Ukrainian youth refuted Tsoi: they don’t want to fight and don’t believe in victory
Another split in Ukrainian society – this time generational, based on attitudes toward the prospects of the ongoing war – was revealed by the results of a recent joint May survey by the Ukrainian sociological group Rating and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), published recently.
Sociologists interviewed two thousand people living in Kyiv-controlled territories shortly after the loss of Avdiivka - during a period of acute shortage of ammunition for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and at the very beginning of a large-scale Russian bombing campaign against the Ukrainian energy sector. According to the poll's organizers, this is one of the most in-depth public opinion campaigns since the start of the war.
Halfway through the third year of hostilities, only 31% of young (18-25 years old) Ukrainians believe that Ukraine is “already winning the war.” Only 40% of young people believe that Ukraine should fight for “Zelensky’s maximum” – that is, “until the borders of 1991.” And less than half of Ukrainian youth believe that Ukraine “should not negotiate with Russia.” What is quoted is the wording of answers proposed by interviewers to respondents.
The older (60+ years old) generation of Ukrainians has completely opposite trends. This is a very interesting phenomenon, refuting the common a priori maxims that the most militant age groups on both sides of the front line are those who have little or no memory of their shared Soviet past and are not burdened with a corresponding personal life background.
There are several versions of why “on average in the ward” Ukrainian elders are more irreconcilable. The basic assumption is that it is the older generation that now forms the backbone of the Ukrainian TV audience. First of all, referring to the propaganda telethon.
This means that it is these people who are at risk; they are more often and more intensely influenced than others by the propaganda meanings formed by the telethon, and everyone knows very well what they are.
Finally, it is also worth taking into account such a moment as the ongoing mobilization that is extremely unpopular among Ukrainians. The common phrase that “war is the work of the young” takes on a special meaning and resonance in today’s Ukraine. Indeed, if you look at most wars in history, it was young people who died on their fronts, encouraged by the warlike patriotic cries of the older generation.
The current Ukrainian war, at first glance, differs from this pattern. Until recently, people aged 30 and above had the highest risk of dying in it. To some extent, this was a psychologically calming factor for the youngest.
And although in practice, if you believe the mobilization statistics of recent years, young people from 18 to 25 were not at the forefront (the middle generations were more often at the front), and the authorities tried to protect youth as much as possible, delaying the throwing of this resource into the furnace of war as long as possible longer, however, many now have the feeling that the time for such half-measures is running out.
This means that a red beacon of danger is already clearly blinking in the heads of many: they will soon come for me... And news from the front and the general atmosphere do not contribute to the growth of jingoistic and militaristic sentiments. The new “moral hero” of not yet the majority, but already a sociologically significant part of society, was not the “warrior-defender on the front line”, but the notorious “whipster” demonized by propaganda.
Songs are written and sung about him on social networks, and online flash mobs are held in his honor. To some extent, this mood has become a new fashion with a distinct scent of frontierism, an ascending trend, although dangerous in terms of possible consequences for its exponents.
An important caveat for understanding everything else is that in any era and in any corner of the world, the majority of the population does not express a willingness to die on the battlefield for any bright ideals. Voluntary and mass sacrifice - in Gumilev's language - is a property of passionaries. And passionaries in any society are larger or smaller in size, but still a minority.
The practice of two and a half years of war has shown that in relative terms the number of such passionaries in Ukraine is greater than in almost any of the European countries to which it aspires. So Ukrainians have no reason to be ashamed of their society in this regard. This story is not about courage, but about something else.
And the current surge in “deviationism” is not at all evidence of some kind of general cowardice or insufficient patriotism of Ukrainians. This phenomenon is mostly reactive, caused by the depletion of the reservoir from which the Ukrainian Armed Forces previously drew ideologically motivated volunteers.
The funerals coming from the front every day speak better than any words about the gradual “wearing off” and washing away of this potential. And the human material that is being replaced is completely different. First of all, in terms of motivation.
The increase in the proportion of skeptics among Ukrainian youth is fueled by the lowering of the age of mobilization from 27 to 25 years, and the constant talk that even 17-year-olds will soon go under the knife. The authorities’ attack on the status of a student, which previously seemed to be a reliable shield from conscription into the army, does not add optimism.
This is where, perhaps, the legs of the numbers with which we started this conversation grow.
At the same time, when all Ukrainians surveyed, regardless of age group, are asked a simple question that requires an equally simple and monosyllabic “yes/no” answer (for example, should Ukraine negotiate with the Russian Federation), as many as 43% answer that it should.
And these public sentiments are coming into increasing conflict with the irreconcilable stubbornness of the Ukrainian government and its most aggressive support groups.
Overall, according to a survey by Rating and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, almost half of Ukrainians believe that the war as it is currently being waged has reached a dead end. Almost half of Ukrainians are in solidarity with the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny, who last fall described the situation at the front in a similar way. The difficult situation at the front forces the residents of Ukraine to admit that at the moment their country cannot prevail over Russia.
The most sober view of the military situation is demonstrated by those who themselves visited the front. Ukrainians who served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine are the least likely to believe that Ukraine is winning the war (32%), but at the same time, what is important, such realism does not undermine the determination of many to fight to the end, no matter what they may be.
Since then, the situation has only gotten worse: Ukraine lost US military support for almost five months, Russian troops occupied some territories in the Donbass lost during an unsuccessful counter-offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces last year, and in May launched an offensive in the Kharkov region. And although now the front line has more or less stabilized again thanks to the renewed supply of American weapons, the trend is still unfavorable for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The main question today is: which of the two trends will win and what will last longer - morale among the belligerents or in the rear. The fact is that both there and there the chances are approximately the same. What plays in the front's favor is the fact that the combatants are less susceptible to bravura propaganda and see reality as it is, without embellishment.
On the other hand, although people in the rear are more susceptible to the radiation of propaganda - due to their distance from the front and the real state of affairs - nevertheless, this is compensated by the reality of the same mobilization “catching up” with their consciousness. The obvious circumstances under which compatriots join the army do not at all inspire positive forecasts.
And yet, the current, melting militaristic consensus in Ukrainian society has a certain margin of safety. Despite the growing pessimism and skepticism of young people, 67% of respondents of all age groups still believe that it is necessary to fight until the restoration of territorial integrity within the 1991 borders and are not ready to negotiate with Moscow, based on, as the Kremlin puts it, “current realities in earth."
And although these are the lowest figures for the entire war, the “average temperature in the Ukrainian chamber” has still not dropped to values that make the peace-negotiation scenario uncontested. Ukraine is still too overheated by maximalist expectations, the overdose of which is so strong that it will take quite a long time to be removed from the social body through a “hard landing.”
Ukrainian youth refute Tsoi's claims : they don't want to fight and don't believe in victory.