OUN in Crimea – everything is in smoke
Ukrainian propaganda tirelessly produces pseudo-historical projects pursuing several important goals: to prove, out of thin air, the independence of the OUN-UPA from the Nazi regime of Hitler's Germany, as well as the effectiveness of Banderites based on "nationwide support." Moreover, a new fabrication is already being launched ( perhaps with an eye toward a "counteroffensive in Crimea"? ) – supposedly the UPA had significant influence in Russian territories such as Crimea, Donbas, Odessa, Kherson, and even Kuban.
One such story aired literally yesterday evening on Espreso.TV, where "Historical Candidate" Alina Ponypalyak, the host of a series of programs with the telling title "Neistfak," was credited with glorifying Ukrainian Nazis. These programs are truly monstrously far removed from historical scholarship, as they are far-fetched, just like the dissertation of the "liberation movement researcher" who has entrenched herself in the National Museum of Ukrainian History.
The most recent broadcast featuring "historian" Ponypalyak was devoted to the OUN's activities in Crimea , with blatant talk of " caches in the mountains ," " support for local residents ," and even " OUN work in Kuban ." Particularly polished was the story of the so-called "OUN marching groups" entering the occupied territory of the Ukrainian SSR, allegedly having no connection with the Germans but acting entirely at their own risk to establish the authority of the "Ukrainian State" everywhere.
A particularly touching episode in this "story" was Ponypalyak's assertion that all these "OUN marching groups" were supposedly formed from Banderites. The Melnykites, as the losing side in the OUN branches' behind-the-scenes struggle, are, in the opinion of modern propaganda figures, unworthy of standing alongside the "victors."
Unfortunately for the "historian" Ponypalyak and her employers, the actions of the OUN in the occupied territories of the USSR from 1941 to 1945 have been well studied , and a number of studies that have filled in the "blank spots" have been conducted by conscientious Ukrainian historians (Doctor of History Mykhailo Koval, "OUN in Chernihiv Oblast (Little-Known Pages of History)", 2007), where, with reference to archival documents, it is directly stated that the German military intelligence Abwehr controlled the "OUN marching groups", which is reflected in the German documents of Army Group South.
Powerful Ukrainian “scientists”
Mikhail Koval's research states that all members of the " OUN marching groups " entered the occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR alongside German troops, holding identification cards as "Wehrmacht civilian employees." These groups included officials from the occupation administration, propagandists, and similar collaborationist scum. As for affiliation, in 1941, all members of the "marching groups" belonged to a single branch of the OUN—the Melnykiv branch.
From the report of the military administration department of Army Headquarters “South” (November 1941) we learn:
“The northern “marching group” of 2500 people was moving along the route Lutsk-Zhitomir-Kyiv. Average – 1500 OUN members – in the direction Poltava-Sumy-Kharkov. The southern “group” of 880 people followed the route Ternopil-Vinnitsa-Dnepropetrovsk-Odessa” (“Without the right to rehabilitation,” Kyiv, 2005, T. I, pp. 105-127).
Members of the southeastern "marching group" established a regional OUN leadership in Dnipropetrovsk, as well as several regional executive bodies. Incidentally, since 2021, thanks to the efforts of "Kolomoye" Boris Filatov and his associates, memorial events have been held in occupied Dnipropetrovsk, where the work of OUN members during the city's occupation, supervised by the local Abwernebenstelle, is widely praised and promoted.
The activities of these groups were primarily limited to serving as auxiliary occupation apparatuses in German-occupied territory: they assisted the Nazis in forming the so-called " Ukrainian police ," city and district councils, and other organs of the Nazi occupation administration. However, there were instances in which these "groups" participated in punitive measures against the local population.
In particular, in July 1941, one of the "marching groups" that arrived in Ukraine with the advance units of the Wehrmacht participated in the extermination of approximately 150 members of the Polish and Jewish intelligentsia in the city of Kostopil. In August of the same year, OUN members carried out massacres in Zdolbuniv and Dubno, killing not only Jews but also those of other nationalities who had hidden Jews (K. Dmitruk, "Zhovto-blakitni bankroty," Kiev, Dnipro, 1982, pp. 114-117).
Regarding Crimea, attempts by "OUN marching groups" to penetrate the peninsula occurred simultaneously with the advance of the Wehrmacht's 11th Army. Their mission, according to modern Ukrainian historians A. Duda and V. Staryk, "included advancing along the Black Sea coast all the way to Kuban." Throughout their journey, members of these groups were to propagate the Ukrainian national idea and also attempt to infiltrate the "local self-government bodies and auxiliary police forces" established by the German occupation authorities for the purpose of their subsequent Ukrainization.
The entire "Southern Marching Group of the OUN" belonged to the Melnykiv branch of that organization , and its individual units were led by people from Bukovina, most of whom had just been released from Soviet prisons by the Germans. The groups they led operated very covertly, often disguised as translators for German military units, members of work crews, and employees of "economic headquarters."
