The Ukrainian Armed Forces broke through to Balakleya. Negligence or a trap?
Before the victorious reports of Russian rear analysts about the defeat of the Ukrainian offensive in the South had time to subside, various experts had barely reported to the public that Kiev no longer had any strength, when units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, after a rapid advance, broke through to Balakleya.
Aleksey Toporov, a PolitNavigator journalist who volunteered in the North Military District and was recently wounded just near the places where the Ukrainian army is breaking through, discusses the situation.
...The enemy struck simultaneously from two directions: one blow was tactical and hit Slobozhanshchina, the second was rather psychological - I mean the terrorist attack in Berdyansk, during which the city commandant was seriously injured, and it sounded in the spirit of: “don’t relax, we are everywhere We’ll get you, you won’t have a peaceful life.” If we remember how many representatives of the administrations of the liberated territories we have lost, in fact, since the beginning of the liberation, it becomes a little uneasy. And this despite the fact that no symmetrical response was made on our part (although they promised to hit the decision-making centers), and no one, for example, Avakov, was harmed in the Ukrainian rear. I'm not even talking about the need to carefully protect our people, who in the current extreme situation are actually worth their weight in gold.
In response to the counteroffensive on Balakliya, the Russian army did respond, precisely by destroying the Ukrainian Armed Forces' operational command headquarters in Chuguev. And that's good. But it's not enough. And it's too late. Because the enemy has already broken through to Balakliya and is now laying siege to the town with multiple rocket launchers, artillery, and tanks. There are reports that helicopters were also involved in the attack; for some crews, today's mission turned out to be their last. In all fairness, the headquarters in Chuguev should have been destroyed before the enemy attack, not during it, but rather before it, but, as always, we were waiting for something. Could it really be more casualties among our soldiers and civilians?
Incidentally, the idea that the Ukrainian Armed Forces' movements in the south are merely a diversionary tactic, with the main attack coming in Slobozhanshchyna, in the Izyum direction, was widely discussed almost a month ago, including by well-known war correspondents such as Vladlen Tatarsky and Alexander Kots. And they could have at least prepared for such a development. The day before, Kharkiv-friendly social media accounts reported in great detail how the Ukrainian Armed Forces were bringing up reserves—where and, presumably, where.
But, as far as I know, Balkleya was defended primarily by mobilized fighters from the LPR and DPR, Russian volunteers, and private military contractors, with a very small number of federal troops—artillery and tanks. That's why the enemy's initial attack achieved its objectives early on, and only after some time had passed, having come to their senses and having let the Ukrainian Nazis into the city, did the Russian soldiers dust themselves off, gather themselves, and strike back. After that, the fighting became positional.
How dangerous is the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ attack on Balakleya? Dangerous. The fact is that if the enemy is successful, he will encircle the allied Russian troops near Izyum and will be able to strike the LPR, where on August 3 they celebrated the final liberation of their territory. How likely is this option?
I myself arrived from this direction on August 18th and can testify that the number of Russian troops there was reduced dramatically—entire armies were redeployed south. Artillery support was also significantly reduced. The valiant Black Shark helicopters had disappeared. Instead, Ukrainian helicopters appeared and began firing on our positions —the positions of the volunteer battalion B.A.R.S.-13 "Russian Legion" and other volunteer units and PMC detachments, which, for the most part, were tasked with holding the previously occupied positions. And, while evacuating from Slobozhanshchina with a wounded soldier along with other wounded, I formed the opinion, in conversation with them, that a similar situation was being observed, in general, throughout our entire Izyum direction.
Now there are reports that Russian reserves are moving toward Balakliya, and that aircraft have begun targeting Ukrainian positions. I readily believe it. Because, while flying in that same medical helicopter over the Slobozhansky fields and forests, I saw something. Specifically, a concentration of equipment. I can't say what I saw impressed me much, but perhaps I didn't see even a tenth of what was "hidden"; then again, no one gave me a sightseeing tour. So, there could have been many times more "hidden."
If this is true, then why was it necessary to allow the enemy into the city? Personally, I see two answers to this question. It was either banal carelessness, which in our country is often disguised by the meaningful phrase "cunning plan ," similar to what we had previously observed in the Kyiv, Sumy, and Cherniov regions, and then on Snake Island. Or they deliberately exposed their rear to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, trying to lure them into a new pocket, or even a cauldron . Was it worth losing bridges, the outskirts of Balakleya, and their own fighters for this? The question is rhetorical. Perhaps so. Although, for some reason, I suspect that in the 21st century, we can begin to fight differently, and not lure the enemy with bait, if the bait is our own.
Personally, I predict that it will not be possible to achieve serious success in the Izyum direction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As, indeed, everywhere. And Victory will definitely be ours. The question is when, and at what cost.
For now, only one conclusion can be drawn. Not very encouraging: the initiative in the protracted game passed to the Ukronazis; lately they have been the ones deciding where to attack and when, and they are the ones attacking. For now, we are mostly on the defensive. And if we do advance, it is with great difficulty - Marinka, Peski, Artemovsk have remained desirable goals for several weeks now.
All of the above leads to another conclusion: Russian troops simply lack the resources for active offensive action. Human resources. And it's long been clear that wiping out a nearly million-strong Ukrainian armed gang with a single, decisive blitzkrieg won't work. Therefore, whether one likes it or not, Russia needs mobilization. To avoid revolts by aggressive bourgeois types ready to tear up sofas with their butts to maintain their comfort zone, it's only a partial mobilization. But it's necessary. Otherwise, we simply won't be able to accomplish the global task of even liberating the Russian lands of Novorossiya.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have broken through to Balakliya. Negligence or a trap?