Moldova on the eve of elections: History 25 years ago repeats itself
The Republic of Moldova will receive a new president in November. The first round is on the first day. Apparently, the matter will not work without the second one either. However, almost all major political players view the presidential campaign as a kind of training before the parliamentary elections. Although it is unclear when to expect them - extraordinary next year, or “planned” a couple of years later.
Not like everyone else
The Moldovan political system is different in that the position of the president here, if not decorative, is certainly not decisive. Back in the 90s, the head of state had a lot of leverage over parliament and the government, including instruments for their dissolution. He retained priority in the selection of the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice, the heads of the special services and the Prosecutor General's Office. The presidency was deprived of all these powers in 2000, along with the abolition of general presidential elections, and parliament began to elect the head of state.
Although for almost the entire first decade, the president remained the head of state not only de jure, but also de facto - the presidency was simply headed by the chairman of the ruling party. And already in the first half of the “tenths” the time came for various (but almost always center-right) coalitions, in which the role of the president was played either by the current speakers of parliament (as acting speakers), or by something like a “wedding general”.
And only in 2016 the second (after twenty years) popular presidential elections on an alternative basis took place. The Constitutional Court returned the rule of law, according to which the people themselves elect their president. But he did not return the powers “from the nineties” to the president.
Moreover, the president was obliged to propose the candidate for prime minister proposed by the parliamentary majority. And the majority themselves have tried such an innovation as “suspending” the president for a couple of hours, during which the speaker of parliament signs those laws that the president refused to promulgate. The current president, Igor Dodon, was indignant, threatened protests, but more often than not, he signed laws without waiting for the next “temporary suspension.”
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the elections, but one thing is certain - the parliamentary majority, if it is not satisfied with the chosen one, will most likely continue to use already proven schemes. The only question is what kind of majority we will see at the end of the presidential battles.
What was it like before?
The 2016 presidential election is not particularly conducive to analysis. Firstly, they were a test of strength after a long break. Secondly, only two favorites took part in that campaign - Maia Sandu (as a candidate of pro-Western forces) and Igor Dodon, who won against her in the second round (declaring friendship with Russia). The rest either supported one of the candidates or were excluded from participation. At the same time, the Democratic Party that really held power (led by oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc) simply watched which of the two would be a little luckier.
To better understand the current election, it is best to look to history. Namely, by 1996. Then the prize in the race was much more significant, but for those who did not qualify for the Grand Prix, the result was also significantly important.
Since 1994, all power in Moldova belonged to the Agrarian Democratic Party, the “political center” that replaced the “national democrats” of the early 90s, who were considered too radical in society, especially in the destruction of the economy that remained from the USSR. The new ruling party was grouped around three politicians - the current President Mircea Snegur (elected on an uncontested basis), Prime Minister Andrei Sangeli and Chairman of Parliament Petr Lucinschi.
It was the presence of the triumvirate on the eve of the presidential elections that marked the beginning of the end for the union. Already in 1995, Snegur, who had recently taken the position of a “statist,” left the ADPM with his supporters and established close relations with those same radicals – nationalists and supporters of the country’s annexation to neighboring Romania.
On the other hand, Lucinschi and Sangeli competed for the center-left electorate. Already closer to the elections, a split occurred not only among the ADPM itself, but also in the ranks of parties ideologically close to it - the Socialist Party, the Unity movement, the Communist Party - in each of them there were disagreements whether to support Sangeli, Lucinschi, or play your game. Similar situations occurred on the right flank: for example, the Popular Front of Moldova fully supported Snegur, forming a “Democratic Convention” bloc with him, but the Congress of Intellectuals, which had previously broken away from the “frontists,” decided to nominate its own candidate.
The first round, in fact, became the main intrigue. As a result, Pyotr Luchinsky, who broke away from the ADPM right before the elections (and, of course, the natural anti-rating it developed in the process of leading the country), was able to bypass Andrei Sangeli (who, due to a “split of votes,” took fourth place) in the dispute for reaching the second round. And in the final, the “radicalized” Snegur predictably won, against whom the entire left-of-center electorate united.
