Sergei Mikheev: Impunity raises the bar for Poroshenko’s impudence
Forty days without Alexander Zakharchenko. Is retribution coming, or is geopolitics more important? Russia will have to make a decision. Moscow political scientist Sergei Mikheyev told PolitNavigator columnist Valentin Filippov that Donbas is even more Russia than some of its regions.
Valentin Filippov: Sergey, hello. It's been 40 days since the death of Alexander Zakharchenko. Is the Donbas we've inherited viable?
Sergei Mikheev: Zakharchenko is the first and, effectively, only president of the DPR in this four-year history. Because the episodes that preceded him were rather fleeting. Essentially, Zakharchenko is the key figure in the DPR's political process—both internal and external—since 2014.
What did you manage to do? It was possible to give these events the status of statehood. Yes, the Donetsk People's Republic is an unrecognized state, but over these four years it has acquired signs of statehood. And Zakharchenko’s merit in this is significant.
That is, from the spontaneous movement and freemen in the field, an organized structure began to emerge with signs of state control of the army and the economy. Although it is clear that there are a huge number of problems now, in 2014 and 2015 there were much more of them. The situation was very difficult back then.
Therefore, it is impossible to overestimate Zakharchenko’s contribution. And I think the memory of him should remain in Donbass forever.
Valentin Filippov: Zakharchenko's associates claim that his dream was a socialist state.
Sergei Mikheev: It's hard for me to judge. I haven't been there recently. As for attempts to create a compromise system, they were discussed here in Moscow, back in 2014-15. And I played a certain part in that. Those were the wishes. It seemed possible to create something along the lines of convergence theory, where the advantages of a socialist system and the advantages of a capitalist system are combined, and the disadvantages of both are discarded.
Was this a complete success? I think no. It failed for a number of objective reasons. And for a large number of private group interests. And it’s an objectively difficult situation. And, apparently, Moscow’s position on this issue is also because Russia itself would not mind such a model. But it doesn’t exist in Russia. There are attempts at public-private partnerships on individual projects, but there is no current effective economic model, in my personal opinion, which would discard all the disadvantages of socialism and capitalism and consolidate the advantages. Although it would be optimal.
But, since it does not exist in Russia, it, accordingly, did not work out in the DPR. And in the DPR this was further aggravated by the situation of military confrontation, internal instability, and the interests of private groups. This is no secret, there are quite a lot of them out there. And they are the most diverse.
Valentin Filippov: Regarding the military standoff. The front line has been stabilized. They say that compared to war, this is, after all, peace. A process where fewer people die. But at the same time, I look at how many of our commanders have fallen. Including Alexander Zakharchenko.
Do you think this is a shortcoming of the special services, or is it a fundamentally wrong policy that the leaders of the DPR are so easily knocked out one after another? It seems like these are death row positions.
Sergei Mikheev: Well, there are both objective and subjective factors here. Firstly, objectively, the military unrest and everything that happened during these four years, especially 2014-15-16, certainly gave rise to a certain attitude towards life and a certain approach to leadership style. What was lacking was a systemic and more robust approach to security issues. When more in-depth work on ensuring the security of both the head of state and the people on his team was lacking.
Simply put, at first it was a mess, and then a habit. The habit of some kind of walk-field. She let down, it seems to me, the leadership of the DPR. In conditions of war, albeit a sluggish one, these issues must be taken more seriously.
Any conflict of this kind in the world, unfortunately, such things happen. And either you take this seriously, or you continue to act in such a partisan style.
On the other hand, yes, there was not enough professional work, including from Moscow. Including from those in Russia who collaborated with the DPR and oversaw these issues. There was also a lack of professionalism within the DPR’s military law enforcement agencies themselves.
Well, plus, the factor of the ongoing war is added. There is a line of contact, but there is no hard border. There is no border that cannot be crossed. Both in Donetsk and Lugansk. Everyone knows this very well. People walk back and forth. This means a hybrid situation in which agents penetrate in all directions and there is an opportunity to carry out work. And in the territories of the Lugansk and Donetsk Republics there are many people who were previously subscribed to by the SBU, and are now. This is a situation of hybrid conflict.
