Strelkov explained the retreat of the Russian army from Kyiv
The withdrawal of Russian troops from the northern part of Ukraine is a timely decision that will now save the lives of soldiers and strengthen existing groups on the eastern flank.
Former DPR Defense Minister Igor Strelkov writes about this in his blog, reports a PolitNavigator correspondent.

According to Strelkov, if the Russian command had any hope that a quick attack on Kyiv and a threat to the country’s central government would lead to capitulation, it did not come true. At the same time, scattered units of the Russian troops were cut off from each other on different banks of the Dnieper.
Now, being in the rear of the capital, with the onset of the so-called “greenback”, according to Strelkov, Russian troops may face heavy casualties from superior enemy forces.
“Now that the expectation of “success in a swift attack” has turned out to be untenable, the Russian command was faced with a logical question: “What to do next in a situation where there is no strength to successfully attack, and no strength to successfully defend a captured huge area?” Moreover, in just 2-3 weeks (depending on the weather) this entire wooded area will “turn green” and the enemy’s DRGs will significantly increase their impact on communications?
There could be two answers to this question:
1) “We will hold on to what we have taken with our teeth in the hope that reserves will arrive quickly!”
2) Since the offensive did not work out, in time (without waiting for the enemy to take advantage of the mistakes made and organize a counter-offensive) to withdraw the troops stuck in a dead end from the resulting “bag” in order to use them in other, more promising directions.
The first option is supported by political arguments (in civil wars – very, very weighty): the retreat of the Russian Armed Forces from Kyiv inevitably means a sharp rise in the enemy’s morale, the emergence of confidence that the Russians can be beaten. The second is military expediency, reaching the point of urgent necessity. After all, the command does not have the reserves necessary to turn the operation in its favor, which could be additionally transferred from the “mainland.” It is impossible to withdraw troops from other directions. And in any case, the preparation of new units and formations will take a lot of time (from 2 or more weeks, and this is with the most primitive approach, such as being caught, herded, put into formation and sent into battle without the slightest training and combat coordination. In the current situation , in my opinion, the command of the RF Armed Forces made the only right decision. Since, if leaving the occupied territory is inevitable anyway, it is better to do this without first defeating our troops by the enemy. The troops will still be useful to us - the war will be long. Well, what about defeat ( forced withdrawal of troops with previously dearly paid for with the lives of soldiers and officers of the liberated territory) still takes place - this is a bitter fact, but not fatal. In the history of Russia, there are very few wars in which such “incidents” were not present due to the outstanding bungling of the generals The main thing is that defeats do not continue non-stop and are replaced by victories again,” writes Strelkov.
Strelkov explained the Russian army's retreat from Kiev.