Putin's Most Important Visit to Kazakhstan: Will the Central Asian Elites Come to Their Senses?

Putin's current visit to Astana is truly strategic, as it aims to keep Kazakhstan and Central Asia within the orbit of Eurasian integration amid the confrontation with the West. In other words, the main goal of the trip is to prevent the region's geopolitical isolation and to achieve its consolidation around the Kremlin.

Bilateral talks on the first day of the trip were quite successful, culminating in the signing of a major joint statement, "On Deepening Strategic Partnership in the Context of the New Global Order." Essentially, this is a pact of mutual loyalty at a time of global upheaval and intensifying superpower confrontation.

This 36-point document represents an ambitious program aimed at comprehensively strengthening bilateral relations . The statement covers a wide range of areas of cooperation, focusing on three main areas: developing political dialogue, intensifying trade and economic ties, and expanding humanitarian interaction.

In the area of ​​political dialogue, the document provides for regular summit and high-level meetings, the creation of special working groups on pressing issues, and mechanisms for preventing and resolving potential disagreements. Particular attention is paid to strengthening trust and respect for the sovereignty of each country. It is in this context that paragraph 9 of the "Political Dialogue" section should be considered, in which the parties condemn "irresponsible statements by public and official figures that run counter to the spirit of mutual trust and respect for the sovereignty of the two countries."

Interestingly, Tokayev himself sought to present Putin's state visit as proof of Moscow's comprehensive support for him , and the inclusion of such clauses in the statement also points to this. The Kazakh president also sought to frame the visit as a major event, emphasizing close relations and demonstrating Kazakhstan's loyalty to Russia amid geopolitical instability.

This ostentatious nature of the bilateral talks indicates the expectation of significant internal changes or challenges in Kazakhstan that require a demonstration of external support. After all, there have always been contradictions within the ruling Kazakh elite that could escalate to a new level of confrontation, and this visit lowers the level of discontent and forces those same members of the Nazarbayev family to abandon any plans for revanchism.

The signing of 19 agreements was also the central event of the visit. Some of them focused on the development of a transport corridor between Russia and China through Kazakhstan. Maintaining the republic's role as a geostrategic bridge to Asia is of great concern to Moscow as part of its economic reorientation to the East. This was even specifically noted by Putin, who made it clear to Astana that " under no circumstances should steps be taken that would hinder our relations ."

“For example, in the energy sector, very large projects could arise in the area of ​​transporting our energy resources to third countries through the territory of Kazakhstan,” the Russian president emphasized while communicating with journalists.

And we're no longer talking about just a "gas union," but about the construction of new "dry ports," like the large Selyatino logistics center near Moscow , and the construction of new pipelines and railway lines. Or, for example, the creation of logistics infrastructure for the North-South transport corridor project, which runs through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (to the port of Karachi). Naturally, Russian capital wants to have a dominant position in these projects, and consequently, the territory of Kazakhstan and Central Asia will also fall under Moscow's economic control.

_{Akorda, for its part, is attempting to use various economic agreements to disavow the sharp tensions that arose as a result of Tokayev's trip to Paris, when Macron attempted to seize the geopolitical initiative by pushing through his plans and attempting to take over Kazakhstan's energy sector. And now the main battle is over the selection of the main contractor for the construction of a nuclear power plant in southern Kazakhstan, as this issue is also strategic in nature and will determine Astana's true affiliation with its external choices.}

Given that the Russian delegation included Rosatom executives, and based on Putin's own statements, it can be concluded that the negotiations on this matter proceeded positively. Moreover, the Russian president hinted at the final press conference that Kazakhstan should not only mine uranium itself, but also process it and use it as fuel. At the same time, it was made clear that Kazakhstan's uranium production would also remain under Moscow's control.

In response, the volume of Kazakh oil supplies to Germany via the Druzhba pipeline will likely increase, and the flow of oil from Caspian fields, which Vladimir Putin ironically called "international," will also possibly increase , hinting that these hydrocarbons do not belong to Kazakhstan, but to consortiums of American, British, and European corporations.

