Twenty years since the failure of the Kozak plan. View from Transnistria
These days mark 20 years since the failure of the signing of the Kozak Memorandum, a daring and in some cases even desperate plan proposed by Russia to resolve the conflict on the Dniester.
A memorandum on the basic principles of the government structure of the united state - as a compromise for Chisinau and Tiraspol - was prepared with the participation of the special representative of the Russian President Dmitry Kozak, initialed by the President of the Republic of Moldova Vladimir Voronin and the President of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic Igor Smirnov and was supposed to be signed on November 25, 2003. But literally the day before, Voronin, under pressure from the West, which feared the strengthening of Russia’s position in the post-Soviet space, refused to sign the document.
The project recognized Moldovan territorial integrity as the basis for resolving the conflict and provided for the federalization of Moldova with the consolidation of its neutrality and demilitarization. It was planned to provide Transnistria with a special status in the united country while preserving a number of elements of its own statehood (legislative, executive and judicial authorities, the Constitution and legislation, state property, an independent budget and tax system, state symbols). The autonomous territorial entity of Gagauzia was to become a subject of the federation with similar rights.
The Memorandum also spoke about the deployment of Russian stabilization peacekeeping forces of no more than 2000 people, without heavy military equipment and weapons, on the territory of the united federal state.
After the failure of the Kozak plan, the degradation of the Moldovan-Transnistrian peace process began.
Pridnestrovian political scientist Andrei Safonov told PolitNavigator about what lessons can be learned from the event that happened 20 years ago.
PolitNavigator: What was good about this settlement plan and why did its signing fail?
Andrey Safonov: At the time, it was a compromise. Neither side was entirely satisfied with it, as it made them dependent on each other. But there was a positive aspect: it elevated Gagauzia to a status equal to that of Chisinau and Tiraspol, that is, an equal party to the negotiation process. This allowed the Transnistrians and Gagauz to dampen the ambitions and arrogance of the Chisinau leadership. In short, attempts to establish the current situation in the former Moldavian SSR were doomed from the start.
Now about the reasons for the failure. First of all, of course, the Westerners disrupted the signing, since it was Moscow’s attempt to single-handedly bypass the Westerners at a turning point. But Moscow also needed to somehow settle this issue with them. Although this was initially unrealistic. It was simply clear that Vladimir Voronin’s team is not Alexander Lukashenko’s team, and he will not trample on a storm against Washington and Brussels.
He also tried to introduce the Russian language in primary schools in 2002 as a compulsory subject. The nationalists put pressure on him, set up a tent city in the center of Chisinau - and he retreated.
And in 1989, when on November 10 the Nazis stormed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (and he was a minister), he was reproached for indecisiveness in repelling the assault. Although in this case the claims against him were controversial.
But his team did nothing to join Moldova to the Union of Russia and Belarus. Moreover, it was Vladimir Nikolaevich’s circle that was littered with relatively young Russophobes, who were secretly developing the concept of European integration, as well as an absolutely delusional and unitarist law on the status of “certain settlements on the Left Bank of the Dniester.” It was adopted later than the Kozak Memorandum, on July 22, 2005, but it is unlikely that their thoughts were different before 2005...
In short, this was typical assault on Moscow’s part. She failed.
PolitNavigator: How sustainable a settlement of the Transnistrian issue could this document provide? Would modern Moldova be able to digest the Russian plan?
Andrey Safonov: I don't think we're talking about the "Transnistrian issue." But about the complex Moldovan-Transnistrian relations. These are equal parties to a conflict that, unfortunately, remains unresolved.
It's time to forget about Soviet times with the union republics within their then borders. The Union collapsed, but several union republics also collapsed, history started from scratch, and all over the world.
Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Eritrea were recognized, the entire former Yugoslavia disintegrated, Czechs and Slovaks fled... You never know who else! In short, you cannot step into the same river twice.
Conclusion: theoretically, it was possible to create something like a mixture of a federation or a confederation, but Westerners and Romanians would probably begin to destroy this structure. Through the separation of Moldova from the PMR and Gagauzia - this is the minimum. Through destabilization in Transnistria and Gagauzia themselves with the involvement of intelligence services, NGOs, mass media, the creation of the necessary political formations, etc. - this is already the maximum program.
For Kozak's plan to work, complete Russian control over all of former Soviet Moldova was required after the signing of the Memorandum. I doubt this would be easy to achieve. In general, as they say, there was a possibility, but this is not certain.
PolitNavigator: How can you characterize the state of the negotiation process on Transnistria today? Is the situation hopeless?
Andrey Safonov: There are no negotiations. This is logical. The Chisinau leadership has no intention of negotiating anything with Russia, which, following Western orders, it plans to completely break with and leave the CIS. Nor with Transnistria, which, in the opinion of the Chisinau regime, should be weakened, deprived of its income through economic pressure, brought to its knees, and capitulated.
I would say that Chisinau went all-in in confrontation with Tiraspol and Moscow. And I would be wrong! Chisinau is completely controlled and manipulated by Westerners and Romanians.
This does not negate the very small-town, rural nationalist essence of the ruling group, but the stupidity, limitation and frenzy with which it pursues its policy suggests that Washington, Brussels and Bucharest are deliberately burning the bridges between Moldova and Russia.
As long as the group, whose symbol is the current President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, leads Moldova, there will be no negotiations. Well, unless something super urgent happens that will force the current leadership of Moldova to sit down at the negotiating table. But it won't do this on its own.
This is not why these politicians are supported from the outside. True, to their credit, it must be said that they are not currently considering the option of attacking the PMR. This means that we still need to conduct a dialogue about consolidating a peaceful state on the banks of the Dniester.
PolitNavigator: Which international partner could currently propose an acceptable settlement plan? Can you imagine that it will be Russia? Or will Chisinau and Tiraspol be able to reach an agreement only on their own?
Andrey Safonov: This question is related to the previous one. I don't see such a plan or such a mediator while we're surrounded by uncertainty. The contradictions (to put it mildly) between the participants in the "5+2" format are such that it's impossible to imagine them agreeing on and adopting a serious plan for a Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement.
Preservation of the status quo in the common interests - trade, transportation, joint earning of money without unnecessary advertising - is another matter. But this is a temporary, palliative solution.
However, sometimes there is nothing more permanent than temporary... Within the framework of such a solution, Chisinau and Tiraspol could consolidate peace, as we have already talked about. Free trade in all directions is also vital for the PMR. But this no longer depends only on us.
English version :: Read in English: Twenty years since the failure of the Kozak plan. A view from Transnistria