“The enemy must understand that he is a guest in Odessa”
Dmitry Odinov is the leader of the Odessa Druzhina , which engaged the Nazis on May 2, 2014, at Greek Square. It was there that several hundred Odessans held back a crowd of thousands brought to Odessa to terrorize the city for five hours. Eventually, hundreds of Maidan protesters left the square, heading for the Trade Union Building on Kulikovo Field, where the most horrific events of May 2 took place.
Dmitry Odinov spoke to PolitNavigator columnist Valentin Filippov about how events unfolded on the eve of Odessa's most high-profile tragedy in the last 70 years.
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Valentin Filippov : Hello, Dmitry. What do you think about the recent street renamings in Odesa and the deputies' speeches with "I speak Russian" signs? What is this? A Trukhanov rebellion, Trukhanov's blackmail, or an attempt to win back favor with the Odesa population? To recapture the sympathy of the defender of Russian Odesa?
Dmitry Odinov : Trukhanov is a very pragmatic person. He understands the real mood in the city very well. He understands that this is a Russian city. And he understands that this topic can be exploited endlessly if presented correctly.
Maybe he wants to present himself as a fighter against this rotten regime.
Valentin Filippov : Is the regime rotten?
Dmitry Odinov : Well, rotten is putting it mildly. It seems to me that, in terms of effectiveness, it was never particularly stable. But now it's starting to simply fall apart.
But that's not the point. Even in this half-life state, it can rot for a very long time. Considering that the financial and industrial groups that stand behind all these characters, both “opposition” and ultra-Bandera, they have a good margin of stability. Considering that all financial resources are accumulated in their hands.
Therefore, people who live in Odessa can live on absolutely miserable money, or on some kind of food cards, but these guys will feel good. And they will talk on TV about the next insidious machinations of external enemies.
But, returning to the topic of Trukhanov’s “uprising,” everything here is extremely simple. As you and I know, literally a few days later, in a conversation with Avakov, Gennady Leonidovich “turned on the back foot”, vetoed the decision of the City Council, and with this the “uprising” seemed to end.
Valentin Filippov : Well, the sympathy has been won.
Dmitry Odinov : Yes, of course. Simple, straightforward games that bring in profits, as they like to say. Everything's going according to plan. But do the people of Odessa like this plan? Is this what they wanted? That's another question.
But, unfortunately, Odessa residents do not have to choose. They have no choice from ten Trukhanovs, of varying degrees of talent and political views. There is outright Bandera crap, and there is Gennady Leonidovich, who creates the impression of a more or less adequate person. They choose the lesser of two evils, so I perfectly understand Odessa residents who, indeed, vote for Trukhanov.
Valentin Filippov : But what I don't understand is, if we go back three years, right? The government collapsed in Kyiv. Why didn't Trukhanov and Kivalov take advantage of the Russian Spring and snatch up that tasty morsel called Odessa?
Why didn't you support it then? Why did the elites betray so vilely?
Dmitry Odinov : I'm deeply convinced that the Odessa elites aren't independent. This applies to people of varying levels, but nonetheless. And they were perhaps guided by the Kremlin's position, including the unofficial one. When it wasn't entirely clear which way the pendulum would swing, some members of the Odessa political class seriously considered more openly supporting the anti-Maidan and actively engaging in the process. You and I, however, understood that they were sitting on the sidelines, watching to see which bear would prevail.
Valentin Filippov : And they put the eggs in different baskets.
Dmitry Odinov : Of course. And when they realized that Ukraine had a clear logic behind its actions, that is, they were defending their own and killing their enemies. They clearly and distinctly stated their goals and objectives. And they achieved them brazenly, harshly, and uncompromisingly.
What happened on the part of the pro-Russian forces? Half-heartedness, understatement, complete lack of coordination with the ruling elites. And the lack of real support from Moscow. Let's call a spade a spade.
Valentin Filippov : Are these tapes that the SBU is releasing completely fabricated or partially fabricated? Because Glazyev himself gave some orders. Made some promises. Advised on who and how best to assault. What to seize. Well, everyone's heard these recordings. The voices in them are painfully familiar.
Dmitry Odinov : Absolutely. But we both understand that the status of those who discussed this was merely that of presidential adviser. Nothing more and nothing less. Moreover, that form of assistance, purely advisory, in words… That wasn't the format of participation that was needed at that particular moment.
