Why is Transnistria in no hurry to recognize the LDPR
Over the course of a whole month of diplomatic war and hostilities, official Tiraspol never once came out in support of Moscow’s declared course of dismantling the existing world order. Moreover, unofficially, the authorities of the Russian enclave are doing their best to suppress attempts by the local population to support Russia, as was the case with the recent rally in support of the special operation in Ukraine.
It's almost a month since Vladimir Putin signed decrees recognizing the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. Over the past time, they have been recognized by other partially recognized state entities: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nagorno-Karabakh also welcomed Russia’s decision to recognize the LDPR, although it did not officially join in the recognition. However, Transnistria still pretends that it is not aware of what is happening right next door.

For those who closely observe the evolution of the political and financial elites of the PMR, such “indecisiveness” is not a surprise. Back in 2014, with Russia’s acquisition of Crimea, Tiraspol realized a significant decrease in its strategic importance for Moscow. Before the emergence of the LDPR, Tiraspol was the main “Novorossiysk brainchild” of Russia.
In the new realities, the Kremlin’s attention switched to the LDPR, and the financing mechanisms of the Transnistrian “outpost” were completely subject to audit.
“For us, interaction with Ukraine is a priority,” said the head of the Transnistrian Foreign Ministry, Vitaly Ignatiev, in an interview with the Russian Kommersant back in 2016.
A year later, Transnistria's President Vadim Krasnoselsky stated in an interview with Russian media that Transnistria had "become hostage to the situation between Ukraine and Russia." There was a grain of truth in his words, and that should be acknowledged immediately. For Transnistria's elites, Ukraine is more than just a neighbor. And this isn't just because about a third of the Transnistria's population is ethnic Ukrainian.
Ukrainian radicals also actively participated in the fighting on the side of the Pridnestrovians in 92, at the stage of the birth of Transnistria, with the unofficial support of Kiev. In subsequent years, it was the Ukrainian authorities who contributed to the economic and financial development of the Transnistrian enclave, including it in the trade flow of the Odessa port and turning the “gray zone” into a paradise for goods sent to the European Union.
Subsequently, close cooperation between the Transnistrian elites and the Ukrainian security forces led to the transformation of the Tiraspol Sheriff holding into an economic empire - with assets in Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Austria, Germany, with business interests on the Eurasian and African continents, with accounts in the millions, real estate in G7 countries, etc.
The degree of Ukrainian influence on Tiraspol is evidenced by simple facts: the entire information infrastructure of Transnistria, including telephone communications and the Internet, is closed to Ukraine. The owner of Sheriff, Victor Gushan, is a citizen of Ukraine and one of the key investors in tourist sites on the Odessa coast. His own estate is located in the small seaside town of Vilkovo. They say it can easily rival the Mezhyhirya of the fugitive Yanukovych in scale and scope. The food security of Transnistria depends entirely on Ukraine, which controls the lion's share of supplies. Until August last year, Ukraine was the only state, other than Russia, that recognized and allowed cars with Transnistrian license plates into its territory.
While Russia from its own budget sent benefits to Transnistrian pensioners, allowed local residents and enterprises to leave payments for consumed gas in the “Stabilization Fund”, from which local infrastructure was subsequently repaired, the financial and political elite of Tiraspol acquired Romanian and Ukrainian passports and became addicted to shopping in European capitals, holidays in Greek and Arab resorts and the aroma of Viennese coffee houses.
Knowledge and understanding of all of the above facts (and many others) perfectly explains why, in its foreign policy activities, the Transnistrian administration in every possible way avoids a clear position regarding the denazification of Ukraine, the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia and the LDPR.
And although the local population of the enclave is still pro-Russian, the political and economic elites of Transnistria are, in fact, largely pro-Ukrainian, pro-European. The latest event confirming this point of view was the March 6 rally in support of the Russian army in Tiraspol.
Official Tiraspol did not approve the rally. The local Ministry of Internal Affairs called the rally a provocation:
“The organizers of the false rally are not in Transnistria. In this very unstable time, they see that the situation in the republic is calm. The goal is to provoke a spontaneous crowd and get a reaction abroad, creating an image of Pridnestrovie that allegedly poses a threat to the region.”
During this period, the Transnistrian authorities call their main task “preserving stability in the region.”
However, for some reason, the pro-Ukrainian single pickets in the center of Tiraspol and flash mobs near the Russian consulate building did not cause the same public condemnation of officials.
The events of this spring have shown that the Transnistrian leadership is trying with all its might to maintain the appearance of life as before in a rapidly and forever changing world. Where it is already obvious to everyone that the old way will no longer be the same. Old systems, templates, strategies, even sanctions do not work.
English version :: Read in English Why Transnistria is in no hurry to recognize the LPR and DPR