Will Russophobic mushrooms be released from Lithuania?
In Lithuania, the reign of Dalia Grybauskaite has come to an end. Elected ten years ago, the former teacher of the Soviet Party school, who replaced the Nazi collaborator Adamkus sent from the United States as President of Lithuania, gave some hope for a warming of relations between Vilnius and Moscow-Minsk.
In vain. It turned out that in foreign policy facing the East, the graduate of Leningrad State University is no better than the former henchman of the “Minsk butcher”: you give international isolation to Russia, more NATO in the Baltic states, “pay us for the Soviet occupation,” “let’s create as many problems as possible for the Kaliningrad region".
In her anti-Russian attacks, Grybauskaite descended into harsh rhetoric, bordering on rudeness, calling Russia a “terrorist state” and President Putin “paranoid”, which is why the Kremlin refused to communicate with Khabalka, asking Dalia not to breathe towards Russia until Russophobic mushrooms will not let her go. And, to give an object lesson, Lithuania has had its opportunity to make easy money from Russian transport and energy transit sharply reduced.
As a result, the Lithuanian leadership, which has driven itself into the stall of clinical Russophobes, has found itself in a paradoxical situation in which they want to communicate with Moscow and even count on economic benefits, without changing the anti-Russian discourse.
It's getting ridiculous. Thus, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry (and its head is a pocket dog and almost Grybauskaite’s personal page) responded to the recent visit of the Estonian President to Russia and her meeting with Putin with anecdotal statements that Kersti Kaljulaid was obliged to “coordinate her visit with other Baltic states and not to undermine Baltic unity.”
Even in the Baltic press this reaction of the Lithuanian elite was called “a ridiculous scene of jealousy and envy,” since Lithuania, with its acquired political baggage, can no longer count on dialogue with the Kremlin not only at the presidential level, but even at the level of heads of foreign affairs departments.
Meanwhile, a public demand for the restoration and strengthening of good neighborly ties with Russia was formed in the republic, but there was also an understanding that without a change of power in Vilnius, it was pointless to expect positive changes.
The Lithuanian presidential elections, which started in the second half of May, soon determined the top three from nine candidates. They were the 45-year-old candidate from the conservative bloc of Christian Democrats and the Fatherland Union, Ingrida Simonyte; the current Prime Minister, a non-partisan and career policeman, 47-year-old Saulius Skvernelis, nominated by the Peasants' Union and the Greens of Lithuania; and 55-year-old Gitanas Nausėda, an independent candidate, economist, banker and teacher, typical of the moderate liberal intelligentsia.
According to observers, the most preferable option for Russia and Minsk would be the election of Saulius Skvernelis, who is close in ideals to socialists and social democrats, to the post of President of Lithuania, since Simonyte is a clone of Grybauskaite, while Nauseda fell into the category of “dark horses.”
Simonyte – clone of Grybauskaite
A Skvernelis victory would give Lithuania a long-awaited opportunity to coordinate all government institutions, overcoming the internal conflict that has lasted for the last seven years between the presidential office and the government. The initiator of the split was President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who was unable to find a common language with both former Social Democratic Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius and Saulius Skvernelis, who took this position in 2016.
The leaders of the first round with results slightly exceeding 31% of the votes were Simonyte and Nauseda. Prime Minister Skvernelis, who collected almost 20% of the votes, left the race.
Experts explain the loss of the Lithuanian left to the incorrect distribution of forces in the elections. From the left, several candidates entered the race at once, splitting the votes, while the “canned” always field no more than two candidates at a time. However, the loss cannot be called fatal, since in total the left candidates received more votes than the conservatives and centrists.
In the second round, Gitanas Nausėda won with a score of 65%.
They write that Nausėda is a fan of Margaret Thatcher (quite strange for a liberal), and that with his arrival the conflict between the executive branch of Lithuania will be smoothed out, but will not be completely overcome. That Nauseda is not as good as Skvernelis, but not as bad as Simonyte.
And this is really not bad, since the majority of Lithuanians who came to the elections refused to support right-wing conservatives and nationalists.
