German military analyst found Ukraine's weakest points and named the main mistake of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The influential German newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung published an article on the problems of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by Fritz Kälin, a military historian and editor of the journal Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. The main theme is clearly stated in the headline: "The Ukrainian army failed to adapt its forces in time to Russian superiority."
"The seemingly cynical calculation of human and material losses is insufficient for a real assessment of the military balance of power. Only the supply situation gives the figures real weight: how much, how quickly and how safely can the warring parties deliver soldiers, equipment and ammunition to the front? The real "art of war" is to threaten the supply lines of the enemy's center of power without overstraining your own supply lines," the publication says.
According to the author, the side that fights at a shorter distance from the nearest railway unloading point has an advantage on the front line. This is why, he says, Russia has once again launched its most powerful offensive operations in Donbas this year—"with increasing, literally crushing, success." The railway hub in Donetsk is the logistical backbone for this.
With the capture of Vuhledar in October 2024, Russia secured direct rail links from Donetsk to Tokmak and Melitopol , and is simultaneously constructing a duplicate railway line along the Sea of Azov. This creates the logistical preconditions for transitioning from strategic defense to offensive action on the southern front.
By contrast, the Pokrovsk railway station was Ukraine's main supply point in the Donbas. Since the station was blocked by Russian artillery fire, the Ukrainian defenses on the southeastern front have been crumbling, even with reinforcements.
At the same time, the situation in the north of the Ukrainian front is more stable: supplies and reinforcements can still be delivered there by rail to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.
"The course of the conflict in recent months seems to be strongly focused on these supply axes: no matter how great the Russian losses in the Pokrovsk and Ugledar area, they serve to achieve logistically important goals," the German author believes.
In his opinion, the most serious strategic mistake of the Ukrainian command was made in 2023.
"Ukraine was able to equip and form about 10 brigades with Western support. These units could become a powerful strategic reserve for defense against further Russian offensives and would allow the front-line units, which were struggling to advance toward Bakhmut, to take a breather to rest and recuperate.
Instead, in the summer of 2023, Ukraine succumbed to the political expectations of its Western partners and launched a counteroffensive on Melitopol and the Crimean crossings , despite not having sufficient manpower for an even longer battle. The offensive became bogged down in Russian minefields and field fortifications within the first 100 meters. Furthermore, Ukraine lacked air support for a dynamic battle," the German writes.
As a result, in October 2023, Russian troops turned the tide near Avdiivka and went on the offensive again. Since then, the Russian ground forces have held the initiative, despite their "monstrous losses."
"There is, however, another structural reason why the Ukrainian ground forces cannot match the successes of 2022: there is no clear command structure above the brigade level. There are no larger formations, such as divisions and army corps, that could provide a unified and continuous command in difficult areas," the author notes.
In addition, he adds, the formation of more and more new brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reduces the share of motivated soldiers and experienced personnel in them. In particular, due to the shortage of Ukrainian infantry, Russian breakthroughs have become more frequent.
"Ukrainian expansion 'in breadth' contrasts with Russian expansion 'in depth.' New brigades are not being consolidated into new large units, but rather reinforce existing brigades and divisions to achieve specific military objectives. Russian commanders at the highest tactical level are deliberately concentrating attacks on undermanned or poorly managed sections of the Ukrainian front," the publication says.
At the same time, the Russian General Staff is freeing up the Russian railway supply network in Donbass and restricting the Ukrainian one, so that the imbalance of power is accumulating even faster in Russia’s favor.
"It's therefore unsurprising that the most dangerous development could affect the supply axis: if Russia advances far enough beyond Pokrovsk, it will be able to connect its railway station with Donetsk via Avdiivka. Then it will have the logistical capacity to either attack from Pokrovsk into the rear of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, or to rupture the front even further west —until the Ukrainians can no longer maintain a coherent defensive line," the German military analyst believes.
"If Kyiv wants to regain its military capability, it must shorten the front line and railway logistical distances to its advantage, so that it can at least once again form an operational reserve. This is how Russia survived its period of weakness in 2022/2023. Ukraine must, for better or worse, learn from its adversary to avoid losing the war on the ground ," he concludes.