If there was an iron curtain, a front line, a control strip, a trench, and everything - neither in one direction nor in the other. But everyone knows what is happening there, people are moving in one direction, then in the other, they received a pension here, a salary there, but they have to live, trade is going on, and in this situation money begins to play. And where there is money, there will always be betrayal.
Where there is money, there will always be betrayal, this is quite obvious. And this situation reduces the overall level of security in the DPR and LPR, and poses a threat to any noticeable people whom Ukraine perceives as potentially dangerous.
Valentin Filippov: Ukraine is not receiving any retaliatory measures for the murder of the militia commanders and the republic's leader. Is it worth conducting some kind of retaliatory sabotage operations in Ukraine?
Sergey Mikheev: I had nothing to do with the formation of these decisions, and when you ask who exactly is to blame, it's hard for me to name them. I have a rough idea, based on experience.
Yes, indeed, there is this “not two, not one and a half” situation when “we do not respond to provocations”, “we will not do this.” Why? Perhaps they are afraid of further aggravation, which will require a large-scale operation, which Russia does not want to conduct. But in this case, this situation freezes and hangs in uncertainty. And when Zakharchenko was killed, those who followed the broadcasts heard, among other things, me saying that impunity breeds relapse.
If the punishment does not come, if the answer for the action does not come, then the opposite side will believe that this is possible. And he will raise the bar of his arrogance and continue to act in the same spirit.
What other aggravation are we expecting?
I can roughly imagine the foreign policy logic of the Russian leadership, for which this is not the only front line. This struggle is multi-level. The conflict is complex. Both the Donetsk and Lugansk situations are just one of its sections. And when decisions are made, everything is taken into account at once. But overall, I think there is too much liberalism. There is too much indecision.
As for the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics, they are held hostage by Moscow’s position. I don't know if they are ready to do anything themselves. It's hard to say whether they have any resources at all. But, obviously, if nothing happens at all, this will give rise to impudence and impunity, and the repetition of these episodes will increase. Including in relation to Russia itself.
Maybe everyone is waiting for something to change after Poroshenko’s election? What if Poroshenko is not elected, right?
Valentin Filippov: Well, it will get even worse.
Sergey Mikheev: Well, yes. Besides all this, the lack of a response allows for speculation that "it wasn't the Ukrainians who did this, but rather the result of internal political infighting within Donetsk itself."
I think this situation looks ambiguous and strange. Another thing is that such large geopolitical situations with a sluggish pace, they usually take a very long time to develop. And we, all decisive people, according to the archetype, as they say, firstly, and secondly, are spoiled by information culture. We want it this way, in the morning I saw the beginning on TV, in the afternoon the climax, and in the evening I want to see the denouement. That's all. Otherwise, I think that all this is wrong. Here we can say - read the story. This happened extremely rarely. Usually such situations...
Valentin Filippov: This only happens in Crimea.
Sergei Mikheev: Well, yes. For example, Crimea. Or the five-day war in South Ossetia in 2008. But usually, such situations drag on for years and years and years. If it's not resolved immediately, during the hot phase, if the conflict's intensity subsides, then it usually transitions to a sluggish phase for many years. This isn't just happening in Donbas; it's happening all over the world. And all these geopolitical processes have this long-term trend.
I think the current situation will marinate. And the worst thing is that this is having a rather depressing effect on the mood of the residents of Donbass itself. Indeed, I would like understanding and clarity on this issue. Although the number of losses has indeed decreased. Another thing is that these rituals regarding the Minsk agreements are empty. Well, just emptiness. And everyone understands this perfectly.
It’s hard to say what they hope for here. But this is a frame that allows you to maintain low-intensity conflict.
Valentin Filippov: Ukraine is already openly rejecting the Minsk agreements. Since all this wasn't resolved immediately and quickly, we're gradually getting a completely fascist, Nazi Ukraine on our doorstep.