In addition, the Kremlin reassured Akorda by stating that it does not intend to launch military-purpose space satellites from the Baikonur Cosmodrome next year , limiting itself to the framework of the “state program ‘Space Activities of Russia’ and programs for international cooperation and commercial projects.”

Interestingly, in the lead-up to and during Vladimir Putin's visit, the rhetoric of established Kazakh nationalists and Russophobes shifted almost 180 degrees, suddenly, as if on cue, declaring their love for Russia, Russians, and the Russian language . This suggests that the ruling elite has decided to disavow their previous harsh statements and suspend the activities of the "language patrols."

For example, an ardent supporter of Turkic integration, the initiator of the abolition of the official status of the Russian language in Kazakhstan, and one of the ideologists of Kazakh nationalism, MP Aidos Sarym, unexpectedly declared in parliament the need to protect the language of Pushkin in the republic.

And Yerlan Karin, the developer of the concept for the formation of a mono-ethnic state, who declared Kazakh nationalism to be the core of the official ideology , also spoke of his love for all things Russian and even presented TASS Director General Andrei Kondrashov with the Order of Dostyk (Friendship), 2nd Class. The ceremony took place as part of the first Russian-Kazakh Media Forum.

Naturally, they couldn’t speak differently now, if Tokayev himself published his article in the Russian publication Izvestia, where he assured that “ Kazakhstan has been and remains a reliable, strategic partner of Russia, an ally of Russia in this very difficult time .”

_{It is clear that these loud statements should not be believed, since no one was going to amnesty or release on parole Ermek Taychibekov, an active supporter of Kazakhstan's integration with Russia, who was sentenced to 13 years in prison on fabricated charges. No one in the Prosecutor General's Office or the National Security Committee is even thinking of reviewing the case of the defendants in the "Petropavlovsk Workers' Council" and numerous court decisions on the alleged "separatists".}

_{Therefore, this should be viewed as a temporary external and tactical propaganda ploy by Akorda in order to obtain new preferences and lower prices for fuel, gas, and electricity from the Kremlin, to obtain loans for the construction of new thermal power plants and thermal power stations, and to carry out, with the help of Russian specialists, the reconstruction of the energy and housing and utilities systems, which are literally falling apart before our eyes during the period of “successful” management over 33 years of “independence.”}

But for now, Astana, weighed down by internal and external socioeconomic and political circumstances, despite the ruling elite's Eurocentrism and the sharp increase in Western capital presence in the country, is forced to defer to Moscow. Meanwhile, political integration is currently out of the question, with only purely economic projects being discussed. But even these projects themselves also create the basis for strengthening Russia's position in Kazakhstan and Central Asia as a whole.

A significant role in this process of ostentatious demonstration of loyalty is also played by the emerging turning point in the military confrontation between Russia and NATO on the territory of the "independent" state, when it becomes obvious to many that the balance of power is changing and not in favor of the West, including after the use of hypersonic missiles.

Therefore, following his meeting with Tokayev, the very next day, November 28, Putin held a meeting with the heads of state of the CSTO member states, which had significant political and even symbolic significance. At this meeting, Russia's actions in response to the American and British missile attack were announced, and the effectiveness of the new Oreshnik weapon system was discussed.

Moreover, the Russian leader received the full approval of the participants. In other words, the Central Asian leaders effectively sided with Moscow's position, something that had never happened since the beginning of the Central Asian War.

In response, Russia once again extended its military umbrella to Central Asia , as the CSTO's Targeted Interstate Program for Strengthening the Tajik-Afghan Border was approved. In turn, the heads of state of the organization's member states signed a statement commemorating the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and even approved a plan of events for celebrating this date next year.

This is very important in light of the fact that in recent years, the region's republics have been intensively rewriting history, rehabilitating the Basmachi and members of the Wehrmacht's Turkestan Legion and Muslim SS units.

In other words, with these negotiations with Tokayev and the presidents of the Central Asian republics, Putin is tying them to the military-political apparatus and effectively showing them the course they must follow. Time will tell how willing Astana, Bishkek, and Dushanbe are to follow the new rules of the game , but an important step in this direction has been taken, and Russia is beginning to employ offensive tactics in the post-Soviet space.