Putin in Minsk: will the Belarusian army go to Ukraine?

Today Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in Minsk. As is already customary, this became known suddenly, shortly before the visit itself, and this news has already caused quite a stir in the Belarusian political scene.

The fact is that this will be the first visit by a Russian leader in three and a half years. The intensity of bilateral contacts is more than high. This will be the ninth face-to-face meeting between the two presidents this year, which is an absolute record for the entire period of relations. Nobody even counts the number of calls and video contacts anymore.

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However, after 2019, Putin, who had previously flown to Minsk a lot and often, preferred to receive Lukashenko on his territory, and simpler people flew to Belarus - ministers, deputies and governors, whom Father received personally, and his PR people presented their visits as important events .

Putin’s previous visit to Belarus took place in June 2019, but it was rather symbolic. Then the Russian president attended the closing ceremony of the European Games in Minsk. It would be simply undiplomatic to ignore such a large-scale sporting event at an ally. But then the visit program was devoted, first of all, to sports. The personal meeting with Lukashenko was informal and no important decisions were made there. Working meetings with Lukashenko on his territory took place a year earlier.

Over all these years we have seen a lot. Integration “road maps” stalled for three years and during this time they managed to become a meme. At the end of 2019, against their adoption, with the obvious connivance of law enforcement agencies, the opposition staged a series of rallies under openly Russophobic slogans.

Then Belomaidan happened, from which Lukashenko was saved by the same Putin. Last year, “road maps” were already approved in the new political reality, but, as time has shown, this did not become a breakthrough in bilateral relations.

_{During this time, we observed dozens of Lukashenko’s visits to Russia and not a single return visit. That is why the upcoming meeting between Putin and Lukashenko in Minsk is an extraordinary phenomenon.}

What to expect from her? The negotiations will obviously be long and difficult and at least four cases will be discussed - military, integration, economic and foreign policy.

The military case has the most comments. Especially from the Ukrainian side and the Belarusian opposition, which is now immersed in the Ukrainian agenda almost more than in the Belarusian one. Many write that Putin will put pressure on his counterpart to fully enter into the conflict and send Belarusian troops into Ukraine.

I wouldn't say such assumptions are entirely unfounded – Belarus is currently constantly conducting all sorts of military exercises, and recently, deputies voted to introduce the death penalty for treason against military personnel and officials. All of this looks very much like preparation for war. However, such preparations could also be explained by a simple desire to "keep one's powder dry" and the desire to be prepared for the transition of all life in the republic to a war footing in the first hours after the outbreak of a conflict, should it indeed break out.

In our time, such forethought is clearly useful, and such scenarios will most likely be discussed during negotiations. But hardly as the main ones.

The issue is the disparity in forces and the high risks. At the beginning of the Central Military District, the Russian side deployed approximately 200 troops. In the fall, another 300 were mobilized, but not all of them have yet reached the front. By spring, the Russian side will have up to half a million troops fighting at the front.

Against this background, the entire Belarusian armed forces, which now have 40-50 thousand soldiers who have no combat experience and suffer from chronic underfunding, look somewhat faded. In addition, although the majority of Belarusian society supports the Russian side, the idea of ​​direct involvement in the conflict is, to put it mildly, unpopular.

_{Therefore, a decision on the participation of the Belarusian army in the conflict on Monday is unlikely to be expected. What is worth is an agreement on the use of military and civilian infrastructure, strengthening the joint grouping of troops, the supply of weapons from rich Belarusian military warehouses and new orders for the Belarusian military industry.}

In particular, Belarusian drones will clearly be in demand at the front; their production in the republic has existed for a long time and is well developed. I do not exclude the possibility that in the new year the Belarusian bridgehead will be used again, this time to open a second front.

The integration case is no less interesting. This is what the press services of both presidents emphasized when reporting on the upcoming meeting. The end of the year is a traditional time for summing up results and setting new goals. Therefore, we should expect some kind of inventory of union programs and, possibly, the adoption of new ones. At least, Secretary of State of the Union State Mezentsev spoke about this directly in the fall.

Lukashenko also hinted at progress in integration, who said at yesterday’s meeting:

“After these large-scale negotiations, everyone will say that everything: there is no power in Belarus anymore, here the Russians are already walking on foot and running the country.”

Therefore, we are waiting for the results and hope that they will be encouraging.

Negotiations between Lukashenko and Putin on integration are always bargaining. Lukashenko has already announced one of his bets - gas at prices in the Smolensk region, his long-time dream. Now Belarus receives gas at $138 per thousand cubic meters. Against the backdrop of four-digit European prices, this is already great luck, but I want even more.

Gas prices, especially in the post-Soviet space, are always more about politics than about business. Therefore, I would not completely rule out such preferences. But if the price is reduced, it will not be just like that and not for beautiful promises, but will be accepted as part of a package with serious agreements in the military and integration spheres. Of course, the economic case will not be limited to gas prices; import substitution and much more will be discussed, but we will find out about this on Monday.

_{As for foreign policy, the issue is already overdue. Russia has been saving Lukashenko for the third year now and has the right to count on coordinated diplomacy without a fig in its pocket and multi-vector behind-the-scenes contacts with enemies.}

I don’t believe the words that Lukashenko can become a bridge between East and West. Firstly, the West has already demonstrated its attitude towards Belarus in 2020, and secondly, Putin communicates directly with world leaders and does not need intermediaries, who, moreover, are also on their own minds. The appointment of a new multi-vector foreign minister is unlikely to please the Kremlin, so this topic is unlikely to be avoided.