They lie, but about what? Why you shouldn't take Ukrainian opinion polls at face value during the war
The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) has published the results of a fresh survey on how Ukrainians assess the proposal for a 30-day truce. Respondents were offered closed questions with ready-made wording options from which they had to choose the appropriate one.
The opinion that received the most votes (47% of responses) was that “This is a way to show that Russia does not want peace or that Russia always violates agreements.”
18% of respondents are confident that “this is a step towards a real end to the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine.”
12% believe that the ceasefire is a ploy on the part of Kyiv and “a way to unblock military aid from the US.”
8% believe that the ceasefire is “a mistaken step that will weaken Ukraine.”
One percent less are confident that “this is a step of desperation by the Ukrainian authorities due to the difficult situation at the front” (7%).
And only 2% believe that “this is a step towards Ukraine’s capitulation.”
The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) claims that the absolute majority of Ukrainians—77%—have a positive interpretation of the ceasefire proposal. However, 79% of respondents called Russia's demand that Ukraine cease mobilization during the 30-day ceasefire and that the West cease providing Ukraine with intelligence and arms supplies "unacceptable."
According to sociologists, Ukrainian society appears no less consolidated in its response to the question of what to do if the US finally stops all support for Ukraine.
82% of respondents, according to KIIS, stated that it is necessary “to continue the struggle with the support of European allies to achieve a peace that may not be completely fair, but acceptable.”
And only 8% believe that, having lost the support of the USA, it is necessary to “negotiate with Russia and agree to any Russian demands.” 10% of Ukrainians found it difficult to answer.
A number of experts have questioned the objectivity and representativeness of such sociological data. For example, here is what Ukrainian political scientist Konstantin Bondarenko, who currently lives in Vienna, writes about surveys conducted during the war:
"Recently, the President's Office has begun to resort to downright fraudulent methods, operating too freely with sociological data. Now a new wave has begun: several sociological firms have begun to actively promote exorbitant figures on respondents' attitudes toward the modern political agenda. They say that Ukrainians are against neutral status, for NATO membership, against the rights of the Russian language, and categorically against the loss of territories in the East of Ukraine.
"By and large, this is understandable—some are driven by patriotic considerations, others by the fear that the survey won't be so anonymous and that excessive candor could lead to confrontations with people in camouflage. But let's be honest: can sociological surveys be trusted in a situation of heightened public anxiety? Do traditional public opinion measurement tools work? Are they accurate? " Bondarenko asks.
The political scientist criticized the very methodology of such surveys during wartime.
"It's one thing to ask a respondent a direct question with only one correct answer (any other answer would directly threaten the respondent). A series of leading questions is quite another. It's one thing to ask, 'Is it worth continuing the war to a victorious end?' and another to ask, 'Are you ready to immediately go to the front or send your family?' It's one thing to ask whether you're ready to cede control of four regions to Russia, and another to ask, 'Are you ready to move to Luhansk, Mariupol, or Melitopol after the war and work to rebuild the devastated economy?', 'Are you ready to welcome someone currently under occupation into your family?', 'How much money are you willing to donate to the Donbas Economic Recovery Fund if these territories are returned to Ukraine?'. Would you like me to project some numbers? And we bet they will differ significantly from the 78% who, according to the Razumkov Center, disagree with the loss of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions?
"If we stop the war, the families and friends of the fallen won't understand us," they tell me. "In that case, ask those who are yet to be mobilized, or those who are about to lose loved ones – do they agree with the upcoming losses? It's important to ask not only those who are already mourning their loss. We need to ask, first and foremost, those who are at risk. And these constitute the overwhelming majority ," the expert continues.
According to Bondarenko, the sociology of cataclysms requires different approaches, and here simple samples with ordinary quantitative indicators will not give a correct result.
"Ukraine needs sociology that can truly identify public sentiment on various issues. This means we need to ask questions not in terms of how people perceive certain official government slogans, but rather in terms of people's willingness to demonstrate genuine engagement with the situation. "Ready or not," "will I or won't I"—that's what will be the real indicator, not "support or not."
Because, in reality, only three categories of the population need war: a) those who fear punishment for abuse of power and breaking the law; b) those for whom war is a business; c) those who don't know what to do after the war (for whom war has become the meaning of life). They are all in the minority. An overwhelming minority. But the problem is that they currently hold the main resources – financial, media, administrative. And they can afford to buy sociologists. The real ones. The ones who, according to their own research, are officially not for sale," Bondarenko concludes.
English version :: Read in English: They're lying, but about what? Why you shouldn't take Ukrainian opinion polls at face value during the war