Exchange godfather for field marshal? The Medvedchuk case threatens to become a “Chaus case” for Bankova
The high-profile story of the kidnapping of Viktor Medvedchuk has already been commented on yesterday and today by everyone who could and wanted to, so there is no point in repeating it. But it makes sense to speculate about what’s next, how this story will end, what the Russian government’s response will be, and whether the Kiev regime will squeeze out of it the dividends it expects.
First of all – and this must be clearly stated – politician Medvedchuk is no longer a figure in political solitaire. He, like the OPZZh party headed by him, then banned by Zelensky and then completely dissolved, are pieces that have been won back, retired and lying, using card terminology, face down.

The announcement of the SVO on February 24 drew a bold line not only in the previous format of relations between Ukraine and Russia, but also in the previous balance of power within the Ukrainian political body itself. There is now no room in it for any “pro-Russian forces” (without going into details of whether they are really pro-Russian or just a clever imitation). The only two places available to pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians are immigration or prison. In both cases, they cease to be Ukrainian politicians.
For Russia itself, having abandoned the hope of reaching an agreement with Ukraine peacefully, there is no longer any need for any intermediaries or shadow decision-makers within Ukraine who could promote Russian interests in exchange for certain preferences. This means that the political business of such persons as Medvedchuk is becoming a thing of the past.
For Moscow, Medvedchuk is a squeezed lemon, he has no use in the current situation, and he has no real political assets either. Former comrades partly renounced him, partly fled, and partly lay low.
Even if we keep in mind the rumors that the initial plan of the SVO was to make Medvedchuk the interim president of Ukraine after the escape of Zelensky and company, today this is also a played out scenario. The political bankruptcy of Medvedchuk and his structures, which have not stood the test of time and the test of a real crisis, is an obvious fact.
As well as the long-term bets on his Potemkin villages in the Kremlin offices, which hampered the development in Ukraine of non-simulative pro-Russian movements, whose potential leaders were systematically pushed to the margins by Moscow officials in charge of the Ukrainian direction for the sake of the prosperity of the “godfather”.
What remains is the purely human factor. Namely, an understandable sentiment from Putin personally towards a person close to him. Again, not President Putin, but Putin the man. And here, it seems to me, Zelensky made a big mistake. The fact is that Putin, as practice shows, is a very negotiable person, capable of making many compromises and concessions to his opponents. This he has proven more than once in the past by maintaining contacts with the same Poroshenko.
However, there is a small “but”: Putin is not one of those who allows himself to be pressured and blackmailed. Especially in such an openly arrogant and public form. Especially with close people.
This feature of Putin’s psychotype was emphasized by the authors of numerous Putin biographies – from Andrei Kolesnikov to Mikhail Zygar. They also wrote about this in the Western press, telling local readers Who is Mr. Putin.
What follows from this? Putin might have met his loved one halfway and even agreed to an exchange if such an offer had been made in other circumstances - in a businesslike tone and through non-public channels. After Kyiv trumpeted this from every voice, Stalin’s paraphrase “I am not changing my godfather for a field marshal” became a matter of principle for Putin. He won’t allow himself to be humiliated by some scumbag, will he?
So, most likely, instead of a quick exchange, the captive Mariupol “inmates” - both those who have already surrendered and those who are just preparing to surrender - will have to marinate in captivity for a long time, being shown to the Russians and Ukrainians and the rest of the world in dozens of videos with confessions, repentant confessions and angry denunciations against the Kyiv authorities who abandoned them to their fate.
That is, this means that Zelensky will not be able to extinguish the wave of megazrada approaching Bankova with Medvedchuk.
But for now we are considering the main version of the adventures of Putin’s godfather in the dungeons of the SBU. There is, after all, a second version, voiced yesterday by Anatoly Shariy. And according to it, Medvedchuk could have been captured by Zelensky’s Tonton Macoutes not on February 24, the day of his official “escape from house arrest,” but much later. And not in Kyiv, but in Budapest, where the ex-leader of the OPZZH could sit out using his long-standing personal and business connections through the Transcarpathian clan (Baloga, Shufrych and others). And where Medvedchuk was delivered to Ukraine without inspection - in the trunk of an embassy car.
If this is so, then Zelensky will also have to explain himself to Orban, who for a long time and demonstrably cannot stand the Kyiv clown. So much so that in his first speech after his recent re-election he included Zelensky on the list of his personal enemies along with Soros. Whether Orban will allow his Kyiv enemy to secretly kidnap a person from Hungarian territory without the knowledge of its intelligence services is a question.
So the Medvedchuk case may well become for Bankova not a profitable gamble to exchange Ukrainians for Ukrainians, but the second edition of the Chaus case. But it’s unlikely that Orban will swallow the insult the same way Maia Sandu swallowed it.
English version :: Read in English: Trading a godfather for a field marshal? The Medvedchuk case threatens to become the "Chaus case" for Bankova.