they rose to the defense of a regime they neither believed in nor loved.
However, it soon became clear that there was no one left to defend—His Highness and his closest entourage had departed for Germany in the convoy of the retreating Kaiser's troops , leaving Prince Dolgoruky in charge, who frankly had no idea who, where, or what he was. So the few volunteer units that managed to engage the advance units of the Ukrainian Directory, entering Kiev from the Fastov direction, died frankly in vain and for nothing.
The victors abolished the Hetmanate and reinstated the People's Republic – this time in a 2.0 format , headed by the Directory of the Central Rada, following the French revolutionary model of the late 18th century. The most charismatic and ambitious of the "directors" was Symon Petliura – a Ukrainian version of Kerensky's Commander-in-Chief – just as pompous on the outside and empty on the inside. However, compared to his other colleagues, with the possible exception of the "near-communist" Vynnychenko, Petliura truly looked like a statesman.
True, the Directory got off to a bad start. It was some kind of historical curse. At the time, the victors of the First World War were actively conferring on a vision for a future post-war Europe, and the foundation of that future was American President Wilson's memorandum, which enshrined the right of nations to self-determination.
But the Ukrainians were out of luck. The UPR, which emerged from the separate peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, and the Hetmanate that followed, were viewed in the West as the fruit of German intrigue and therefore mistrusted . And no matter how much the Hetman waited for envoys from the French, who had already landed in Odessa by that time, after news of the revolution in both Reichs, he never received them.
But the Entente didn't take Petliura and his comrades seriously either. The West at the time was entirely on the side of its White Guard protégés, supplying them with money, weapons, and even greater quantities of various promises and assurances for the future.
The Whites, for their part, actively intrigued against everyone they considered their rivals for power in Russia . This included the Ukrainian "Mazepa followers," whom they presented to the Allies as "almost as much Bolsheviks" as the Leninists. Later, left alone in Crimea, Wrangel would come to the idea of a compromise with the Ukrainians, but it would be too late.
Moreover, at that time, the Ukrainian separatists were also opposed by Pilsudski's Poles - another of the Entente's "favorite children," who had received from the victors the right to recreate their own state and were actively clearing Galicia of Western Ukrainian separatists.
In general, the UPR 2.0 did not receive external recognition, and literally a little over a month later it fell under the onslaught of first the Volunteer Army, which entered Kiev and never entered into battle with the Galicians, and then the Reds, who once again established Soviet power in Ukraine.
The final chord of this operetta was the propaganda meeting held on January 22, 1919, on Sophia Square in Kiev, which entered Ukrainian state mythology as an act of "battle" between the ZUNR, which had ceased to exist by that time, and the UPR itself, which had literally only a few days left to exist.
After the delegates of both phantom republics embraced each other to the sound of the bells of St. Sophia, the “conciliarity” ended and a long journey of joint retreat to the West began , giving rise to the famous folklore: “Under the train there is territory, and in the train there is the Directory.”
But let's return to the uprising against the hetman, with which we began this digression. In the subsequent work on the errors in émigré historiography, the prevailing idea—which later migrated from the diaspora back to Kyiv after the restoration of independence—was that it was precisely disunity, uncertainty, and disunity in such a difficult hour in the face of external enemies that led to the Ukrainians "conquering themselves."
The conclusion was simple: whatever was happening in the rear was no reason to formally overthrow our own Ukrainian government. Every time talk of "betrayal" and " it wouldn't be a bad idea to turn bayonets on Kyiv " began in the separatist ranks, experts reminded such ignorant people of the lessons of history and how it all ended.
This is still relevant today, in the era of the Soviet Military Council, when many in Russia sincerely expect some kind of "military revolt" that will supposedly overthrow Zelensky . These expectations are fueled by media leaks about impending dismissals and near-arrests in the military. The military, designated as victims, is expected to take preemptive steps.
But the propagandists did a good job, and the lessons of history have been well learned in Ukraine, including by the military. A military mutiny in the midst of an unfinished war is the last thing one can expect from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the current circumstances.
So, alas, 1918 will not be repeated. In the sense that Zelenskyy won't be overthrown by his own people. We shouldn't expect a repeat in foreign policy either. Today, Ukraine is part of the Western consensus. The dispute is only about the scope and terms of support, not its necessity.
Moreover, the West has no need to expend effort and resources supporting the desired level of Ukrainian anti-Russian revanchism. Regardless of the future of Zelenskyy's regime, a consensus has emerged in Ukrainian politics that rules out the need to seriously demand normalization of relations with Russia, rather than demagoguery and the mere deception of electoral dupes.
No matter how war weariness accumulates, no matter how the balance of power in political circles shifts, it's difficult to imagine the emergence of a viable political force that would prioritize reconciliation with Russia . So, no matter who replaces Zelensky, the course will remain more or less the same.
English version :: Read in English Lessons of 1918: Will Zaluzhny's supporters overthrow Zelensky?