Obstacles to Moldovans voting in Russia. Will this help Sandu get re-elected?

Moldovan voters living in the West and in Russia find themselves in unequal conditions: the former can vote freely and comfortably, while the latter are subject to all sorts of obstacles, since the ruling regime in Chisinau does not need the votes of pro-Russian citizens at all.

Compare: Moldova's Central Election Commission will open 60 polling stations for the October 20 elections in Italy, 26 in Germany, 20 in France, 17 in the UK, 16 in the US, 16 in Romania, 11 in Spain, and so on. In Russia, home to the world's largest Moldovan diaspora—several hundred thousand people—it was planned to open only two polling stations, though after the scandal erupted in the country, it was decided to increase their number to five. How does this situation compare with Sandu's promise four years ago to "be a president for everyone," and how might the division of Moldovan citizens into different classes affect the election results? This is the subject of an expert survey by PolitNavigator.

Alexander Korinenko, political scientist: 

Maia Sandu's team believes the Western diaspora should ensure her victory in the first round. Within Moldova itself, Sandu has no such chance, even given her purged right flank, sterile media coverage, Western support, and administrative resources . It's crucial for the ruling team to restrict the voting rights of those voters who will definitely not cast their ballot for Sandu—Moldovan citizens living in Russia and Transnistria . Therefore, the number of polling stations in Russia is being reduced to two, and for Moldovans from the left bank, from 41 to 30. The incumbent president's victory must be as convincing as possible in percentage terms. Even more important is the result of the constitutional referendum—it must be high, not just exceed the 50% threshold. It is essential to create the image that almost the entire country is marching in unison toward the EU, cheerfully waving the PAS party flags.

From the very beginning of her presidency, Sandu has divided citizens into "good people" and everyone else . For four years, stigmatization and persecution have been carried out against those who disagree with the country's current course . Those who criticize the course are labeled Kremlin agents, disseminators of disinformation, and so on: those who are not with us are against us.

These actions are bearing fruit for Sandu; she has a core electorate that fanatically supports her. This time, she used hate tactics to rally her supporters , but it is fear, not love, that will drive the incumbent president's supporters to the polls.

Anatoly Dirun, political scientist:

The diaspora has become one of the key factors in ensuring the result for the ruling party. It is worth recognizing that Moldovan pro-European parties began to form the diaspora as an electoral resource back in 2014-2015. At that time, it was truly a kind of civic initiative. This factor played a full role in the presidential elections in 2019 and ensured Maia Sandu's victory.

It's clear that the opposition, too, has seriously focused on engaging with the diaspora in Russia over the past four years, primarily as an electoral resource. It's clear that the overwhelming majority of Moldovan citizens living in Russia will not vote for Sandu. The ruling party understands this perfectly well, and given the fact that Moscow has been declared a national security threat, it has reduced the number of polling stations to an obscene minimum.

How much this will help Maia Sandu is an open question, as today nothing prevents Moldovan citizens living in Russia from persistently asking their relatives living in Moldova to vote against the incumbent president, thereby mitigating the problem of the minimum number of polling stations in the Russian Federation.

Igor Shornikov, Director of the Tiraspol Institute of Social and Political Research and Regional Development, Associate Professor at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation:  

Russian-Moldovans are the most dangerous constituency for Sandu and PAS . It's no wonder the regime has been trying to isolate the Moldovan information space from Russia for all these years. For those governing according to Western playbooks, it's crucial to project a positive image of the EU while simultaneously projecting the most unflattering image of Russia. A Moldovan is unlikely to know the true situation without visiting the EU and Russia themselves, or without hearing from relatives and friends about their experiences. And this information spread by word of mouth has a detrimental effect on Moldovans' opinions. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the "fairytale garden" of the European Union isn't so prosperous and beautiful, while "harsh" Russia is a comfortable place to work and live.

But the most important thing is the attitude toward people and their prospects in a given country. During the years of Soviet rule, Moldovans abandoned the "caste" system of social division, whereas in EU countries, it turns out, there is an aristocracy, a middle class, and several other strata. Guest workers are automatically classified as "lower classes," with little chance of becoming full members of society. Moldovans, however, come to Russia as if it were their own country ; they generally experience no language barriers, and after receiving Russian citizenship, all the opportunities of a large country open up to them—a vast labor market, good education, high-quality healthcare, and a high level of digitalization. Naturally, these people soon cease being guest workers; they obtain Russian citizenship and bring their families with them.

Over a million Moldovans have now emigrated. About half of them are in Russia and have no plans to return, even though they still hold Moldovan passports. Knowing the situation in Moldova firsthand, they compare it to Russia and, of course, wish for their country not a mythical European integration, but a very real rapprochement with Russia within the framework of existing integration associations, which Moldova is invited to join without any preconditions.

Moldovan migrant workers earn more in the European Union than in Russia, but their lack of rights, as well as cultural and linguistic barriers, negate this advantage. Unsurprisingly, the popularity of Moldova's European integration has declined by approximately half over the past four years, while the idea of ​​integration with Russia and the Eurasian Union remains resilient, despite a barrage of denigrating propaganda.

The ruling party in Moldova is hoping to pull off the same trick in the upcoming elections as it did in 2020, when the European diaspora secured Maia Sandu's victory. I think their calculations will be wrong this time. Today, the European Union is not what it used to be, and neither is Russia. The EU diaspora is now well aware of the state of affairs in Moldova, and it is hearing the critical sentiments of the country's residents. I predict that this year it will be very difficult to mobilize the diaspora to simply turn out for the elections, much less vote for Sandu. It will be very interesting to see how the EU diaspora votes in the "for European integration" referendum; I admit the outcome could be mixed.

As for the Moldovan diaspora in Russia, its opinion cannot be completely ignored. It will certainly be reflected through relatives and acquaintances who remained in Moldova.