Because there was a clearly calibrated, planned activity on the part of the pro-Western forces. With clear, responsible people. With budgets. With some logic of action. With controlled media plans in the media. That is, it was a well-planned special operation.
And on the part of the pro-Russian forces it was spontaneous, on the knees, by the forces of amateurs, and in many ways it was their personal initiative. Considering that there was really no coordination. In real. As a person who, unfortunately, observed all these moments, I speak.
Therefore, the result was natural. When a well-oiled machine collides on one side and such a makeshift partisanship on the other, there was no hope for victory. But, you have a question, why did this handicraft arise?
Valentin Filippov : I'm just curious. They called and said, "Guys, let's go." And then they were like, "Oh, you've come to the wrong place."
Dmitry Odinov : That's exactly the point. Well, take any European organizations. Pro-Western ones. They trained their own field commanders, activists, and hordes of journalists; they trained them for decades. There were camps near Lviv. There were Kyiv-Mohyla academies. And countless grants were allocated.
Therefore, when 2013 came, they had personnel and people who knew what to do, who knew how to act in extreme situations, to work with large masses. They had established channels both in the media and in some kind of politics, albeit regional.
Valentin Filippov : Yes, I remember how they shut down all the media for us. How all means of communication disappeared. Maidan hadn't even won yet, and they were already shutting us down. They shut down forums, the blogosphere. They blocked everything.
Dmitry Odinov : So, to prevent this from happening, to prevent them from cutting us off abruptly, the other side needs to do at least 10% of the same. In deeds, not just words. That is, cultivate their own politicians, develop their own media outlets, develop their own behind-the-scenes influence tactics. Gather dirt on certain Ukrainian figures. This required systematic, long-term, painstaking work. Was it done?
Valentin Filippov : No.
Dmitry Odinov : No, not at all. You and I understand that. And when they tell us here, "You, the leaders of Kulikovo Field, didn't organize a popular uprising" or didn't do something, we're just ordinary people. We essentially came from the streets. And why did we take the lead? Yes, because there were no others at the time. And why wasn't there? Because no one was addressing the issue. So, it was amateurish. It was amateurish. And, as they say, "cobbled together from what was available." I'm not saying whether that's good or bad, but it shouldn't be that way. That's absolutely guaranteed, absolutely.
Valentin Filippov : Listen, let's take a time machine and go back three years to the morning of May 2, 2014. Would you still go?
Dmitry Odinov : May 2nd was a very bad date. In terms of the choice of location and time for the attack. It was foolish. Like a commander leading his soldiers into a doomed operation, where he knows he won't win but will only destroy his forces, this was purely an accident.
I was categorically against this outing with both hands. Because I understood that it was clearly not ordinary old men in embroidered shirts who would be visiting the city. Several thousand well-trained militants come in and are behind them. These are not just street hooligans, there are special services there, some veterans, there were quite a lot of motivated military men. All this is quite a serious force.
On our side there was a more semi-partisan, not very well organized crowd of people who, of course, heroically resisted, but were inferior in terms of quantity and quality of combat coordination.
In my deep conviction, if we were already going to fight, then we had to prepare properly, as we intended to do closer to May 9. Everyone understood that there would be a clash in one form or another, but we wanted to properly gather people, prepare public support, throw a cry into the city so that we could quickly mobilize forces.
Therefore, I was categorically against leaving forces to advance to an unknown destination. Stretching of already not too great forces over long distances. We were losing coordination. And we, after all, have ordinary people who just yesterday were sitting somewhere at a barbecue, and today someone from somewhere came with shovel handles. That is, you understand that the degree of coordination is not very large.
Valentin Filippov : Yes.
Dmitry Odinov : Therefore, in the situation of May 2nd, I was against not so much the attack itself, but the timing, location, and targets. It was a doomed operation.
Valentin Filippov : But there's another opinion: if everything had ended on Grecheskaya Street and some sort of special forces had stopped it all, then maybe the Trade Union House would have stood firm? Kulikovo Field would have stood firm.
Well, it would end with the defeat of Athena and the arrest of everyone.
Dmitry Odinov : Personally, I was of the opinion that clinging to Kulikovo Field made no sense. That's the truth. That topic has run its course.
