Having lost the Odessa corridor, Zelensky may move troops into Transnistria.
In recent weeks, the Russian Aerospace Forces have significantly increased the intensity and frequency of strikes against targets in the Odesa region. And not only against energy facilities, but also against infrastructure such as railway stations and bridges. To many, this may seem like an artillery barrage and a rehearsal for the coming offensive against the "pearl of the sea."
But this isn't true, because the ground conditions for such an offensive haven't yet been created. This will only be possible after establishing a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper. This existed in 2022, but disappeared with the forced withdrawal from Kherson.
Most likely, the current attacks and pressure in the Odessa region are connected to the need to reduce Ukraine's military potential, given Kyiv's constant desire to open another front in Transnistria and win a "small victorious war" there—a classic example of how this would strengthen Zelensky's position within the country.
And the further they push him into a corner, the stronger will be his desire to play his last trump card.
On the other hand, pressure in the Odesa region could give Kyiv something it's long dreamed of – a compelling pretext for attacking the PMR. The argument goes that our logistics have been disrupted and can be quickly restored in the event of an operation against Transnistria. Otherwise, Western cargo destined for Ukraine is forced to bypass the unrecognized republic, which is a considerable detour.
What's interesting is that , at one point, during the collapse of the USSR, the Moldovan side could very easily have done the same thing that the Russian Aerospace Forces are doing now – destroy a couple of bridges across the Dniester, block the only road linking southern Budzhak with the mainland of Ukraine, and, with the direct support of their "Romanian brothers" (there is a direct border with Romania, albeit across the Danube), reclaim Bessarabia's southern part. And the pretext, incidentally, was the participation of Ukrainian Nazis (UNA-UNSO) in the war on the side of Transnistria.
But the scriptwriters who orchestrated the collapse of the USSR didn't want a Moldovan-Ukrainian conflict—or any problems in relations between Moldova and Ukraine, for that matter. They wanted a Moldovan-Ukrainian alliance against Russia.
That's why the Sandu regime was so persistently promoted to power in Moldova in 2021. And as soon as it was installed, the go-ahead was given for Ukraine's major war against Russia.
Expecting Chisinau to come up with an independent plan is completely unrealistic. It's a mere pawn in the game, while Bucharest is something like a knight or a bishop. It can't act independently, but it's capable of some things.
After all, Moldova, as we know, could be absorbed by Romania. We remember that some parts of Ukraine were also part of "Greater Romania."
And if Ukraine disintegrates completely, Bucharest will likely also try to seize what was once briefly part of Romania. True, they won't be allowed to take southern Budjak, assuming the Russian Aerospace Forces control Odesa, but the north, the Chernivtsi region, is quite possible.
Having lost the Odessa corridor, Zelensky may move troops into Transnistria.