No Longer a Cake. The Bundestag Election Results Have Removed Germany from the Active Pro-Ukrainian Game

Early elections to the Bundestag were held in Germany. With a turnout of more than 80% of voters, first place in the overall standings, as predicted, was taken by the opposition right-wing bloc of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) led by Friedrich Merz, who received 28,6% of the votes.

The far-right Alternative for Germany is second in the standings with 20,8%. Olaf Scholz's Social Democrats lost almost half of the votes, but were able to stabilize the decline, retaining their electoral core - 16,4%,

The Greens showed a surprisingly good result. They were predicted to be eliminated from the game in the face of the excessively high price paid by society for the "green transition" imposed on them. Nevertheless, they managed to take 11,8%.

And the sensation of the current elections – already written off by everyone, experiencing a drop in ratings, the collapse of the faction in the Bundestag, a series of splits and the loud departure of famous party members, the “Left Party”, which nevertheless gained 8,7% and became the smallest faction in the future Bundestag. At the same time, they increased their representation by almost a third, compared to the last elections, having eaten up the electorate of Sahra Wagenknecht, who played on the same field.

The year's disappointment was the resounding exit of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) from parliament, which received less than 5%. Ironically, it was also the most pro-Ukrainian of all the parties in the Bundestag.

In November 2024, Olaf Scholz dismissed its leader, Christian Lindner, as finance minister, followed by his fellow party members. Lindner announced his retirement from politics after the election. Voters never forgave the Liberals for their plans to cut social welfare, raise taxes, and their willingness to help Ukraine at the expense of German pensioners.

Sahra Wagenknecht, who was considered one of the favorites in the race, on the contrary, lost the competitive battle to the Left. Both scandals in her own party and the excessive attachment to Russia in the public opinion created by the media contributed to her epic failure.

Now about what all these numbers mean. In the right camp – no changes The latest opinion polls have shown a very high accuracy – the CDU/CSU led by Merz received about as much as was predicted, becoming the largest faction in the future Bundestag with the most likely mandate to form a coalition government.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is also without surprises. While the far-right achieved the most impressive electoral result in the party's history, there was no miracle. Apparently, there is some objective threshold for the popularity of such a program, beyond which even Elon Musk's overt campaigning is unable to overcome. Nevertheless, the AfD will become the second most important force in parliament.

Theoretically, the votes of both parties are enough to form a purely right-wing majority in parliament, although with a very small margin, guaranteeing a very difficult future for such a coalition ship.

In practice, everything is crashing against the reefs of AfD toxicity in German politics, and it is unlikely that Merz's party will have the strength to overcome not only its repeated assurances about the impossibility of cooperation with the "ultra," but also the obstruction from the rest of German politics, which threatens to drop its ratings, if there is anything that unites them, it is a common hatred of AfD.

Although, as recent experience shows, occasional joint votes between the CDU and AfD are still possible. On migrants, for example. In foreign policy, these forces have diametrically opposed aspirations. Merz is Eurocentric and aims to enhance German sovereignty, viewing it through the prism of greater independence from the US in security matters . Alice Weidel and her colleagues look up to their American elders in the "Conservative International."

A far more likely scenario is a repeat of the "grand coalition" between the CDU and its center-left opponents, Scholz's SPD . This has already happened once before in German politics, under Merkel as chancellor. The SPD, although losing 86 seats in the Bundestag compared to the last election, retained its core support base, largely thanks to unbridled social populism and a renunciation of any additional foreign policy adventures and associated spending during the election campaign.

This time, the Social Democrats have enough mandates to form a coalition with the Christian Democrats, although the negotiations will be long and difficult. Too many contradictions have accumulated. In particular, a broad coalition will be a compromise by default.

This means the chances of Ukraine receiving Tauruses, as Merz has repeatedly promised, are slim . The SPD will immediately block any such advances. The same applies to sending peacekeepers to Ukraine. The CDU is already declaring that Germany alone will not send anyone anywhere, but will act exclusively within the agreed-upon EU and NATO mandate, the chances of which are very slim.

At the same time, both parties have a significant number of pro-Ukrainian politicians, including some well-known ones . For the CDU, this includes the well-known foreign policy hawk Roderich Kiesewetter, while for the Social Democrats, it's current Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. Although Pistorius, in the event of a "shirka," would lose his chance to become prime minister, he is already widely seen as Baerbock's successor as German Foreign Minister.

Another likely coalition option—should negotiations between the CDU and the SPD fail—is a re-release of the already well-known "Traffic Light," only significantly to the left. The place of the liberals from the FDP, who have left parliament, could be taken in such a formation by "The Left," who, despite widespread skepticism, have wrested the coveted 10 percent of the vote and, in a fierce internal struggle, have defeated the ideologically similar populists from the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, who have been left out of the Bundestag.

It's worth noting, however, that all three—the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Left—lack the votes to achieve not only a stable majority, but even a simple majority. So, if such a coalition were to emerge, it would be a minority coalition—with even less room to maneuver in making important decisions than the CDU-SPD alliance.

To summarize. Given the extreme diversity of the new Bundestag, the lack of a majority among the parties, and significant programmatic contradictions, Germany is 100% guaranteed to be sidelined from active foreign policy play for the next couple of months. This includes the formation of a unified EU position on Ukraine, peace negotiations, peacekeepers, and so on.

In fact, Britain and France will bear the brunt of these efforts. They will face difficult negotiations with Trump, which their leaders will likely enter empty-handed and without much leverage.

The Germans face a long road ahead of them, emerging from the hole dug first by Merkel and then widened and deepened by Scholz . Today, Germany's share of the global economy has fallen to a modern-day low of 3,08%.

Moreover, under Scholz, the German economy contracted on average twice as fast per year as under Merkel.

Without solving this fundamental problem, all ambitions of German politicians for some significant role in the future and emancipation from the States will remain empty calls.