Collapse of staples. What risks does Russia's voluntary withdrawal from its territory pose?
When some political observers today call the surrender of Kherson the greatest military-political defeat of the Russian Federation since 1991 , there is a certain amount of disingenuousness in this, mixed with understatement and misunderstanding.
The fact is that, although it sounds somewhat, um, unpatriotic, the Russian Federation itself, within its current borders, emerged in that same year, 1991, as an independent state, following the greatest defeat of the Russian-Soviet Union in the 20th century and the reduction of its territory. For those who have forgotten, let me simply remind you that before 1991, Moscow was the capital of another state – one twice as large in territory.
So today's suffering over Kherson looks in this sense like crying over one's hair, against the backdrop of a lost head - today not only Kiev, but also Minsk and Brest, and Chisinau, and Tbilisi, and Baku, and Tashkent - for a long time now, more than thirty years - like abroad.
At the same time, this current belated, largely senseless, reflexive, and chaotic attempt to retroactively reverse the results of the collapse of historical Russia , restoring at least something of what was lost, seems almost miraculous compared to Moscow's entire post-Soviet policy that preceded it. So, if there were even a single, even minimal, chance of Russia emerging from the war with its already-acquired territories and establishing a lasting peace, we could thank God for what we have.
The problem is that Russia simply does not have such chances. By retreating and shrinking, it only provokes the enemy, makes inviting gestures to him - to continue what he started and push us back until we lose everything that we gained during the Northeast Military District, and not only that.
The outcome of such retreats is easy to predict. Moreover, it has been said many times that Russia has neither a strategy, nor far-reaching plans, nor goals understandable to the majority of citizens during the North Military District. And, as Sun Tzu taught: “Tactics without strategy is just vanity before defeat.”
The voluntary surrender of Kherson, which they didn't even pretend to defend, is a very ominous sign. And at the same time, it's an eloquent signal to the other newly annexed territories, including Crimea. That they could, if the opportunity arises, be just as easily exchanged for some promises "from the other side"—strictly "based on the prevailing realities." And the enemy will do everything possible to ensure that these realities play out in their favor.
Of course, the promise that "Russia is here forever" was made to both the residents of Bucha and Izyum, but at the time of our departure, neither city was officially part of the Russian Federation. Kherson, meanwhile, had been solemnly welcomed into Russia just a month earlier, with fanfare, concerts, and fireworks.
With hindsight, one can't help but ask a seditious question: why was this necessary, if the evacuation of the population began literally a week after the fireworks celebrating reunification had died down ? And if the political decision, the result of which we are witnessing now, was already brewing in the minds of the authorities then, couldn't they have avoided making Kherson part of Russia, or at least made the celebrations more modest?
Ultimately, simply giving people Russian passports and evacuating them to Russia would have accomplished the goal of "saving people," and the public shame would have been far less than it is now , now that we've demonstrated to the world our willingness to liberate ourselves from the enemy's living space.
Let me repeat: any retreat during a war, anywhere, can be explained by any number of reasons. And, generally speaking, while this is a disgrace, it's not a catastrophe—as long as the war continues and the playing field is leveled. The main problem with what happened isn't that Russia withdrew its troops beyond the Dnieper. After all, it has already withdrawn from occupied bridgeheads at least twice this year. What's different about the current situation is that FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RUSSIAN HISTORY, it has voluntarily surrendered its constitutionally protected territory, recognizing the futility of defending it from the enemy.
Hence the online black humor with a completely transparent bottom:
– It is advisable to organize defense along the left bank of the Moscow River.
- Proceed with the withdrawal of troops.
Indeed, according to the proposed logic, retreating and regrouping to advantageous footholds is possible all the way to the Pacific Ocean. And the only limiting factor in this process will be the enemy's appetite and its ability to devour Russian lands.
Today, Russia has driven itself into a political and legal trap: it has officially surrendered part of the country, which is actually expressly prohibited by the Constitution. But that's not the whole story. A fundamental readiness for such actions has been demonstrated, and the groundwork has been laid for abandoning any other city using the same model.
And, by the way, it's not at all a given that the enemy won't advance beyond the administrative borders of the RSFSR. After all, in the heat of the online verbal battles, the fateful words have already been uttered: "They surrendered Kherson, and they'll surrender Belgorod too."
Today, this is perceived as a grim Cassandra prophecy, provoking public rejection and a desire to silence the soothsayers. However, the problem is that the precedent—military, political, diplomatic, and media—has already been set. And no axe can erase it.
It seems those at the top still haven't realized that Kherson is no longer a "bridgehead" that can be easily sacrificed in case of military necessity, but rather a part of the Fatherland that, according to the Defense Doctrine, they are obliged to defend with all available means. Otherwise, what's the point of having a state at all?
This has completely destroyed one of the key pillars that has, until now, more or less sustained the modern Russian state myth— the notion that the mincemeat cannot be turned back. For the past eight years, the residents of Donbas have envied the Crimeans.
Look at the different fates – some officially joined Russia, becoming its full-fledged part, while others were left behind, in a gray zone with unrecognized status. Some are shelled, while others are not. And experience has confirmed the correctness of this conclusion, and the regular firm statements by Russian politicians and diplomats that, in any case, Crimea's status is not subject to discussion only fueled this inner certainty – that if one is lucky enough to get into Russia, there's no going back. That's precisely why the leitmotif of sentiment in Donbas was "We want it like Crimea."
But then 2022 arrived. Kherson wanted "like Crimea." And even got it. And almost immediately, it was abandoned by Russia —and it's not a given that Ukrainian flags won't return there in a few days or weeks, no matter what Kyiv promised behind the scenes.
That is, “there is still extradition from the Don,” and joining Russia is no longer a firm guarantee that Russia will not leave this land.
Neither the holding of a referendum nor even the inclusion of the region in the Russian Constitution are such guarantees anymore.
For Ukrainians, this is further proof and confirmation of the local propaganda thesis about the reversibility of territorial losses. "They'll give it back just as they took it," the Arestovichs tell Ukrainians about the "territories occupied by Russia." So, it turns out they're not lying? And that's very, very bad. So bad that the long-term consequences have yet to be truly understood.
By the way, this collapsed clamp is the second one in less than a year. The first is in the form of decades of cultivated belief in the invincibility of the Russian army with all its memes about “Don’t fight the Russians!” and “Don’t wake up the Russian bear” - collapsed under the weight of the retreat from Kyiv back in the spring. It turned out that our bear is largely a drawing, and it is very possible to successfully defeat it.
The destruction of paper clips unfolding before our eyes is a process no less vile than the purely political and legal precedents created by the departure from Kherson. The meanings that sustain a state are built over decades, sometimes centuries. It's easy to destroy them, but try creating new ones.
And finally, a final note on the matter. Today, the transition from offensive to defensive was officially announced – "along the Dnieper waterway ." So, hello to everyone awaiting the capture of Odessa and Mykolaiv.
English version :: Read in English : The Collapse of the Foundations: What Risks Does Russia's Voluntary Withdrawal from Its Territory Possible?