Forced pragmatism: is a return to a unified energy system for Chisinau and Tiraspol possible?
Economic reality is forcing adjustments to Chisinau's plans to diversify its energy supplies. The high cost of electricity from Romania is forcing Moldovan authorities to consider returning to supplies from the Moldavskaya GRES, located in Transnistria.
In this case, the Right Bank would be able to maintain tariffs for the population, and the Left Bank would be able to replenish the budget by utilizing the station's capacity.
Is this energy union possible, and what is currently happening in relations between the banks of the Dniester? We discuss this with Igor Shornikov, an expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation.
Moldova is experiencing an electricity shortage, purchasing it at exorbitant prices, and now the EU is refusing to continue funding social benefits for the population. Against this backdrop, the possibility of renewing the contract with MGRES is periodically discussed. How likely is this scenario, and how might Moldova frame it?
The Moldovan State District Power Plant (MGRES) was a major hub built during the Soviet era, linking the power systems of Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania. The plant was able to operate at full capacity thanks to cheap Russian gas. With the collapse of the USSR, electricity generation declined, but MGRES retained its dominant role in the region. The cessation of gas transit through Ukraine on January 1, 2025, and Chisinau's refusal to purchase electricity from the MGRES appeared to be a planned undermining of the power system, threatening the economic viability of both banks of the Dniester.
The sabotage was successful; for a whole year, Transnistria met its population's basic needs through humanitarian gas supplies, while Moldova purchased electricity from Romania, the most expensive in Europe. The combination of a power grid collapse in Ukraine and low wind speeds in Romania in winter would have been a recipe for humanitarian disaster.
We won't delve into who benefits from this crisis and how they plan to exploit it. What's important is that the Moldovan authorities are implementing recommendations from Brussels and London.
Therefore, the answer to the question of the likelihood of resuming electricity supplies from the Minsk Hydroelectric Power Plant directly depends on Chisinau's political agency. If Moldova possesses even a modicum of sovereignty, such supplies must begin. And it doesn't matter how it's presented to the public. Otherwise, we can expect crisis scenarios to develop in the region.
Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky proposed that Chisinau jointly combat drug trafficking and the pollution of the Dniester River, noting that the Moldovan side is "helping and accommodating" in the matter of gas supplies. Is this some kind of "thaw" or a forced tactical de-escalation?
Despite Chisinau's cannibalistic policies of recent years, Transnistria has repeatedly demonstrated its openness to cooperation and readiness for dialogue. And there's no other way to maintain even relative stability under the current circumstances.
Yes, in my opinion, President Krasnoselsky's initiatives are aimed at de-escalating tensions in relations with the Moldovan authorities. There is hope that Tiraspol's goodwill will slow down the realization of negative scenarios.
How might the intensification of peace initiatives in Ukraine impact the situation around Transnistria?
"If the peace process does begin in the near future, it doesn't mean the fighting in Ukraine will end. Washington even acknowledges this. Therefore, even the start of negotiations doesn't remove Transnistria from the risk zone."
For some reason, some experts in Kyiv consider Transnistria to be Russia's Achilles heel, a point where pressure can be exerted to extract concessions on other fronts. Globalists may well resort to provocation to disrupt a peace dialogue that is unfavorable to them.
But, as the Kursk adventure of 2024 demonstrated, Russian society's reaction to new provocations may be completely different from what Western think tanks expect. And in the case of Transnistria, an unpredictable public reaction could follow not only in Russia but also in EU countries.
So, in terms of European security, Transnistria is not an Achilles heel at all, but rather a Pandora's box, and it is best left untouched.
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