However, no less important was the result of the candidates who took third and fifth place - communist leader Vladimir Voronin and right-wing candidate Valeriu Matei. Their performance in the first round (approximately 10 and 9 percent, respectively) was a sufficient indication for the future (candidates who received 2-3 percent each could not boast of this). And already the parliamentary elections of 1998 showed that Voronin and Matei are the most promising politicians in the country (in the trust rating they were only slightly inferior to the former and current presidents - Snegur and Lucinschi).
Many expected that these two would challenge each other for the presidency in 2000. This, apparently, would have happened if Matei, who joined the new parliamentary majority, had not gotten bogged down in corruption scandals, and Voronin, who remained in the opposition, had not thereby made his party the undisputed leader. But, one way or another, this story shows the importance of the performance of “impossible, but noticeable” candidates for their teams in the future very clearly.
24 years later the roles have changed
The 2019-2020 election scenario almost completely repeats the situation in the mid-90s. Unless the actions of the “left” and “right” in it are diametrically opposed.
The new ADPM is an “anti-oligarchic alliance” formed after the parliamentary elections. Completely different political forces were forced to unite against the Democratic Party of Vlad Plahotniuc, which had a colossal anti-rating in the country. The all-powerful oligarch was completely forced to go abroad.
The new coalition was also grouped around three politicians of republican scale: the current President Igor Dodon, Prime Minister Maia Sandu, and First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Nastase.
The current president has again become the “New Snegur”. The Socialist Party, controlled by Dodon, not only left the parliamentary majority, but also began to actively vote with the same democrats against whom it had united just recently. Except that Snegur, preparing for the elections, did not hesitate to play the role of a “Romanian,” and Dodon continues to speak out for deepening relations with Russia. But here everything is explained more simply: the idea of friendship with Russia is so popular among Moldovan voters that to refuse it means automatically losing future elections.
The chairmen of two right-wing parties who left the cabinet - Maia Sandu (Action and Solidarity Party and Andrei Nastase (Political Platform "Dignity and Truth") - fully play the roles of Sangeli and Lucinschi. Even one of their main information mouthpieces - the TV8 channel - is associated with the family ex-president Petro Lucinschi (already a much more pro-Western figure than twenty years ago).
Formally, Sandu and Năstase remained in the same political bloc until the end, even though their parties had separate parliamentary factions. Both convinced themselves that the main thing was to beat their “colleague” in the first round, and in the second it would be possible to “overwhelm” Dodon, whose anti-rating after leaving the “anti-oligarchic alliance” increased.
In fact, even now, when both politicians have officially announced their presidential ambitions, the “divorce” has not been announced. Although Nastase seemed to have given guarantees to Sandu to support her in the presidential elections (Sandu herself supported Nastase, the candidate for mayor of the Moldovan capital, and seemed to have to nominate him for prime minister). And in the end, he put forward his candidacy by collecting signatures “secretly” from his partner.
The main battle between the "right" is no longer over voters, but for the support of "foreign curators." According to sources, Sandu, in addition to the support of American diplomats, has also managed to secure the help of "senior colleagues" in Germany, who had previously favored Năstase. He, in turn, has formed a close alliance with the "Bucharest Regional Committee," counting on the support of supporters of unification with Romania (several unionist politicians have expressed a desire to become president, but whether any of them will be able to gather the signatures required for registration is a big question).
Renato Usatii, the mayor of Bălți (the northern capital, the country's most important city after Chisinau), is vying for the role of "dark horse." His "Our Party" positions itself as "more left than right," but generally counts on an anti-system electorate. Usatii, citing polling data, threatens to advance to the second round, beating Dodon. But voters have no more faith in these sociological data than in the promises of some Dodon supporters to win the election in the first round. It's clear to everyone that both politicians are actively engaged in self-deception.
The Democratic Party did not nominate its candidate, but a split occurred within it too. The breakaway parliamentary group Pro Moldova is nominating as its candidate Adrian Candu, a former speaker of parliament and a relative of fugitive oligarch Plahotniuc. His anti-rating is, of course, huge. But the task is still the same as Usatii’s – to “show his teeth” for the future. True, he will show results not at the expense of “his boyfriend’s rating,” but at the expense of the administrative and financial resources left over from his relative.
Four years ago, Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu faced off in the second round. This time everything is heading towards the fact that the same two politicians will become the “tournament finalists”. And also with a “50 to 50” chance. But what and how the country will develop in the coming years will be shown by the first round.
Moldova on the Eve of Elections: History from 25 Years Ago Repeats Itself