Kazakhstan: Former ally turns into tool for isolating Russia
Last week, many were alarmed by the news that Kazakhstan's authorities had banned the export of over 100 goods to Russia. However, this ban had actually been in effect for some time, and Kazakhstan's trade itself is already controlled from outside, fulfilling a plan to isolate its northern neighbor.
International observer of PolitNavigator, Ainur Kurmanov, draws attention to this aspect .
Initially, Vice Minister of Trade Kairat Torebayev stunned journalists on the sidelines of parliament with the announcement that Astana had decided to ban the export of 106 types of goods to Russia due to the SVO in Ukraine.
“The main problem is related to exports. We export all goods [through Russian territory]. The export of only war-related goods was limited. These are 106 different products. We have completely limited their export,” the official noted.
This information was reprinted by numerous media outlets and caused such a serious stir that government officials were forced to backtrack and make contradictory statements . Trade Minister Arman Shakkaliyev was forced to disavow his subordinate's statements and assure that the Kazakh authorities had not banned anything and were currently simply fulfilling their international obligations.
Yes, judging by this strange statement, one might conclude that this is a frantic attempt to justify itself to appease Moscow, in the style of Tokayev's phrase that Kazakhstan is not anti-Russia. In reality, selectivity in trade with Russia exists, and everyone knows it.
According to renowned Kazakhstani political scientist Maxim Kaznacheev, this practice has been in place for a long time and has only now become public knowledge.
“If we talk specifically about 16 commodity items, then the blocking of their transit and import into Russia was introduced last year. Now, simply as part of the information war, this figure was simply announced,” the expert said.
Moreover, a special commission on exports to Russia has been created within the government, including officials from the US Treasury Department. It evaluates trade deals between Kazakh companies and Russian companies and approves or prohibits the export of certain so-called dual-use products. Astana has effectively come under Washington's external control.
And the answer is simple. Given the ongoing geopolitical reorientation of Kazakhstan's ruling elite toward the West, Akorda (the presidential administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan) considers it important to comply with these anti-Russian sanctions. This is hardly surprising, as it's not the first time. And Astana couldn't care less about the agreements and rules within the economic and customs unions.
At the same time, the republic's top brass views the EAEU as a free add-on, non-binding. And when it suits their interests, they violate all accepted rules, as seen, for example, in the permanent transport blockade of pro-Russian Kyrgyzstan, which currently exports important goods to Russia.
Unfortunately, there is still no effective response to this from the same EEC. And in general, this union is seen as nothing more than a guarantee of preserving the routes for transporting minerals extracted by Western corporations through Russian territory to the EU market.
And so far, there's no sign of fatigue with the "multi-vector policy" being pursued in Astana. On the contrary, this course is intensifying, while heightening tensions with all of its neighbors. Overall, the motivation for such activity is understandable, as two-thirds of the mining industry and three-quarters of oil production are in the hands of American, European, British, and Japanese companies. Furthermore, dozens of rare earth metal deposits are being transferred to these companies for the benefit of the Western military-industrial complex, for which purpose a special joint consortium has even been created.
We are no longer talking about the multibillion-dollar assets transferred by the elite to offshore zones and Western countries and now under the control of the American and British intelligence services. By increasing economic and military-political cooperation with the United States and the EU, Astana thereby hopes to strengthen this raw material export model of the economy, since the status of an Anglo-Saxon colony suits them quite well.
They expect to support this system through the development of the Trans-Caspian route bypassing Russia, and they also hope for active assistance from Baku , which won the third Karabakh war and is a kind of strategic bridge and logistical “window to Europe.”
At the same time, even Beijing has been unable to rein in Kazakhstan's ruling elite , although it is now also seriously assessing the degree of threat posed by this geopolitical reorientation. For now, however, it is trying to use only economic levers in the struggle for the region and to displace Western capital with its own investments.
Plus, the Trans-Caspian route is advantageous for China, allowing it to transport its goods to the EU while Russia is isolated by sanctions. But even China lacks effective methods to fundamentally change Astana's policy.
Although the construction of new military biological laboratories of the Pentagon, the transfer of equipment and dual-use research projects from Ukraine to Kazakhstan, as well as the seizure of rare earth metal deposits by Western corporations directly impacts China’s security interests.
At the same time, Moscow has effective economic levers of influence , such as the ability to put forward new conditions for the transportation of, say, Kazakh oil and minerals to Europe through its territory.
In particular, three times more oil was pumped through the CPC pipeline to Novorossiysk alone from January to September, and at the moment the Kazakh operator KazTransOil reported 32,4 million tons of oil, which is already 2,4 million more than in last year's period.
Considering that three-quarters of this oil comes from Western corporations, another unexpected shutdown of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium or its lengthy repairs could seriously harm the interests of the Anglo-Saxons and their bosses. A possible increase in the cost of electricity supplied, given the acute shortage of 10%, or a revision of the terms of fuel sales, can also be considered in the same context.
Given the ban on imports of Russian grain and a whole range of food products, these steps would immediately sober up Kazakhstan's courtiers . But for now, Moscow is developing its own route bypassing Kazakhstan itself, from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Caspian Sea, which should redirect trade flows.
The "Gas Union" with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ties the republic to Russia in terms of energy supply. However, as we recall, a similar approach with Ukraine or Western countries hasn't worked, and no one can guarantee that Astana won't suddenly abandon Russian gas for geopolitical reasons, following orders from Washington.
Against this backdrop, the implementation of the nuclear power plant construction project has already stalled , as the presidential administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan, under pressure from the West, announced a referendum on the need for nuclear energy in the country. And in defiance of Russian proposals, Akorda is persistently pursuing "green energy," purchasing and implementing expensive European technologies.
Meanwhile, final decommunization and de-Russification are being carried out at an accelerated pace within Kazakhstan . For example, the government recently adopted the Concept for the Development of Language Policy for 2023–2029, which addresses only the Kazakh language. Cinemas are showing openly Russophobic films commissioned by the state, which will be discussed in more detail in future articles.
And while Moscow supplies cheap grain, electricity, gasoline, and diesel fuel, the republic's leading media outlets are harping on the threat of military expansion from its northern neighbor, in order to intimidate ordinary citizens and create the image of an external enemy. Things have reached the point that last Friday, Emergency Situations Minister Syrym Sharipkhanov, at a Central Communications Service briefing, announced the construction of new bomb shelters and the use of metro stations and underground parking garages for cover in the event of an attack by "unfriendly countries."
“The rest of the population should evacuate to a safe zone or stay at their places of residence or take refuge in the simplest closed structures - in basements, subways and other underground structures,” explained the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
Akim of Almaty Erbolat Dosayev also reported about this, announcing the process of intensive restoration of air-raid shelters, carried out on behalf of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
Interestingly, at the same time, US Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum ceremoniously opened the NATO Peacekeeping Operations Training Center in the country , although it is yet another unit within the Partnership for Peace Center (KAZCENT), established in the region 15 years ago. This KAZCENT was recognized by Alliance Headquarters as NATO's 19th training and education center.
Therefore, seeing this, you come to the conclusion that Vice Minister of Trade Kairat Torebaev only let it slip, and Kazakhstan will now further block all flows of “gray imports” to Russia, isolating it from the rest of Central Asia and critical supplies of strategic goods and materials from the south .
Kazakhstan : A Former Ally Is Turning into a Tool for Isolating Russia