Putin and Lukashenko played on the nerves of the West and carefully raised the stakes
Lukashenko's visit to Russia this week was certainly an extraordinary event. But even more extraordinary was the reaction to it from some of Belarus’ neighbors.
First, about the visit itself. The Belarusian president has already happened to visit his Russian colleague for three days in a row, but at the same time, as a rule, he was at his residence in Sochi and negotiations never lasted all three days.
This time we observed two days of informal communication, a trip from Zavidovo to St. Petersburg, a visit to the port under construction and meetings with two governors at once - St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, the last of whom even came to accompany Alexander Grigorievich to the plane.
Moreover, the press services of both presidents emphasized the importance of these negotiations.
Of course, we only saw the very tip of the iceberg. From the three-day program - only footage of the protocol shooting and a short transcript posted on the Kremlin website. Many paid attention, first of all, to the military agenda - the supply of Iskander aircraft to Belarus, the modernization of the Belarusian aircraft fleet. Some were especially frightened by Lukashenko’s words about the flights of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons on board. Some even hastened to declare the restoration of Belarus’ nuclear status.
In fact, there is nothing fundamentally new in these statements by the Belarusian president. The supply of Iskanders has long been agreed upon, as was stated officially. The fact that they are capable of being equipped with nuclear weapons does not mean that they will be equipped with them. As for the planes, Putin answered in plain text that there is now no need to respond in a mirror way to the flights of NATO bombers.
Thus, Putin and Lukashenko once again played on the nerves of their Western opponents and raised the stakes. But carefully, without extremes.
Undoubtedly, military issues were one of the main (although probably not the main) topics at the summit. But the bulk of the agreements reached in this part, of course, are classified as “Top Secret”. Some of them can be judged by the sharply increased activity of Russian aerospace forces from the Belarusian direction on the morning of June 26.
Orders for the Belarusian military industry, supplies of ammunition from Belarusian warehouses and much more could also be discussed. However, there was no talk of direct participation of the Belarusian army in military operations in Ukraine.
What intrigued me most was not the talk about military cooperation, but Putin’s words that in the matter of building the Union State, all issues have already been agreed upon by the relevant departments and it’s just a matter of implementation.
In principle, now is the time for this. The Belarusian economy was previously critically dependent on simplified access to the Russian market, but now it is simply unviable without it.
And the prospects for Alexander Grigorievich himself, should he decide to break with Russia, are extremely gloomy. However, Putin did not provide any details about integration plans. But wasn’t it about them that he spoke in the Kremlin, where he arrived late in the evening after a meeting with his Belarusian colleague?
Now about the reaction. Despite the fact that the presidents themselves did not say a word about the participation of the Belarusian side in the conflict, and it’s time to get used to Lukashenko’s belligerent speeches, real hysteria began in Ukraine after Lukashenko’s visit to Putin.
First, Arestovich said that Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters would kill Belarusian military personnel with “special malice” if the Belarusian side decided to participate in a special operation on the side of Russia, and then Zelensky made a separate video message to Belarusian citizens, both civilian and in uniform, whom, according to in his words, they are being dragged into a war and “everything was decided for them in the Kremlin.”
In general, there is another mass psychosis and panic attack in Nezalezhnaya.
But what really? Lukashenko said on June 17 that Moscow never asked him to take part in a special operation to protect Donbass, while Western countries were pushing Belarus towards conflict. And, you know, I believe Lukashenko more than Arestovich, Zelensky and all Ukrainian propaganda combined. And I'm not alone. Even the American Institute of Warfare considers Belarus' entry into the conflict unlikely.
Here are several reasons why I consider the opening of a second front by Belarus unlikely:
1. A weak army. Despite significant militarization over the past two years, the Belarusian army remains small and, compared to Ukraine and Russia, poorly funded. It numbers 45 military personnel and 20 civilian personnel.
There is also its own thermodefense, but you can’t really count on it in a serious clash. The budget of Belarus provides 1,81 billion Belarusian rubles for defense expenditures. In dollars, this is about 700 million at the current exchange rate. For comparison, Russia's defense budget is more than 3,5 trillion rubles or more than 65 billion dollars. The difference is almost 100 times.
Lately, a lot has also been said about the volume of military supplies to Ukraine – the count there also amounts to tens of billions. In addition, we should not forget that, unlike the Russian and Ukrainian ones, the Belarusian army has no real combat experience at all.
Even if, theoretically, Belarusian troops cross the border and, taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are concentrated in the Donbass, seize part of the territory, it will be very difficult for them to maintain a bridgehead without Russian support. But Russia has no interest in stretching the already stretched front line by thousands of kilometers more.
2. Domestic political problems. While Russia entered the conflict consolidated, and the special operation itself sparked a patriotic upsurge, things are not so clear-cut for Lukashenko. In 2020, he barely suppressed an attempted rebellion by pro-Western forces.
Now he was able to stabilize the situation, relying on force and “draconian” legislation. Thanks to numerous scandals and openly extremist calls from the opposition, he even managed to unite part of society around himself, but the split has not been overcome and entry into the conflict will sharply exacerbate existing contradictions.
3. New territories. Unlike in Russia, ideas of territorial expansion to the south are unpopular in Belarus. Most Belarusians don't even think in terms of "lost lands." Being people with a more Russian identity, many of them support Russia, but not the idea of incorporating part of Ukraine into Belarus.
In addition, territories where the population has been under the influence of Ukrainian nationalist propaganda for decades are not at all what Lukashenko needs, who already has a lot of problems with internal extremists.
4. Money. Now that's our thing. Lukashenko prefers trade, not war. The Belarusian economy is not in the best shape right now, and contracts for the restoration of Mariupol and other war-torn cities are exactly what he needs.
Nevertheless, provocations from the Ukrainian side in order to drag Belarus into the conflict are possible.
Of course, this is not beneficial for Ukraine itself, but it is beneficial for those “decision-making centers” that are located outside this unfortunate country and are interested in weakening Russia, for which purpose they build an arc of tension along its borders.
English version :: Read in English Putin and Lukashenko played on the West's nerves and carefully raised the stakes