Siege of Kaliningrad. How Russia can punish Lithuania

"Run or die" has become a fashionable game among teenagers. The rules are simple: run as close as possible in front of an oncoming car. If you succeed, you win; if you fail, you die. It's certainly monstrous, but at least their behavior is understandable—hormones, a desire for self-affirmation, a frivolous attitude toward their own lives. If the actions of 15-year-old slackers are somehow explainable, then what drives such behavior among Baltic politicians, who have become accustomed to testing Russia's patience?

First, the Latvian authorities decided to give local Russians a nightmare by banning the Russian language in education, introducing criminal prosecution for supporters of the Russian special operation and imposing a fine of 14 thousand dollars for watching Russian TV channels, which also banned every single one. Now Lithuania has distinguished itself by banning the transit through its territory of a number of goods subject to EU sanctions to Kaliningrad from other Russian regions. The restriction came into force today at midnight and covered up to half of the range of cargo, including metals and construction materials.

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If Moscow gritting its teeth turned a blind eye to the antics of the Latvian authorities, Lithuania may well regret the decision of its politicians. After all, this isn't about domestic policy, albeit openly Nazi, but a direct attack on the security of one of Russia's regions. This cannot go unanswered. But what kind of reaction will it be?

For some, what happened became an occasion to remember the Suwalki corridor and the prospect of a final solution to the problem by military means. In principle, there are legal grounds for this. Kaliningrad transit is an integral part of the package of agreements between Lithuania, Russia and the European Union. By guaranteeing it, Lithuania received ratification of the state border treaty. Accordingly, if Vilnius unilaterally violates the transit agreements, the legitimacy of the border is lost, and Moscow gains the right to draw it wherever it sees fit.

But this is, after all, a last resort. Of course, the risks of a direct clash between Russia and NATO increased significantly yesterday, and there are plenty of people overseas who are interested in such a clash. Seeing that Ukraine is failing, they are seeking to up the ante by throwing the Baltic states into the mix. I hope, after all, that this time a world war will be avoided, but a war of nerves is inevitable.

How should we respond to this challenge? The counterattack must be painful enough to bring the overzealous politicians to their senses, but it would be better to avoid brute force. Russia has ample opportunity to make life very difficult for its Baltic haters. An embargo must be met with an embargo, and a blockade with a blockade. Establishing a full-fledged blockade is difficult. Land borders can be blocked. And even then, in the case of the Belarusian section, we must also consider the factor of Lukashenko, who has a habit of using sanctions against Russia and its counter-sanctions to his advantage . As for a naval blockade, it is impossible without military action and carries serious risks of the situation spiraling out of control.

However, there are many more options when it comes to embargoes. The main focus here is the energy embargo—breaking the BRELL ring, which connects the energy systems of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

In 2017, the NATO Energy Security Centre prepared a report on the risks of the Baltic states' energy dependence on Russia, after which they decided to withdraw from the BRELL. But they didn't make it. The disconnection from the common power grid was supposed to be completed by 2025, but politicians wanted to make things even more challenging in 2022. Lithuania could have become energy independent, but it abandoned this goal by shutting down the Visaginas nuclear power plant at the insistence of the European Union. Disconnecting from the Russian grid would mean rolling blackouts, economic collapse, social upheaval, and a very likely political crisis for Lithuania.

_{In turn, the Kaliningrad region remains secure in energy terms. The Kremlin calculated possible threats earlier and already managed to ensure energy self-sufficiency in the region.}

In this situation, the Belarusian factor will again be important. Currently, Lithuania refuses to buy Belarusian electricity, offended by the construction of a nuclear power plant 50 kilometers from Vilnius, but, finding itself literally in the dark, it may reconsider. I hope that in this case, Lukashenko will demonstrate his commitment to his allyship and not act as he did with Ukraine, to which Minsk increased fuel supplies in defiance of Russian restrictions until February 2022.