Preparation for eternal strife with Russia. Grant-eating sociologists named the main friends of Ukraine
"Tell me who your friends are"—advises an old folk wisdom to those who wish to know more about themselves. Thus, the perceptions of individuals or entire communities about who they find complimentary in the outside world and who they consider their enemies has always served as a reliable mirror for countries and peoples.
Ukrainians are no exception to this rule. The answer to this question is all the more interesting now, a year and a half into the great war, and for many Ukrainians, the notorious "foreigners" of nationalist chants have ceased to be just an abstract figure of speech, becoming a fact of everyday life. Moreover, millions of Ukrainian refugees themselves have found themselves in a foreign land, experiencing the image of "newcomers" and "outsiders," confronting negative stereotypes about themselves.
The Kyiv-based Razumkov Center, which receives Western grants, conducted a social survey to determine who the current Ukrainian collective consciousness considers Ukraine's friends and who its enemies. While the overall results were quite predictable, the details and nuances revealed many interesting insights.
Ukraine's main friends, according to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, are not the United States, as you might expect, but Poland and Great Britain. This is the opinion of 94% and 91% of Ukrainians surveyed, respectively. This is despite the well-known disdainful, if not downright hostile, attitude toward Ukrainians held by many modern Poles, despite the numerous media-reported incidents of Poles attacking Ukrainians and vice versa. And, especially, despite the mutual historical grievances that have accumulated over centuries.
The list of Ukraine’s friends also includes the Baltic limitrophes – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (90-91% of positive answers from respondents). Next comes Canada (90%), the promised land for several generations of Western Ukrainian diaspora, and only then the USA and the Czech Republic (88% each).
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Germany has accepted over a million Ukrainian refugees and actively sought their integration and employment, the overall attitude of Ukrainians in Germany is rather cool and reserved. Only 85% of Ukrainians surveyed by the Razumkov Center consider Germans a friendly people. This is a high number, but still not as high as the number of Poles or Estonians.
Also in the positive zone is the attitude of Ukrainians towards countries such as Israel, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although there are already much fewer positive assessments here - around 70% and below.
As for the dislike rating, as you might guess based on the context of the events of recent years, Russia is in the lead (almost 94%), Belarus is in second place (81%), and bronze is confidently held by Iran (73,5%), which Ukrainian propaganda cannot forgive military cooperation with the Russian Federation and the notorious “martyrdom”.
The top five countries Ukrainians dislike also include the Chinese (60%) and Hungarians. However, in the case of the latter, the balance of positive assessments slightly outweighs the Hungarians. Only 46,5% of Ukrainians have a negative attitude toward Hungarians.
In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the regional breakdown is interesting: Ukrainian sociologists are trying to convince the world that, after the start of the Second World War, both the West and the East of the country, previously conflicting over differences in geopolitical and cultural orientations, have united on an anti-Russian platform.
“The overwhelming majority of residents of all regions express a negative attitude towards Russia – from 90% of residents of the Eastern region to 97% of residents of the Central region,” says Vladimir Omelchenko, director of energy programs at the Razumkov Center.
However, in terms of language, a small but still significant difference in people’s attitude towards Russia makes itself felt: among Ukrainian speakers, 95% are Russophobes, and among those who speak Russian, only 88%.
But if Ukrainian sociology is lying, it's not much. Considering that with the loss of 20% of the territory that falls precisely in the Russian-speaking southeastern belt, the parameters of today's Ukrainian "East" have been significantly adjusted, and now, in essence, it's just Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, where anti-Russian sentiment was nurtured long before the Maidan.
In addition, one should not discount the fact that these regions, as one of the most densely populated, are one of the main suppliers of cannon fodder for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the growing cemeteries do not add to the local residents’ love for Russia, which propaganda blames for the loss of loved ones.
Sociologists’ interpretations of negative figures regarding China are also interesting.
“What’s interesting is the Ukrainians’ understanding of the negative role China plays in this war. That is, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians did not fall for Beijing’s peace-loving rhetoric,” says the Razumkov Center.
What's even more telling is the Razumkov Center's recorded increase in negative attitudes among Ukrainians not just toward the Russian state, its foreign policy, authorities, or army, but toward Russians themselves as a people . This is true regardless of ethnicity, as in the Ukrainian language, the words "Russian" and "Rossiyanin" are identical and do not denote a political nation, as they do in the Russian Federation.
While in April 2014, immediately after the coup and literally in the wake of the loss of Crimea, a relative majority (45%) of Ukrainians expressed a positive attitude toward Russians, by June 2017, neutral attitudes predominated (42,5%). In 2023, only 2% of respondents have a positive attitude toward Russians, while 77% are not shy about publicly demonstrating their dislike of all things Russian. Only 14% maintain a neutral attitude.
Such survey results undoubtedly have far-reaching goals and a formative character, leaving an unbridgeable gap even in the event of a hypothetical freezing of the conflict. According to the architects of the conflict, not a trace should remain of the former unity of the Slavic peoples, and the format of relations between them should approach the Indo-Pakistani or Arab-Israeli one.
This means that any option for finalizing the Northern Military District within any territorial framework, but without solving the political and ideological tasks declared at the very beginning, unsuccessfully designated by propagandists with the cumbersome word “denazification,” will only formalize and consolidate Russia’s final withdrawal from Ukrainian territory as a significant factor. Regardless of gas prices, trade turnover, export and transport logistics and other mundane things.
In that case, it would be theoretically possible to imagine the restoration of trade relations between the two countries in a certain number of years. But the restoration of friendship and what is called civilizational unity is simply not possible.
Preparing for Eternal Discord with Russia: Grant-Eating Sociologists Name Ukraine's Main Friends