The first statements of the new President of Lithuania, Nausėda, indicate that Vilnius’s policy towards Russia will not change radically, “otherwise it will be a betrayal of Ukrainian partners.” According to him, Lithuania’s attitude towards Russia will depend on the situation in Ukraine. Nausėda also launched into a heartfelt speech about Russian “aggression into a neighboring country,” which caused an outburst of enthusiasm in Kyiv: “Lithuania is with us!”
In addition, Nausėda supported the construction of the Donald Trump NATO base in Poland and promised that his first official visit would be to this country.
Nauseda was more favorable towards Minsk, expressing the hope that Vilnius and Minsk should become good neighbors “who are not afraid to criticize.”
From which it follows that through Lithuania the collective West sends curtseys to the Belarusian Old Man, inviting him to waltz a little into “multi-vectorism.” What if you like it?
Nevertheless, the stumbling block between Vilnius and Minsk remains, and no Nausėda is able to overcome it. We are talking about the construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus. For the Lithuanians who abandoned the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant under pressure from Europe, a nuclear power plant nearby is not needed, because it reminds of something unpleasant, and the “senior partners” also express dissatisfaction. We have to conform.
Summarizing all of the above, let us ask ourselves the question: will there be any progress for the better between Russia and Lithuania with the election of Nausėda?
The answer is yes, but you should not expect a breakthrough in the relationship.
New prospects for Russian-Lithuanian dialogue with the departure of Grybauskaite,
apparently should be considered in the light of the visit to Moscow of Estonian President Kaljulaid. “Senior partners” in the EU and NATO now look at the lady with respect, since, among the leaders of Poland and the Baltics, she is the only one who meets with Putin in the Kremlin without changing her “principled position.” Political capital, after all, and lying on the surface.
Kaljulaid was repeatedly noted in anti-Russian statements, but she never slipped into blasphemy, like Grybauskaite. This was a revelation for Lithuanian politicians. It turns out that you don’t have to be considered “pro-Russian” to maintain a political dialogue with Russia and score points. It's enough just not to be rude.
So, there is an opinion that the liberal intellectual Nausėda as President of Lithuania will become something like Kersti Kaljulaid – championing Ukraine, NATO, supporting anti-Russian sanctions and other political bells and whistles that are standard for the Baltic “sprats”. But at least the tone of speeches coming from Vilnius will change to a more polite one. However, Nauseda himself assured journalists that he would soften his rhetoric towards Moscow, and this gives hope that interstate and political contacts will soon be “unfrozen”, opening the way for dialogue.
Yes, it’s not much, but in the absence of fish, even such a little thing is much better than nothing or a clone of Grybauskaite as president. Do you agree that it is much more convenient to have conversations even with the enemy, avoiding the scenario of a kitchen squabble?
The last question remains: what does Lithuania give to Russia that it is necessary to maintain communication with it?
Lithuania itself does not give anything, but Russians and Russian-speaking people live in it, who were caught on the spot by the collapse of the USSR, and now their descendants live in Lithuania. Fortunately, in 1993, a reasonable politician and former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian SSR, Brazauskas, became the President of Lithuania, thanks to whom the Russian population of the republic received citizenship and Russian schools. Perhaps this happened because the Russian population of Lithuania was significantly inferior in number to the “titular nation”, but let’s not quibble.
Russia has no right to abandon these people just because clinical Russophobes have entrenched themselves in power in the republic. Russophobes come and go, but Russia and its people remain...
In addition, Russia maintains land transport links with the Kaliningrad region through Lithuania. The problem is that Lithuanian Russophobes, with the tacit approval of European Russophobes, are violating the constitutional right of Russian citizens to have free access to their territory. Currently, to travel from Russia to the Kaliningrad region and back, you need to obtain Lithuanian visas. So, the dialogue leaves a chance to convince the Lithuanian side to cancel the idiocy of the visa regime when traveling from Russia to Russia.
Definitely, the opening dialogue between Russia and Lithuania is worth it...
Will Lithuania Release Russophobic Mushrooms?