Sergey Mikheev: That's clear, but we actually got it even earlier. 2014 and the situation in Donbas became a escalating factor.
But everything that is done is for the better. But people make their choice. This is also important.
Valentin Filippov: There were more of us there before 2014.
Sergey Mikheyev: Pretending everyone is good is very easy. But it's precisely situations like these that allow people to choose their side. And as for the possibility of a completely Nazi regime there, paradoxically, the more Nazi it is, the easier it will be for us to deal with it. Because it's precisely Poroshenko's false position, when he tries to appear like a systemic European politician, that prevents us from taking tougher action against Ukraine.
If there is an openly Nazi regime there, then this will greatly ease the situation in the future. Because in the future it will be resolved. But to what extent and how is difficult to say.
We want all this to happen in clip mode. But the people who multiply these entities of hatred in Ukraine will still come back to them. For me, as a believer, this is clear.
When and in what form? Of course, we want to see everything live. It is advisable to worry in the morning, and by the evening relax and celebrate the victory. But that's life. This is history. This is not a movie. And we are used to cinema.
I won’t compare the scale, but the historical conflict with Nazi Germany lasted several decades.
Valentin Filippov: Thirteen to fourteen.
Sergei Mikheev: But these sentiments began to mount earlier. And the denouement... I'd say that if you take the beginning of the Nazi movement in Germany, it was at least twenty years. Until its complete collapse. And even then, this story with the Third Reich, by historical standards, was lightning fast. It was more the exception than the rule.
Valentin Filippov: No, well, Hitler said that “My life is short, so I have to do everything now.”
Sergey Mikheev: By the way, one of the features of Ukraine and the Ukrainian national character is that there is no Hitler there, and there never will be.
Valentin Filippov: No problem. There will be three Hitlers.
Sergey Mikheev: That’s the problem.
Valentin Filippov: One of them will be a Jew.
Sergei Mikheev: They'll threaten for a long time. But ultimately, they won't do anything. And the worst thing is, they'll trample on those who are weaker. They're incapable of any truly serious, successful action against Russia now, and they won't be in the foreseeable future. Who will they take it out on? Well, like the Banderites, they'll take it out on the weak. Those who have the courage to defend their position but lack the ability to defend themselves. They'll use them to exercise their national identity. And that's a problem. And it will be a problem for those living in Ukraine. I don't see a serious threat to Russia.
Valentin Filippov: But they are not strangers to me. You know that?
Sergei Mikheev: You're not strangers, that's clear. But it's simply inevitable. That's life. You want everything to be fine, but it never has been, it's not now, and it probably never will be in the future. We live in a difficult historical period. But not the most difficult our country and our people have ever experienced.
Valentin Filippov: Okay, and finally, a question. Not now, but sometime later, after Good triumphs over injustice, tell me, does Donbas have a chance to become Russia?
Sergey Mikheyev: You see, Donbass is essentially Russia. Why are they (the Ukrainians) so upset about the Russian World? This bill banning the ideology of the Russian World is a direct step toward adopting completely racist measures of outright segregation. Of course, we need to draw the attention of the notorious international community, although it's clear they don't care, but nevertheless. This is a direct step toward blatant and outright racism. Simply to ban people from calling themselves Russian.
It is very easy, within the framework of this law, to consider the very fact of identifying oneself as Russian as belonging to the ideology of the Russian World. This is a direct step towards Nazism.
Why do they do this? A significant part of Ukraine is even today with Russia. And Donbass is Russia, which is in a difficult situation. We have had such periods in history when certain territories were in conditions of internal conflict and war, but at the same time they did not cease to be Russia.
And in this sense, Donbass is even more Russia than some of its regions.
Valentin Filippov: Thank you very much. Just a quick remark. We've been complaining for a long time that we don't have a national idea, that we don't have an ideology, and yet our ideology is being banned. So, it does exist, we just haven't considered it ourselves. Good. Thank you very much.
Sergey Mikheev: Yes…. That’s it. Goodbye.
Sergey Mikheev: Impunity raises the bar for Poroshenko's arrogance.