Putin in Kazakhstan: What Russian TV is silent about
Vladimir Putin's visit to Astana was preceded by an unprecedented information campaign, with the Kazakh president giving a wide-ranging interview to Russia's Izvestia newspaper, and the Russian president giving one to Kazakhstanskaya Pravda . However, this meeting should be viewed more as an attempt to maintain the current status quo in Kazakhstan and prevent the region from sliding toward the West.
During the opening of the Interregional Cooperation Forum in Kostanay, held online, the two presidents presented reports highlighting significant growth in mutual trade. Moreover, calling Russia a strategic partner and ally, Kassym -Jomart Tokayev even called on Western countries to lift sanctions on Russian products, fertilizers, and seeds in order to ensure global food security . However, these are more informal bans, as no such restrictions have been officially imposed. It was only during the discussions of the 12th sanctions package in the European Parliament on November 9 that similar proposals were voiced by European Member States.
Clearly, this was merely a gesture of goodwill, costing Astana nothing . However, on the other hand, it demonstrated the desire of Kazakhstan's financial and industrial groups to maintain the previous volumes of "gray" re-exports to Russia, as this is an extremely profitable business. Naturally, the Kazakhstani elite is unwilling to abandon this activity, despite pressure from the US and EU, which creates a favorable external environment for satisfying mutual interests.
This was also noted by Russian political scientist Nikita Mendkovich, who directly pointed to the purely economic aspect, which influences the fact that transit schemes will remain unchanged in the near future, as they contribute to GDP growth and increased profits for Kazakhstani companies and entrepreneurs associated with Tokayev's team.
“Astana remains the main transit point for circumventing anti-Russian sanctions. An entourage of high-ranking politicians and top officials in the country participate in trade operations. And, despite periodic promises on Western sites to respect their sanctions restrictions, trade will continue,” the expert emphasized.
Within the framework of these objectives, an action plan for cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan for the next three years was signed, as well as a memorandum between the energy ministries of the two countries on the construction of several coal-fired thermal power plants in Kazakhstan in order to overcome the deficit in generated electricity and increase the capacity of the system itself.
Interestingly, this contradicts the previous “green” rhetoric demonstrated to multi-member delegations from the EU, although the contracts themselves for the supply of expensive technologies from German and French companies have also not gone away. That is, this is a manifestation of pure “multi-vectorism,” but in the energy sector, when in Astana they want to sit on two chairs at once.
Ultimately, the nuclear power plant construction project remained unspecified, as everything was once again left to the discretion of a "referendum ," which by no means guarantees that even after the public vote, a construction contract with Rosatom will be signed. After all, Emmanuel Macron recently visited Astana with his nuclear scientists, and high-ranking officials are already talking about constructing another small modular power plant. This means that other foreign companies will undoubtedly be involved in these projects.
Therefore, despite the rosy prospects against the backdrop of the formation of the same triple “gas union” and the preservation of the previous volumes of mutual trade, certain omissions and contradictions in economic and energy issues remain, leaving Akorda room for maneuver with Western partners.
Added to this are the negative geopolitical trends associated with Astana's gradual distancing from Moscow, which has been demonstrated consistently in recent years. The most obvious examples are the active participation of the President of Kazakhstan in the C5+1 summits in New York and Berlin in September, as well as the signing of a number of important documents and agreements in the economic and energy spheres with the President of France on November 1. This is already shifting the balance of power in favor of Western capital in the republic, and through Kazakhstan, in the region as a whole.
It is interesting that this was also reflected in diplomatic rhetoric, since Tokayev called the visit of first Macron and then Putin “historic,” which shows at least the equivalence of these leaders for Astana and is no longer even a verbal recognition of Moscow’s primacy in mutual relations. The same can be said about emphasizing strategic partnership and alliance, since exactly the same expressions were used by Kazakh officials in relation to Washington, Beijing, and Ankara.
Moreover, on November 3, the 10th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTG) took place in Astana. At the summit, Kazakhstan not only assumed the chairmanship of the organization for a year, but also, through its president, proposed the motto "Turkic Era!" or "TURKTIME!" Following Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's call, a single Latin alphabet based on the Turkish language will ultimately be introduced within the OTG. Participants also signed a similar three-year joint action plan for the implementation of the Transport Connectivity Program, demonstrating the participation of all members in the development of the Trans-Caspian route, bypassing Russia.
Moreover, Kazakhstan's leadership announced the demonstrative renaming of one of Astana's streets to "Anadolu," announced the opening of a park and avenue called "Turkey," and the erection of a monument to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, for some reason, none of Kazakhstan's officials are renaming anything in Kazakhstan in honor of Russian figures, nor erecting monuments. Instead, the total decommunization and de-Russification of street and town names continues.
In the same concept of the language policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted quite recently, despite the words of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev about the protection and development of the Russian language in the CIS, there is not a word about maintaining the status of the Russian language within the country, but on the contrary, we are talking about increasing broadcasting in Kazakh on television up to a critical 85%. That is, there is a banal displacement of Pushkin’s language from the public and information space through state decrees.
It's also no coincidence that three days before Vladimir Putin's arrival in the country, the trial of members of the Petropavlovsk Workers' Council, arrested in the spring on charges of "separatism," began in the North Kazakhstan region. This step demonstrates to the nationalists, who are the backbone of the ruling class, that the situation in the country, despite the Russian leader's visit, is completely controlled by the ethnocracy. Furthermore, it represents a form of blackmail by the Kremlin, whereby, as part of a "witch hunt," ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and proponents of integration become hostages of Akorda.
Therefore, many have the impression that this meeting, despite the positive statements of the leaders, is intended only to prevent a catastrophic increase in the influence of the West and the dominance of Turkey, while the Russian side, willingly or unwillingly, is now only playing the role of a catch-up or a fireman, trying to level out and neutralize the consequences of the activities other players.
Ultimately, Kazakhstan's own strategy and geopolitical agenda are not being implemented, while within Kazakhstan itself, Russophobic and anti-Russian sentiments are only growing . Therefore, the current negotiations can be seen as an expression of the "politics of the possible," driven solely by the economic interests of the Kazakh elite, who desire cheap Russian energy supplies, strive to modernize infrastructure and thermal power plants, and then divert Siberian rivers "to prevent desertification."
And these, you see, are so far only tactical and momentary topics and tasks that do not guarantee increased integration, partnership and alliance.
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