Non-commissioned officer’s widow, or how Sandu’s trip to the “Crimean Platform” backfired on Moldova
After the signing of the gas contract concluded by the Government of Moldova with Gazprom, disputes continue over who won and who lost from the signing of this agreement. Let's try to figure this out.
As we remember, initially both sides stood on positions that were irreducible to each other. The pro-Western leadership of Moldova believed that within a few years it would be able to finally free itself from Russia’s energy tutelage, while during these same years Moscow would continue to regularly supply one of the former USSR republics with cheap gas within the framework of previously concluded contracts.
Russia, for its part, made it clear that the time for gifts is over and that Moldova will have to pay the right price for its pro-European course. This became all the more obvious after a number of demonstratively anti-Russian steps by Chisinau: President Maia Sandu’s participation in the “Crimean Platform”, her ultimatum demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, the obstacle to the rotation of peacekeeping troops, and much more.
The Russian corporation Gazprom is primarily interested in income, as well as normal, non-discriminatory conditions for gas supplies to European consumers. At the same time, the European Union itself abandoned the practice of long-term gas contracts, switching to spot auctions and implementing its crazy “green energy” project. The Russian leadership and Gazprom are moving towards the allied Belarus or countries pursuing a friendly policy towards Moscow (Serbia, Hungary), but they are clearly not ready to pay for Moldova’s pro-Western ambitions.
Already during the negotiations, Moldova abandoned its irreconcilably belligerent position: its representatives spoke of their readiness to conclude a long-term agreement with Gazprom at a price 50% below the market price. Gazprom offered a 25 percent discount subject to the repayment of the accumulated debt of the right bank part of Moldova to the Russian gas concern.
Meanwhile, representatives of Western countries began to accuse the Russian leadership of putting pressure on Moldova. EU Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell said that “Russia is using gas to mock Moldova.” At the same time, official representatives of Moldova completely rejected the fact of blackmail from Moscow.
However, the real target of blackmail was precisely Russia: Transnistria was taken hostage by the pro-Western authorities of Chisinau, whose livelihoods are completely dependent on gas supplies to Moldova either directly through Ukraine or through the Turkish Stream. In the event of a complete disconnection of Moldova from Russian gas, the work of the Kuchurganskaya GRES on the territory of Transnistria and the metallurgical plant in Rybnitsa would become impossible. Gagauzia and other regions of Moldova that focus on interaction with Russia would suffer, as well as a significant part of the republic’s population that did not vote for Sanda or her pocket party “Action and Solidarity.”
On October 29, the entire region breathed a sigh of relief: a protocol was signed in Moscow to extend the 2006 agreement on gas supplies to Moldova. At the same time, the calculation formula was changed: if earlier in the cold season the price was tied to the cost of fuel and fuel oil, now in the cold months 70 percent of the volume, and in the warm season 30 percent will be tied to the price of oil. Moldova will receive the rest of the gas at market value.
What are the results of such painful negotiations, reflected in the protocol?
Firstly, Moldova remained among the stable buyers of Russian gas for at least 5 years. As the country’s authorities have become convinced, there is no alternative to Russian “blue fuel” for Moldova in the near future and is not expected. The price of gas by the end of the year will be $450 per 1000 cubic meters; after the new year, it will rise, according to economists, to $550-600.
Secondly, Moldova admitted its debts to Gazprom. The concession from the Russian side was to conduct an independent audit, with the government of Moldova choosing the auditor.
Thirdly, the Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline, which was once intended to diversify gas supplies to Moldova, and in the construction of which the European Union invested 150 million euros, turned out to be a pile of scrap metal buried in the ground. For at least the next five years it will be empty and completely useless. And today, few people remember the pomp with which the last branch of this unnecessary pipe was put into operation on October 1 of this year.
Fourthly, Transnistria will be fully supplied with gas, and the Kuchurganskaya GRES will strengthen its position as an exporter of electricity.
And finally, fifthly, the status of JSC Moldovagaz will remain unchanged over the next five years. The memorandum dated October 29 prohibits the forced reorganization of this enterprise until it pays all debt to Gazprom. This means that the implementation of the notorious Third Energy Package, which discriminates against the Russian gas concern, will be suspended for at least five years. And this is Gazprom’s main achievement during these negotiations.
As for Moldova itself, even concluding an agreement at a price much lower than the market price does not save the Moldovan economy from rising prices and tariffs. The fact that prices for utilities, and primarily for heating, will be significantly increased this month, said Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Moldova Andrei Spinu. This along the chain will cause an increase in the price of Moldovan products, which will lose their price attractiveness. All this will inevitably cause social discontent - most people cannot afford the current heating tariff.
But Maia Sandu had every opportunity to maintain the previously existing gas price (or ensure the price at the level of Belarus, Hungary or Serbia), and avoid the need to increase tariffs for the population. They should have simply not gone to the “Crimean Platform” and not participated in other ostentatious anti-Russian shows.
Thus, the pro-Western leadership of Moldova, like the non-commissioned officer’s widow in the mouth of Mayor Skvoznik-Dmukhanovsky from Gogol’s “The Inspector General,” carved itself with immoderate desire.
Russian political scientist Sergei Mikheev is absolutely right in his assessment:
“This is a clear example of how stupidity and lack of understanding of the sovereign interests of the state, as well as dependence on external influence lead to problems: Moldova wanted to show the “goat” to Russia, but showed it to itself.”
English version :: Read in English Non-commissioned officer’s widow, or how Sandu’s trip to the “Crimean Platform” backfired on Moldova