Project "Novorossiya", or just an old "rake"?
Author: Andrey Safonov, political scientist, Tiraspol, ex-Minister of Education of Transnistria
Events in Ukraine continue to develop according to the scenario of the confrontation between Moldova and Transnistria in 1990-1992, only even worse. Our lessons remain unheeded, but our “rake” is stepped on several times a day. Moreover, sometimes in the media, and on the Internet in general, you come across the conclusion: what is happening is the implementation of the “Novorossiya” project, supposedly designed to “close” the pro-Russian arc of Donetsk-Lugansk-Kharkov-Nikolaev-Odessa-Tiraspol.
Since the Transnistrian theme flashed here, well, let’s think together, dear readers of different views, countries and peoples!
We have a lot in common
I don't know about anyone else, but as an expert, I've always been wary of overly contrived scenarios. Especially when these scenarios are overly global and conspiratorial. But we'd better start thinking, as they say, from the ground up. Let's see what similarities exist between what's happening in Ukraine now and what happened on the Dniester in 1990-1992. This will help us draw some conclusions.
Firstly, we, too, initially considered resolving the problem by force, refusing to negotiate with the Transnistrian side and issuing ultimatums demanding disarmament. For example, on March 28, 1992, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur demanded that Transnistria (where the republic had been proclaimed on September 2, 1990) lay down its arms within 48 hours. There were other ultimatums as well. Nothing came of these, but the opportunity to find a compromise had been lost.
Secondly, we at least had occasional ceasefires, which, admittedly, were violated. But in Ukraine, even that is missing. The authorities in Kyiv are saying that the "anti-terrorist operation" will continue. As in 1992 on the Dniester, analyzing the situation in Ukraine now, the military option is a dead end. As of now, the military defeat of the federalists has failed. Is there any reason to believe it will succeed in the future? In our country, the Moldovan authorities saw additional troops and volunteer units as a solution. The outcome is well known.
Third, proposals are being made in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to strip certain deputies of their mandates, and entire factions are being expelled from sessions. I can testify: this has already happened in Moldova (though they didn't think of expelling entire factions here). The effect is not just zero, but negative. This only embittered the opponents of Chisinau at the time, and the Chisinau authorities lost one of the channels of communication with Transnistria, which allowed them to save face and avoid being accused of "capitulating" to the "separatists."
Fourth, the desire to hold presidential elections on May 25 at any cost, hoping the US will approve them and everything will "resolve" itself, will achieve nothing. Here's what we had, if you're interested. On December 1, 1991, the first nationwide presidential elections in the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic were held, and even earlier, corresponding referendums on the creation of Transnistria. And on December 8, 1991, a president of Moldova was elected (also for the first time and also by nationwide vote). Chisinau was eager to hold these elections in Transnistria as well. The authorities in Tiraspol even allowed Mircea Snegur, a candidate for Moldovan president, into the Transnistrian capital to visit a baby food factory. He came. He visited. He spoke. He left. But control of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic remained with the Transnistrian authorities, because they had held their referendums and elections earlier. The same is true in Ukraine: the referendum in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions took place on May 11, but the presidential election is two weeks behind. It is lagging behind the processes in the "rebellious" regions and no longer offers a political solution. Because the movement for independence in certain regions is always, in principle, broader than the choice of the leader.
The gist of the matter is this: Ukraine, unfortunately, is experiencing the same scenario that the former Moldavian SSR experienced almost a quarter of a century ago. And it's happening not because someone launched some "Novorossiya project," but because the former Soviet republics have much in common. Including "time bombs." They just explode at different times.
Learn from the past
The Ukrainian SSR, like the Moldavian SSR, included regions with different historical, political, cultural, and mental traditions, and sometimes even with different ethnic compositions. We will now recall all of this together.
Firstly , in the former MSSR, there was Transnistria, firmly oriented toward the Russian-Ukrainian space, as well as Bessarabia, located between the Prut and Dniester rivers, where pro-Romanian sentiments were always felt to varying degrees. In the Greater Country, these contradictions were muted, but when the question of independently choosing a path arose, they erupted. The same is true in Ukraine: it's hard to imagine a monument to Joseph Stalin in the center of Lviv, or to Stepan Bandera in Luhansk. It's a shame that the example of the Moldovan-Transnistrian "explosion" teaches no one a lesson in this regard.
Secondly, both here and in Ukraine, there are foreign states that have historically profited from turmoil. Romania, for example, has a genuine claim to the former Soviet Moldova: its president, Traian Băsescu, has already declared unification with the former MSSR a "national idea." His words have been widely reported in the media. Meanwhile, Poland, whose ardent "compassion" for Ukrainians could make even a primary school student smile, is clearly seeking to establish a de facto protectorate over Ukraine (or part of it). Neither the Right Sector fighters nor the Donbas militias should forget: Poland is unlikely to sincerely consider Lviv a Ukrainian city. If I'm wrong, correct me. They also haven't forgotten in Bucharest that from 1941-1944, "Greater Romania" included not only modern-day Moldova and Transnistria, but also Chernivtsi and Odesa. Poland and Romania are clearly waiting for Ukrainians to exhaust each other and their entire country in civil war. So wouldn't it be better to seek agreement before the gulf between people and regions becomes insurmountable, to the delight of foreign "well-wishers"?
