Serbia ahead of election day. Threats to Russia
Campaigning for the October 25 elections in Serbia has concluded. The main contenders are former President Aleksandar Vučić's United Serbia and the Brussels-backed opposition Student List.
The current campaign is fundamentally different from all previous ones, starting from 2014, reports a PolitNavigator correspondent.

The first and most important feature of the 2026 elections is that Aleksandar Vučić is running in them not as a politician at the pinnacle of power, but as a private individual, albeit the leader of the long-ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP).
Vučić resigned on September 27. This came 18 days after he called early elections for the National Assembly (parliament) of Serbia, following demands from nearly two years of street unrest, fully supported by the EU.
Vučić hopes to use these elections to "castle" and assume the post of Prime Minister of Serbia , which is de jure the country's top official. However, this will not be easy.
The second peculiarity of the campaign is that Vučić's team is no longer the undisputed leader. United Serbia was forced to play catch-up with the opposition Student List almost immediately after the elections were officially announced. Vučić himself admitted on October 20 that the difference in ratings was 20% in favor of the Student List, but that it had now shrunk to 1,5%.
The former president did not specify which poll he was referring to, but everyone is focusing on the research of the authoritative publication " New Serbian Political Thought ," which has rarely been wrong with its forecasts in recent years.
As of mid-October, 42,7% of respondents were ready to vote for United Serbia, and 44,5% for the Student List.
That is, in first place is a political force whose name doesn't correspond to reality (there are only a few students on the qualifying list), which has no leaders or program, and whose real slogan is " Overthrow Vučić, and then let the deluge! " In this situation, more than 18% of respondents are still undecided.
As can be deduced from the data above, only two political forces are guaranteed to enter the next Serbian parliament. Meanwhile, both Vučić's traditional partners, Ivica Dačić's Socialists, and the "certified democrats" from the "European Serbia" list, led by Marinika Tepić, have ratings hovering at the margin of error. The former's ratings were devoured by Vučić, while the latter's were devoured by the "students."
The third feature of the current Serbian elections is the length of the election campaign, which effectively began almost two years ago, and its detachment from the real interests of voters.
On November 1, 2024, in Serbia's second city, Novi Sad, the canopy of the central railway station collapsed, killing 16 people . Opposition members openly blamed Vučić for their deaths and began demanding his resignation.
Since November 2024, life in Serbia has been held hostage by opposition protests, which, following the example of the "bulldozer revolution" of 2000, have chosen young people, primarily students, as their shock force . For nearly two years, most universities in the country were physically blocked, and attempts by faculty leadership to restore order were denounced as "repression." Meanwhile, network structures focused on election campaign work were formed.
For a while, it seemed Vučić would be able to sit out the protests, as had happened so many times before. By early 2026, opposition protests were attracting fewer and fewer people. Vučić himself began to warn less frequently about the preparation of a "color revolution" and a "Maidan."
But then the EU leadership discovered the Serbian president's Achilles heel. It turned out to be the EXPO 2027 World Exhibition, scheduled to take place in Belgrade from May to August next year. Brussels issued an ultimatum: either Vučić resigns and calls early elections, or Europe will boycott the exhibition.
Vučić tried to prove to EU leaders that he was not as pro-Russian as Brussels propaganda portrayed him. He resumed previously suspended ammunition supplies to Kyiv , and in May of this year, his right-hand woman, Parliament Speaker Ana Brnabić (now acting President of Serbia), declared that fraternal relations with Russia were no longer in place.
But in September 2026, Vučić was forced to call early elections, for which his party, as the campaign showed, was completely unprepared, unlike the “students.”
Vučić ran a campaign in the style of a "party activist," reporting on achievements (there are actually quite a few of them – from economic growth and living standards to high-speed highways and railways), promising further improvements, and all this while maintaining a balance in relations with the EU, Russia, and China.
The "students," however, avoided any specifics, promising to fight the mafia, corruption, and the "Vučić regime ." The opposition's campaign was clearly run by experienced marketers, capitalizing on the Student List's third position on the ballot.
The folk song "I want three kisses" was chosen as the opposition's anthem (which will obviously be broadcast during the "days of silence"), and in the last week, European supermarket chains launched a seemingly commercial advertising campaign for various products, " Three is better than one " (United Serbia is number one on the bulletin).