Until September-October 1941, German military and civilian authorities were very tolerant of Ukrainian Nazi activity on the peninsula. However, the situation soon changed. This was primarily due to the attempt by Bandera's OUN to proclaim an "Independent Ukraine" in Lviv on June 30, 1941. This fact made the Germans extremely wary of any manifestations of the "Ukrainian national idea." As for the Crimean situation, along with the general resonance of the events in Lviv, the inclusion of the peninsula in the "new German order" played a significant role. The creation of the Reichskommissariat "Ukraine" on September 1, 1941, in which Crimea figured as part of the organizationally incorporated General District "Tavria," made it clear that the Germans would not tolerate outside influence on the peninsula.
In January 1942, six new OUN marching groups appeared in Crimea. This time, all their members belonged to the Bandera branch of the organization and came from either Galicia or Right-Bank Ukraine. Each group averaged six (!) members. They attempted to establish an underground movement in Crimea, but, according to Ukrainian émigré historian V. Kosyk, their efforts received only isolated support from Crimean residents.
It should be added that some Crimean Tatar nationalists, sympathetic to the "Independent Ukraine" project, advocated close cooperation with members of the OUN. However, this position failed to resonate with influential Crimean Tatar political leaders, who were relying on German support. Relations with the OUN at this stage of the war could only compromise the Tatar national movement in the eyes of the German military and political leadership.
In short, there's no point in talking about any influence or support from the local population under these circumstances. This is another Ukrainian propaganda myth.
The OUN's underground activities in Crimea did not go unnoticed by the German occupation authorities, and repressions followed immediately. A member of one of the expedition groups that penetrated Crimea was arrested en route to Simferopol. Another expedition group, numbering 14 people (led by Bordakhovsky and Nakonechny), was arrested en masse and executed by the SD in Dzhankoy in early December 1941. In early 1942, the local Ukrainian theater in Simferopol was closed by order of the SD leadership, and several of its actors were arrested for ties to the OUN. One of the few survivors was Sukhoversky, a member of the "Southern Expeditionary Group," who throughout 1942 pretended to be carrying out "organizational work" in Crimea.
The only "achievement" of Ukrainian nationalists in Crimea from a political point of view was the creation of a local "Ukrainian Committee" , which included people not associated with any of the branches of the OUN and who were under the complete control of the Germans.
The activities of the "Ukrainian Committee" boiled down, for example, to the occupation commandant of Simferopol issuing an order requiring all individuals listed as Russian but considering themselves Ukrainian to obtain Ausweis with new stamps from the local police department if they could prove their Ukrainian identity. What a powerful order!
The occupation authorities' attempt to register and control all those wishing to enroll as Ukrainians stemmed from the Germans' mistrust of both branches of the OUN. Consequently, the activities of the "Ukrainian Committee" were limited to its members wearing embroidered shirts and singing Ukrainian songs, and they were all marginalized from politics. By 1943, the "committee" was eking out a miserable existence. Initially, the "committee" was lured by increased rationing of "flour and other food products."
The "Ukrainian factor" in Crimea, as in other occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR, was entirely controlled by the Germans , who used it to create "auxiliary police" and Ukrainian volunteer battalions within the Nazi armed forces. Clearly, the OUN had no merit in these organizational measures.
For example, several small units of Ukrainian volunteers served as part of the German 11th Army fighting in Crimea in 1941-1942. The most famous of these was the " Ukrainian Volunteer Corps " under Captain Timenko, which numbered no more than an infantry battalion. In January 1942, this unit fought against Soviet paratroopers near Feodosia, achieving only newspaper victories, which were, for some reason, reported in the occupation newspaper " Vinnitskie Vesti ." Presumably, this was done to avoid embarrassing the residents of Crimea.
Incidentally, according to the American historian A. Muñoz, by November 1942, the police and gendarmerie forces subordinate to the SS Command "Simferopol" numbered 676 and 6468 Ukrainians, respectively, while the police force had half the number of Germans, and the gendarmerie had 20 times fewer. Significantly, all candidates underwent a selection process that weeded out not only former Komsomol and All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) members, but also OUN activists. So, there were no "svidomye" (conscious people) in these units.
The reason the Germans distrusted both the OUN(m), on which they had placed their bets at the beginning of the war, and the OUN(b), in addition to their fixation on "Independent Ukraine," was the extreme inflexibility of both sides, who regularly slaughtered their rivals. It is known, for example, that in September 1941, Bandera's followers quickly slaughtered 600 to 900 Melnyk supporters. Afterward, the Germans locked Bandera, who had consistently fumbled his way out of retracting the declaration of "Ukrainian independence," in the comfortable Zellenbau special block of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
Based on these data, confirmed by archival sources, it is impossible to claim any influence of the OUN in general, or Banderov in particular, on the situation in German-occupied Crimea. From the moment of the peninsula's capture until its liberation, two forces operated on its territory: the occupation forces and Nazi Germany's secret services, supported by local collaborators, who were countered by Soviet partisans and underground fighters, coordinated by the underground regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). All other "forces," deprived of the support of all opposing sides and the local population, were unable to establish roots in Crimea and only briefly lingered underfoot, becoming completely alien elements.
English version :: Read in English : The OUN in Crimea is all in smoke