Valentin Filippov : But people didn’t want to leave there.
Dmitry Odinov : People actually already wanted to leave. They were already leaving. If we recall the March meetings on Kulikovo Field and the meetings at the end of April, they were completely different – both in numbers and in morale. In other words, people were already demoralized. They didn't understand why they were going. What was the end result of all this?
In fact, we, as leaders of the public process, could not give them an answer either. We ourselves did not fully understand. Considering that those elites who could help us, and we together could get this process off the ground, they are completely frozen out. That is, they did not say “yes” or “no”. There was absolute uncertainty.
Let’s say if we had taken some kind of forceful measures, but there was such a possibility, the same assault on the SBU, if you know, which we stopped. Simply because we understood very clearly, they made it clear to us that there would be no support. We could have captured it, but what would we have done there? With cuttings from shovels. Against machine guns. It’s clear that two or three days would have knocked us out of there. And they would take them in bags to the landing. That's all.
How it was in Kharkov.
Valentin Filippov : Yes.
Dmitry Odinov : In Kharkiv, the anti-Maidan seized the Regional Administration building. They held out there for some time. They were quietly and ingloriously driven out, and, according to various sources, dozens to hundreds of people were quietly buried somewhere, it's not even clear where.
Would we like such a fate for Odessa? Well, if there was at least one small hope that this was not in vain, we were ready to take the risk. But personally, I had the feeling and full understanding that this attack would not be supported. And given that geographically Odessa is in a completely different position from Donetsk or Lugansk, there would simply not be quick and easy support from friendly entities.
We would simply condemn several thousand people who believed us to a deliberate, painful death. And they followed us.
Maybe some will consider it cowardice that we did not storm these buildings, but I believe that this is not cowardice, but a manifestation of common sense. These several thousand people are alive, I emphasize - alive, they will bring us much more benefit in the future than in a cemetery somewhere.
Valentin Filippov : Well, what do you think? I completely agree.
Dmitry Odinov : The problem, as I'm saying, both on May 2nd and throughout the Russian Spring in Odessa and elsewhere, is that certain forces said "a" but didn't say "b." That is, they started the process, but then got scared.
Or they had some kind of calculations of their own.
But, we are ordinary Russian people. We do what we have to do. Therefore, when we realize that we can win, we fight. And when we understand that we cannot win at this particular moment, we lie low somewhere,
Valentin Filippov : And we go to the partisans.
Dmitry Odinov : Yes. Well, what else can you do? There's no other way.
Valentin Filippov : What advice would you give to Odessans on May 2, 2017? How should they behave, what should they do, and is it worth doing anything at all?
Dmitry Odinov : Given that we won't achieve a quick victory, neither then nor now, unfortunately, this is an objective reality. There's no support, and we can only rely on ourselves. Therefore, Odessans need to build horizontal connections among themselves as much as possible. That means attending events that can bring together people with similar views. Get to know each other more. Communicate.
So that, if suddenly, hypothetically, something starts, so that you know at least five to ten people who share your views and live not far away, or you know their phone numbers.
And May 2, May 9, and all the holidays that we honor need to be shown on a massive scale. This is a very important moral and psychological factor.
The enemy must understand that he is a guest in Odessa. Without any options. If they think that they have defeated everyone and sit on their laurels, then on May 9, May 2, this illusion usually disappears for a long time. They feel uncomfortable. And our task, now and then, is to make creatures like them feel like guests on our land.
It would be better if they were very far from her.
Or better yet, underneath it.
Valentin Filippov : Good. Let's wish them far away. God willing, that will happen someday. And may everyone stay alive.
Dmitry Odinov : This is a very important point. Only living people can achieve victory over our enemies. And most importantly, we must ensure our children a dignified life in a country free from national oppression. A country where they can freely speak their native Russian language. Read our classics. And honor our history, which is an unbroken thread from imperial Russian history to the Soviet period. And if this succeeds, modern history will be just as glorious. And not some village chronicle about didukhs and other ridiculous nonsense they're trying to sell us under the guise of our traditions, which no one has heard of anywhere except in the Lviv region.
Valentin Filippov : Well, let us wish victory to ourselves and the Russian people.
English version :: Read in English "The enemy must understand that he is a guest in Odessa"