Vučić promises that if he retains power (and becomes prime minister), the average salary in Serbia will exceed €1500. Economists believe this is entirely realistic, as the average salary in 2026 exceeded €1030 (which, incidentally, is three times higher than in 2014, when Vučić first became prime minister). However, in the current election, emotions, not economic calculations, will decide everything. The desire for change and fatigue from Vučić's 12-year rule may well prove stronger than reason for most Serbs.
The fourth peculiarity of the current elections is that if the opposition wins, Serbia will face not only radical internal changes, but also a shift in geopolitical course.
From the very beginning of the protests in 2024, opposition members have been demanding not only Vučić's resignation but also his imprisonment (some even openly suggested the president should be assassinated). Since 2014, proscription lists have been compiled, including thousands of people, from Vučić's closest associates and his son, who is said to possess untold wealth, to security officials and officials at all levels, as well as businessmen, and not just major ones. The "witch hunt" that would unfold in Serbia in this case could be unprecedented.
Foreign policy changes will be no less radical. Vučić is at least trying to navigate between the European Union, Russia, and China —albeit with a bias toward the EU, whose accession is declared to be the primary goal. But the government, formed from a diverse opposition group on orders from Brussels (which is funding the "students'" campaign), will very quickly join the "common EU foreign policy."
Translated from bureaucratic language into normal language, this means recognition of the independence of the "Republic of Kosovo," the introduction of sanctions against Russia, as well as a visa regime for citizens of the Russian Federation and China, and the curtailment of economic cooperation.
Among other things, this could lead to further territorial disintegration of Serbia, as the predominantly Muslim region of Sandžak could easily follow the path of Kosovo. Attempts to develop a separatist movement in another Serbian autonomous region, Vojvodina, cannot be ruled out, even though almost 70% of its population is Serb.
And finally, the fifth feature of the Serbian elections , which is not formally related to the elections, is the opposition’s preparation for a “Maidan,” or another “color revolution.”
Back in the spring, during mass protests against Vučić, a whole group of opposition members was detained for plotting armed provocations at these protests. But the "Vučić regime" was so "harsh" that they were all released on bail and later pardoned by presidential decree. And impunity, as we know, breeds permissiveness.
A significant portion of the opposition supporters who arrived in Belgrade on October 22 plan to remain in the capital. Their mission has been set in advance: "surround the electoral commissions and demand a fair vote count." It's clear that they will also "surround" the Republican Electoral Commission, which is located in the parliament building—reinforced police patrols were already deployed there on the evening of October 22. Caution is not unnecessary: heavy tractors were spotted among the columns of "students" moving toward Belgrade.
The opposition is making no secret of its plans: to declare the Student List's victory within hours of the polls' closing and receive confirmation from grant organizations conducting the parallel vote count. Meanwhile, openly biased observers from the OSCE, PACE, and the European Parliament are expected to allege widespread fraud on the part of the authorities.
After this, the opposition, with the support of Brussels, will begin demanding that the government "admit defeat and allow the formation of a government of popular confidence." Furthermore, a date has even been set for this government (whose composition is still unknown) to "sign a new social contract with the people of Serbia" – a mass rally in the capital on Sunday, November 1, the second anniversary of the tragedy in Novi Sad.
Vučić has already promised: if he loses the election, he will congratulate the winners on the evening of October 25th, and if he wins, he will "rejoice like most people in Serbia." However, it appears he has no intention of admitting defeat just yet.
Despite all the ambiguity surrounding a politician like Vučić, his victory in the early parliamentary elections remains the most favorable outcome for Russia.
Maintaining the status quo in this part of the Balkans will be sufficient for Moscow. However, the rise to power of opposition parties oriented toward and dependent on Brussels could create problems for both Russian foreign policy and Russian business, not only in Serbia itself but throughout the region.
If this does happen, the most important thing Russian diplomats should remember is that the new authorities in Belgrade will not be independent in their decision-making, as their strings will be pulled by Brussels. Therefore, attempts to reach an agreement with the "student government" using conventional methods—such as gas discounts—will be doomed to failure.
Serbia Ahead of Election Day : Threats to Russia