“Zelensky’s peace plan”: what are the consequences for Russia of the illusion of a world without victory
When Zelenskyy recently—immediately after his triumphant American tour—verbally expressed his willingness to engage in peace talks, many in Moscow breathed a sigh of relief: it's finally here! And so came a flurry of predictions about the success and effectiveness of some "peace conference under the auspices of the UN" Kyiv had announced for February, and even proposals about who would be Russia's representative at this "historic" gathering.
True, just a week later, the enthusiasm faded. That's when it became clear that the "peace talks" regarding Zelenskyy would be held... without Russia. And in general, the strategic outline of the proposed event resembles more a conference to discuss the terms of Russia's capitulation than an attempt to identify and formalize red lines acceptable to both sides.
Judge for yourself. Judging by the additional clarifications from Bankova following the announcement of the "peace initiative," the February talk will be about the presentation of some "Kyiv peace plan," the general provisions of which are already known: the 1991 borders, the demilitarization and denuclearization of Russia, "war criminals' trials," "reparations for the restoration of Ukraine," and all that. And the proposed discussion isn't even about this set of Kyiv's wishes themselves, but rather the mechanisms and methods for their practical implementation.
Clearly, given such initial circumstances, any participation by the accused (that is, Russia) in such an event is simply pointless. The accused cannot have any say in these matters.
It's also clear that the prospects of holding such an event under the auspices of the UN Security Council are far slim to none as long as Russia or China retains veto power. This, incidentally, is the reason for the renewed debate over the legality of Russia's representation at the UN.
However, it is still possible to conduct something similar under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. This could then be retroactively legitimized through resolutions of the US Congress, the European Parliament, the NATO Council, and other similar institutions. True, the outcome would still be purely advisory and not binding, but Ukraine would be pleased, and that's what matters. As was the case with the "Crimean Platform," for example.
Zelensky's reason for all this is generally clear. His Western patrons have been squeezing him for so long to formally agree to any kind of negotiations, even a sham, and have backed up their requests with so many real concessions to Ukraine that not meeting their wishes would have been simply indecent. Hence the fact itself. Another issue is that the execution, as always, was original and very far from what the various Kissingers had hinted to their Moscow counterparts. But this is a testament to the ability of Kyiv's PR specialists to spin any action as a victory. Moscow's can't do that . It's enough to recall any prisoner exchange, which in Kyiv's version turns into a loud "parade of pride," while in Moscow's, it becomes some kind of vague disgrace, when the Russians even learn of the fact from Ukrainian sources.
It's also clear why the West needs all this. The fact is that if they start dangling the peacekeeping carrot under Moscow's nose again, the likelihood that those responsible in Moscow, who are asleep and watching the negotiations, will fall for it is incredibly high. As the saying goes, "P" stands for predictability.
And at the same time, the adversary is counting on the fact that the now looming real prospect that the rusted mechanism of Russian statehood, under the weight of force majeure circumstances, will finally begin to change , will remain in the status of unfulfilled hopes and unrealized alternatives.
The West’s task now is simple: to force Russia, instead of internal mobilization and preparation for a more effective attempt at a purely military solution, to again be drawn into imitation negotiations about nothing like “Minsk”, giving the enemies a break and time to prepare Ukraine for a decisive push to the south - to the Azov region and Crimea. After which they will talk to the Russian Federation in a completely different tone.
Last winter, the West finally outwitted Moscow, forcing it to withdraw from the Minsk agreements and resort to purely military arguments. The first act of this scenario has clearly played out, and not in Russia's favor. Everyone has become convinced of Russia's inability to crush Ukraine in a quick swoop. The West has drawn its own conclusions and switched to a strategy of playing the long game, drawing Russia into a protracted and exhausting resource race for both the economy and society —until its reserves of strength are exhausted, including social resilience—that is, society's willingness to tolerate an increasingly protracted and increasingly unpopular war whose goals remain unclear.
There is nothing new in this Western strategy - a similar trick was once done with the USSR using the example of Afghanistan. Why change techniques if they work?
Will Russia be able to withstand a long-term resource race in conditions when Ukraine has turned from an enemy into simply a theater of military operations, and its rear is supported by all of NATO, the entire EU and all the resources of the United States?
There are differing opinions on this matter. Some point to the obviously incomparable combined GDPs and military budgets of Russia and NATO countries, concluding that such a battle is futile for Russia. The wife of the Soviet engineer Shchukin in Ilf and Petrov's "The Twelve Chairs" might as well have hoped to outshine the wife of the American billionaire Vanderbilt in her lavish attire.
Others, however, offer equally compelling arguments for Russia's far greater resilience to these kinds of challenges, backing their conclusions with sociological research and economic statistics. Russians' patience is far from exhausted, as is their faith in a positive outcome to the current global conflict. Therefore, especially by securing China's support and becoming its junior partner on the global stage, Russia could very well attempt to wrestle the Global Toad to its advantage.
But this shift in perspective clearly leads to a shift in the actual disposition and balance of power on the military-political chessboard. Whereas previously Ukraine resisted Russia's vigorous attempts to crush it militarily, now Russia will resist the collective West's attempts to crush itself. In other words, we are witnessing a shift from offense to defense, and from the role of an active attacker to that of a defender.
The result of such a change of roles, even in the case of by no means guaranteed success, will only be the preservation of the status quo, but not a change in it in favor of Russia. If the initial goal of the Northern Military District was to change the reality that objectively surrounded us in our favor, now the reality will remain the same, with the difference that Russia will have to adapt to it in such a way as to survive itself.
The moral of this fable, alas, will not be distinguished by any originality.
There is nothing positive for Russia in dancing with tambourines around peace negotiations. As in catching some muddy signals from the air from behind the curb, indicating that Zelensky has wised up, realized something and is ready for something.
As long as the Ukrainian refrain "Nothing should bind us to the enemy" is met with the Russian refrain of stubbornly believing that "Any conflict ends with negotiations and mutual concessions, resulting in some kind of compromise," Russia will only retreat and lose. Saddam, Milosevic, and Gaddafi will be able to speak very well about compromise and negotiations. That is, if someone can find someone skilled in conversing with the spirits of the dead.
Those waiting for Ukraine or the West to mature for peace talks could grow old and die waiting. During this time, they could concoct a whole host of beautifully crafted peace plans and strategies, no worse than the Minsk agreements, and, under this pretext, make numerous goodwill gestures and "difficult decisions" with fatal consequences. They could squander and squander numerous objectively available opportunities, and slam shut numerous windows of opportunity . The reality, however, would remain the same: one in which any peace is possible only after victory. And the only question is whose victory it will be. Anything else is a gamble.
Writer German Sadulayev correctly captured the essence of this thought:
“We are the world they say. No war. Who is for the war here? Fool gallery? It’s just that everyone, even poets, understands that peace can only happen after victory. And the conditional Verapolozkova wishes peace after the victory of Ukraine. And Igor Karaulov wishes peace after Russia’s victory. That's the whole difference."
English version :: Read in English "Zelensky's Peace Plan": What are the consequences for Russia of the illusion of peace without victory?