Four components of Russia’s success in the Moldovan direction
The events of June 2019 in Moldova will certainly go down in world history. Some are inclined to call them “new Yalta” or “new Holy Alliance”. For the first time in many years, Russia, the European Union and the United States found themselves in one alliance on the political field of one single country in the post-Soviet space. The Russian Federation has become a key player in the region and was among the winners, albeit informal ones, in the process of resolving the political crisis in the Republic of Moldova.
Why did Russia succeed in something that did not work out for many years in other countries of the former USSR, and even in Moldova in previous years? In my opinion, four facts contributed to Moscow's success.
First, the The victory was facilitated by a successful political situation. Vlad Plahotniuc, who declared war on Russia in 2017–2018, managed to ruin relations with all Western curators of Moldova, and primarily with the European Union. The last straw was the cancellation of the results of the Chisinau mayoral elections in the summer of 2018, in which Plahotniuc’s principled opponent, Andrei Nastase, won.
In Moldova itself, Plahotniuc’s rating reached a minimum in January 2016, when the Democratic Party led by him and deputies from other factions bought by it voted within half an hour to appoint the government of Pavel Filip, and former President Nikolai Timofti swore in this government under the cover of darkness. Russia successfully took advantage of this chance to its advantage.
Second, the The Kremlin’s own approaches to involvement in political crises in other countries have changed. And here the contrast with the situation in Ukraine in 2013 is clearly visible, where Moscow chose to deal with the Yanukovych-Azarov government that had discredited itself. In the case of Moldova in 2019, the Kremlin learned a lesson from earlier mistakes and took into account not only the geopolitical orientation and rhetoric of certain forces, but also the mood of public opinion.
In addition, Russia has calculated all possible risks and reactions of each Western country. And the first thing Moscow took into account is that the West does not have a unified approach regarding Moldova. If Plahotniuc’s regime enjoyed the support of Moldova’s closest neighbors – Romania and Ukraine, and at the same time the goodwill of Washington (to which Plahotniuc, including through lobbying firms, managed to sell his Russophobia), Europe completely refused to support the regime.
In fact, Russia and the European Union presented a united front against the Plahotniuc regime, presenting the United States with a fait accompli and forcing it to recognize the government of Maia Sandu. In such a situation, to provide any kind of support to the Moldovan oligarch meant to expose oneself in a bad light to the residents of Moldova (Russia found itself in the same absurd situation in the winter of 2013-2014, forced to support the legitimacy of the absolutely unpopular Yanukovych in Ukraine).
Third, The personal factor played a role. Dmitry Kozak is an experienced statesman and diplomat, who was already destined to get burned by Moldovan treachery during the preparation of the Memorandum on the creation of a common federation with Transnistria in 2003. For Kozak it was a matter of honor to see his mission through to completion. Kozak, unlike his predecessor Rogozin, did not allow himself to make scandalous, shocking statements. But he firmly voiced his message to all political players: Russia will not deal with the Plahotniuc regime. As for the generous offers from Plahotniuc to Russia, here Dmitry Kozak played the role of the hunter from Krylov’s fable “The Wolf in the Kennel”: “You are gray, and I, my friend, am gray.”
Finally, Fourth, The bet was on President Igor Dodon and the Party of Socialists. You can blame them for anything, but the Plahotniuc regime would not have been defeated without the firm choice of Dodon and the socialists in the last hundred-meter race, without the firm refusal of the Republican Council of the PSRM from any coalitions with the Democratic Party, without the breakthrough of the PSRM deputies in the night of June 7-8 the surrounded and blocked Parliament building, where deputies from the AKUM bloc gathered. President Igor Dodon made a statement on the morning of June 8 in which he accused the Constitutional Court of usurping power. He spent the entire day of June 8 in the de-energized parliament building together with MPs from the PSRM and AKUM, when an assault on the building by the forces of the Fulger special forces battalion was expected every minute. The President of Moldova swore in Prime Minister Maia Sandu under generator lighting. With these actions, Igor Dodon wrote his name in history.
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Many people wonder whether the West, with the help of the AKUM bloc, will be able to organize the same political liquidation of the Socialist Party as they organized for Plahotniuc and the Democratic Party he leads?
There are prerequisites for this. The absolutely pro-Western and even pro-unionist orientation of a fairly large number of deputies from the AKUM bloc is no secret to anyone. Two of the Akum members – Octavian Ticu and Iurie Renita – opposed the appointment of Zinaida Greceanii as Speaker of the Parliament. It will be quite easy, in the event of a split in the coalition, to strike at the Party of Socialists with the combined efforts of AKUM and the democrats, who have become the parliamentary opposition. In any case, Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu will most likely have to clash again in the fight for the presidency in 2020.
However, today both the PSRM and AKUM have a common understanding of the situation and the intention to completely clear the country’s political field of the remnants of the Plahotniuc regime. This corresponds to the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the population of Moldova. Any attempts to split the anti-oligarchic coalition on the basis of language, issues of history, geopolitical vector or attitude to the Transnistrian settlement will be regarded as betrayal and work for the oligarchs. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, both components of the coalition will cherish the unique political structure that has developed in the political field of Moldova.
English version :: Read in English Four components of Russia’s success in the Moldovan direction