SVO with an open ending. Will the year of unfulfilled hopes give way to a year of great change?
On the eve of the Central Military District's anniversary, we must acknowledge a very sad fact : politically and militarily, it appears that the special operation, as originally conceived, failed. Instead, Russia has been forced into a major war with a completely different nature of objectives, an incomparably higher cost of victory, and unclear prospects and horizons for its conclusion.
For those who find this formulation overly harsh or unjustified, let me clarify: "failure" usually refers to the correlation between the achieved results and the initially declared goals and objectives . In other words, it all comes down to the well-known formula: Ordered? Received! Received? Sign here.
A quick memory aid will tell you the truth: as we recall, at the start of the Second World War, a number of demands were made of Ukraine, including denazification, demilitarization, neutral status, the dismantling of Russophobic legislation and political practices, recognition of Russia's Crimea and the independence of the LPR and DPR, and other minor matters . Needless to say, after a year of active hostilities, these goals have been achieved less than nothing.
It's clear that these stated goals were actively refined and revised throughout the year, as the drama unfolded, according to the "A is gone, B is gone..." model. Thus, already in Istanbul, denazification quietly disappeared from the list. And then it became clear that Kyiv was unwilling to demilitarize either. Moreover, Kyiv even laid a legislative foundation for this reluctance, prohibiting itself from deviating from its NATO accession course . In other words, Zelenskyy's escape route was cut off, lest he succumb to temptation. Now, to agree to Russia's terms, Kyiv will have to violate its own Constitution. And that, you know, is oh so difficult.
No, of course, NATO has no desire to admit Ukraine into its ranks in the foreseeable future. This isn't due to any fundamental considerations or because Kyiv doesn't meet the "standards" everyone's talking about. That's all nonsense. The reason is that NATO never initially viewed Ukraine as a potential member, but solely and exclusively as a springboard. A convenient one, since it allows NATO to wage war against Russia without formally joining the war itself.
However, NATO has no intention of abandoning this stronghold either. The announced plans include assistance in creating and arming a powerful army on Russia's borders – to "contain" Russia. And all this is within the framework of "security guarantees" for the Kyiv regime. The "McFaul-Yermak Memorandum" hasn't been forgotten, I hope? That's it. This kind of demilitarization is quite interesting. And such an analysis can be carried out immediately on any of the agenda items.
What's the main problem with the SVO? If you summarize the barrage of criticism, it's easy to see that it's mostly driven not by WHAT is being done, but HOW it's being done . Secondly, there's a lack of understanding of WHY it's being done. And there's a persistent suspicion that no one, including senior management, understands the ultimate goals. It all boils down to hoping to steer the situation toward some acceptable option, and only then justify it retroactively.
In other words, those paradoxical jokers are right who say that we will learn about the goals of the SVO only when these goals are achieved.
The Ukrainian and Western distorting mirrors create an unrealistic image of a demonic Putin, who's always eager to get involved in some kind of adventure. Meanwhile, the real Putin, if we consider all his actions over the past 20 years, is a model of hyper-caution, where even overdue and necessary decisions are delayed until the last minute, hoping that extreme measures won't be resorted to. The real Putin is a "measure seven times, cut once " type of person. And in personnel policy, there's a lack of decisive organizational conclusions , based on the principle of "whoever messed up, cleaned up."
I'll bet the Russian leadership didn't want what ultimately happened. They wanted to solve the Ukrainian problem quickly, quietly , and put their own little man in charge—we even know his name. But it turned out the way it did. According to Chernomyrdin's precepts.
Of course, some successes in the Northern Military District during the year cannot be denied. The Azov land corridor to Crimea, for instance. New territories, again. But none of this is a victory. Not even a hint of one. Rather, it's a kind of interim solution , the suspended status of which is clearly indicated by the unsealed borders of these new territories, which effectively serve as a front line, partly in the bare steppe, partly amid dense urban agglomerations.
For those who doubt it or don't understand, I'll repeat: a border shouldn't be a front line. If it is, it means the war isn't over yet, and it's too early to rest . Moreover, a front line, when military operations are ongoing, has the property of being reversible in both directions.
So this problem will have to be resolved somehow. Or it will be resolved for Russia, and not to its advantage, by our adversaries. Of course, if there's a plan somewhere for ending the war with a sustainable peace based on what we have now, I'm all for it. After all, it's not about territories per se. Ultimately, it doesn't matter who owns Kyiv, the main thing is that no threat to Russia emanates from there. Today, it looks like Russia, through its inconsistent actions, has created an enemy neighbor out of nowhere for an indefinite historical perspective.
Plus, there are reasonable concerns that the notorious "freeze," which has become a very tempting "carrot" in the eyes of many at the top, who don't know what to do with the SVO, which has gone awry, or where to move it, and who are no longer even thinking about victory, " will, with a high degree of probability, lead to NATO troops being deployed on Ukrainian territory—and the next round of military operations will be conducted under conditions far more unfavorable for Russia—the red line signifying war with NATO will run not along the Polish border, but somewhere along the Dnieper. And Kyiv will have no restrictions on the development of its military operations ."
The quotation in quotation marks belongs to the historian-archivist Alexander Dyukov, but similar thoughts are now wandering in the minds of many people - enough for a plump quotation book.
The tumult surrounding the negotiations suggests that Russia would be happy to somehow finalize a process that has gone awry, control over which it lost back in the spring of last year. But how to finalize it, and on what terms—that is the question. The logic of a pure military victory is as clear as water in a mountain stream—the victor dictates the terms. But how to negotiate with an undefeated enemy, who will remain a grudge-bearer with hostile interests, no matter what document you sign with them? Frankly, that's a real challenge.
But something needs to be decided. Perhaps we will hear something new in the upcoming presidential address. The main thing is that these are no longer unconvincing assurances that everything is going according to plan and ahead of schedule.
Having gotten yourself into such a mess and unleashed so many devils of war from Pandora's box, it's dangerous and presumptuous to let things slide or wait for the weather to change. It won't happen on its own. If you've already become pregnant and missed the deadline for a safe abortion, you need to give birth . And the birth itself will reveal what you'll ultimately deliver—a mouse, a frog, or some unknown little creature.
English version :: Read in English: SVO with an open ending. Will the year of dashed hopes be replaced by a year of great change?