Kherson. Be patient - this is not the end of the drama

The evening news coverage on Russian federal television about the decision to abandon Kherson came as a shock to the vast majority of our country's citizens. Our hearts can't accept this event, even though we've all been prepared for it since early October, with talk of "difficult decisions."

However, we don't think with our hearts—it's, after all, a muscle, an electrical organ, celebrated by writers but fundamentally incapable of thought. Therefore, to at least understand what's happening, we'll have to use our brains and grasp the logic behind Russia's military-political leadership's decision to abandon Kherson.

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For the most part, we, ordinary citizens of the Russian Federation, assumed that the city of Kherson and its distant approaches would be transformed into lines of fortified areas and strongholds , the gnawing through of which would cost the Bandera avalanche, trained and armed by the West, the highest price.

In fact, the attacks on Kherson are already costing them dearly. According to available data, in October alone, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost at least 9 men killed and wounded on the southern sector of the front.

However, given the mistakes made in planning and conducting the Soviet military operation at its early stages, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces faces a choice between the worst and the worst . Namely, surrender Kherson to the Banderas or, with a shortage of reserves and Group Z's supply lines under attack from enemy artillery, accept battle against significantly superior enemy forces and risk a military catastrophe for the right-bank bridgehead in the absence of reliable, high-capacity crossings.

_{After all, none of us who are worried about the fate of Kherson want an outcome similar to Ilovaisk or Izvarino for the group of troops holding a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper?}

There's no doubt that such an outcome could undermine the combat effectiveness and morale of our troops along the entire front line far more than the abandonment of Kherson. Yes, Russia will suffer serious image losses, but despite all the unpleasantness, it's survivable.

Let us remember that the bulk of those mobilized will have to gain combat experience until at least the beginning of December, and throwing people who have not undergone combat training into the meat grinder would be a crime.

President Putin announced that approximately 80 mobilized troops had been deployed to the combat zone, and only half of them had reinforced the most dangerous sections of the front, which was still insufficient to reliably cover the 1000-kilometer-long line of combat contact.

_{Strengthening Kherson by transferring troops from other sectors of the front means exposing other, no less dangerous directions.}

In particular, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have not abandoned their plans to seize the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and with Ukraine's energy collapse looming, this attack vector is becoming an increasingly important priority. Another ideologue of the Kyiv junta and its handlers is a breakthrough along the frontline near Kremenna and Svatove, leading to Luhansk.

_{In general, the situation on all sectors of the front does not look very good and will remain so at least until the end of December.}

Among the obvious mistakes in the military planning of the Northern Military District, the following should be noted:

a) Unfortunately, the Russian Armed Forces have been preparing for local wars with terrorist gangs for the last 30 years, rather than for anything as close as possible to the battles of the Great Patriotic War.

However, this delusion has also gripped our sworn “Western partners”, who are determined to conduct small, victorious wars with an obviously weak enemy.

By and large, it turned out that in order to carry out the SVO, a partial mobilization of the male population is necessary, since the Russian army does not have the necessary numbers to carry out operations that our country has not seen since 1945.

b) A serious mistake by the General Staff was the attempt to attack in several directions at once, which dispersed the already small forces involved in the Central Military District.

When this mistake was realized, the liberated territories of the Kharkov region were lost, nuclear blackmail began with shelling of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, endless boat landing-assault operations to capture Energodar and a widely publicized “counter-offensive” on Kherson, which resulted in what we have today.

c) Experts note that it was a major mistake to create a separate airborne group to create diversionary actions, like those we saw near Kiev, with zero results as a result of the Istanbul agreement.

It would be much more expedient to create mobile reserves from airborne paratroopers for emergency transfer to dangerous areas and strengthening the defending groups, which was not done during the September counterattack of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Izyum.

Returning to the topic of leaving Kherson.

Military experts noted that for our group on the right bank bridgehead there was a danger of attack and encirclement from the Nikolaevo-Krivoy Rog direction. If the enemy reaches the crossings, our troops have nowhere to retreat.

_{According to some reports, NATO curators are afraid of the withdrawal of our combat-ready units - paratroopers and the 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade, which caused a lot of pain and damage to the enemy.}

At the moment they are tied up in heavy fighting, whereas by occupying the recently built fortifications on the left bank they could hold their positions with small forces, freeing up large forces for mobile operations.

The same can be said about other units and formations of the three armies and the Airborne Forces engaged in fighting on the right-bank bridgehead. Their inclusion in the mobile reserve will positively impact the balance of forces and resources if they are redeployed to locations where the threat of an enemy breakthrough is greatest.

_{Experts note that our prospects in the southern direction are minimal at the moment. Group Z could have taken Nikolaev long ago, but holding another city with the Dnieper crossings under enemy fire would have been a serious test for it.}

But there is a bright side to this seemingly complete hopelessness.

The top brass of the Ze-junta sees a catch in what is happening around Kherson and is in no hurry, as before, to trumpet about a “victory,” leaving this fun to the mercy of the information mackerel.

In particular, Zelensky's office advisor, Podolyak, usually under the influence of acetone fumes, this time stated that he sees no signs of Russia abandoning Kherson. On the contrary, Podolyak asserts, there are all the signs of Russian troop reserves amassing near the city, and even the disguise of Russian regular soldiers as militiamen has been documented.

The head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Yermak, commented on the information about Russian troops abandoning Kherson on social media: " Someone thinks they're being very clever, but we're one step ahead ."

Natalia Gumenyuk, head of the press center for the Ukrainian Armed Forces' South Operational Command, suspects General Surovikin's statement today of being " an element of a psychological warfare operation designed to create a false impression of his true intentions ." According to her, no one intends to withdraw troops from the bridgehead, and there are no visible pontoon bridges.

_{It seems that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not averse to striking at the pontoon crossings at the moment when our group Z, leaving along them for the left bank of the Dnieper, will be maximally vulnerable.}

Moreover, the leaders of the combat Ukrainians suspect that a trap has been set for them in Kherson , where the manpower and armored vehicles drawn into the city will be met by well-trained anti-tank missile and RPG crews, machine gun fire, and sniper fire from cover.

In short, I suggest we stop panicking, don't stir our imaginations with things that haven't happened yet and might never happen, be patient, and watch the unfolding drama through to the end. There's always a chance the devil isn't as black as he's painted.

Everything will become clear in the coming days. And most importantly, whether or not our troops will begin crossing to the left bank of the Dnieper.