Third, just as the Moldovan authorities in 1990-1992, the Ukrainian authorities are now lagging behind with their settlement proposals. If Kyiv has its own clearly formulated compromise model of government, it should be offered alongside federalization proposals. Then federalists should consider it, discuss it, and put forward arguments for its acceptance or rejection. Then official Kyiv would score points. As in Chisinau in the early 90s, a blatant rejection of the federal model appears strange and a dead end, as this is a common form of compromise worldwide.
Fourth, the Kyiv authorities declare that they will not negotiate with "rebels," "separatists," and "terrorists," because, in Kyiv's view, they "represent no one." I report: it was exactly the same with us. Chisinau took the same position. The result is this: the failure to achieve a military victory was followed by negotiations and the signing of a variety of agreements between Moldova and Transnistria. Negotiations on a political settlement are still ongoing. Yet, Chisinau does not control the territory of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic. Perhaps Kyiv considers itself luckier and more victorious than its colleagues in Chisinau... But isn't it better to learn from others' mistakes and not take matters to extremes?
Fifth, events are being held in Ukraine that opponents of the Kyiv authorities call "imitation roundtables." This refers to the forum of May 14, which was devoid of federalists and featured no speech by a representative of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This is familiar to us. Official Chisinau, declaring in the 90s that "separatists do not represent the population of the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova," put forward a (seemingly successful) idea: "We will talk to representatives of local councils and Transnistrian businesses." They, they claimed, would convince the "separatists" to return to Chisinau's authority. Clearly, nothing came of this idea, divorced from reality. Both on the Dniester then and on the Dnipro now, we are talking about mass movements that put forward their own leaders. Negotiations will have to be conducted with these leaders and the structures created by the masses. Likewise, the federalists of Ukraine will have to negotiate with the authorities in Kyiv, because that is the reality.
It’s just better that the negotiations start early so that the number of victims does not become too large.
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The Church deserves a separate discussion. Unfortunately, here too, the tragic experiences of Ukraine and Moldova have much in common. Only in Ukraine, they're trying to "run" the "Moldovan path" as quickly as possible, which carries more dire consequences than in Moldova.
Seeking to break away from the former USSR and draw closer to Romania, the Chisinau authorities in the 1990s gave the green light to the Romanian Orthodox Church's infiltration of the former Soviet republic. A schism was orchestrated within the Metropolitanate of Moldova, with the so-called Bessarabian Metropolitanate emerging under the auspices of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Not only Transnistria, but also the Gagauz Autonomous Region, the Bulgarian-populated Taraclia region, and the overwhelming majority of believers in the purely Moldovan areas did not accept this. Enmity and discord only intensified. Now, as can be seen from the media, there are politicians in Ukraine who want to quickly rid themselves of the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in record time and even transfer its property in Ukraine to the Kyiv Patriarchate. The media's reports of the expulsion of several hierarchs from the country, such as Archbishop Agathangel of Odessa and Izmail, prompts such thoughts. I'd like to be wrong, but our experience shows that this will only exacerbate discord within the country, as the east and, to a large extent, the south of Ukraine will not accept it. On the contrary, a unified voice of Orthodox hierarchs, united by a desire to guide their flock onto the path of peace, would greatly help calm passions.
Incidentally, we must also understand this: the current leadership in Kyiv, not pursuing a course of dialogue and compromise, is unable to consolidate society, and here's another reason. Of course, I'm judging from open sources and the media, but still... In a country where the vast majority of the population is Orthodox, the acting president and the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada are Protestants, and the prime minister is Greek Catholic. Confessionally, they represent a clear minority of the population. And yet, even on the front lines, it's mostly Orthodox Christians who are fighting each other! This isn't the Middle Ages, of course, but a shared faith still plays a significant role. For example, in 1992, this commonality largely enabled us to move from war to peace relatively quickly.
In a situation where war is flaring up, the Church should not be the next battlefield, but the most important collective peacemaker.
The nature of the confrontation in Ukraine is purely Ukrainian!
The events in Ukraine, it seems, were not engineered to fit the aforementioned "Novorossiya project." The split in Ukraine arose spontaneously. Almost a quarter of a century apart, the diverse "inner workings" of the former Soviet republics are exploding.
Looking from the outside, from Ukraine's neighboring Transnistria, one comes to the conclusion: by balancing between East and West, Ukraine could still maintain its integrity and functionality. For how long is another matter, requiring a separate discussion. But, as before in Moldova, attempts to turn the country strictly toward the West (and in our case, toward Romania) are causing a practically inevitable split. In Ukraine, all these processes were accelerated by the United States, which, following its pattern of instigating violent actions during the next Olympics, facilitated the violent change of power in Kyiv on February 22. Washington, which is undeniable today, has set the goal of forcibly tearing Ukraine out of the former USSR. Poland is also working alongside the Americans in this effort.
Now that the son of the US Vice President and the ex-President of Poland are infiltrating Ukrainian business structures, their common motives are becoming clearer...
Instead of a conclusion, or our “rake” is at the doorstep...
Being realists, Transnistrians understand that people with very different views live in our fraternal Ukraine. But it was precisely these very same people who came to the aid of the PMR in 1992. That's why we would like to warn Ukrainians against stepping on our "rake," which will soon be 25 years old.
These “rakes” carried out their gloomy “weeding” even when there was no talk about any “Novorossiya”. And it seems to us that now in Ukraine it is better not to use them, but to seek peace and harmony.
Well, if our words and our experience do not seem convincing to someone, if someone continues to be attracted to our “rakes” - well, we are unable to prevent this.
I just feel sorry for the people...
English version :: Read in English The "Novorossiya" Project, or Just the Same Old "Rake"?