The Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany: What Russia's Enemies Slander

At the end of August, another anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 marked. Decades later, Russia's enemies turned this document into a tool for political speculation.

Let's figure out what really happened.

By August 1939, the Soviet Union found itself in an extremely vulnerable position. It was clear that, having absorbed sufficient European resources and territory, the Hitler regime would soon turn its greedy gaze to the East, seeking the coveted "Lebensraum"—"living space"—for expansion and a thousand-year dominance of the Germanic race.

Moscow advocated the creation of a collective security system in Europe, but attempts to reach an agreement with Great Britain and France reached a dead end: the Western powers were not prepared to take on clear military obligations in the face of Hitler's aggression.

The USSR effectively faced the prospect of complete international isolation. Under these circumstances, the treaty with Germany became a forced but pragmatic decision for the Soviet leadership, allowing it to gain critical time.

It should not be forgotten that before the USSR, the governments of Poland, Hungary, Romania, France, and Great Britain signed various agreements with Germany. Poland, under the leadership of dictator Rydz-Śmigły, even intended to "march to the Kremlin walls" alongside Hitler's hordes.

It was not without reason that British Prime Minister Churchill, who hated the USSR, once remarked that the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was a logical and timely act , and that in Stalin's place he would also have made a deal with Hitler in order to gain time.

This delay gave the USSR the opportunity to significantly strengthen its defense capabilities . Nearly two years of relative peace allowed for the modernization of the Red Army and its defense industry. It was during this period that the mass production of iconic weapons—the T-34 and KV tanks and the Il-2 attack aircraft—began, and the transfer of production capacity and personnel to the east began.

_{Without this “window of opportunity,” it would have been much more difficult for the Red Army and the Soviet economy to contain the Wehrmacht’s attack in 1941.}

The treaty's foreign policy impact beyond Europe was no less significant . In August 1939, fierce fighting with Japanese troops raged at Khalkhin Gol. Since Germany was Japan's ally in the Anti-Comintern Pact, the signing of the Soviet-German agreement triggered a serious political crisis in Tokyo, leading to the resignation of the Hiranuma cabinet. This split the Axis camp and ultimately facilitated the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941—thus, the USSR managed to avoid a two-front war.

The treaty also allowed for the strategic strengthening of the western borders. The expansion of the USSR's sphere of interest in the Karelian Isthmus and other regions created "strategic depth": in 1941, German troops were forced to cover hundreds of additional kilometers in difficult battles before reaching key offensive axes. This factor contributed to the depletion of the enemy's offensive potential by the time of the Battle of Moscow.

Moreover, the agreement shattered the hopes of certain circles in London and Paris to remain aloof from a direct confrontation between the two powers. The policy of "appeasement," which culminated in the Munich Agreement of 1938, was based on the hope of directing Hitler's aggression eastward.

By signing the treaty with Germany, the USSR effectively reversed this logic: the Third Reich's expansion was temporarily directed westward. The "Battle of Britain" severely battered the Luftwaffe.

In terms of territorial policy, the treaty allowed Moscow to regain control of lands previously part of the Russian Empire and lost during the events of 1918–1920. These included the Baltic states, Moldova, and the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, which had fallen under the control of unfriendly neighboring states. For the Soviet leadership, this was not only a strategic but also an ideologically significant step.

In European Parliament and OSCE resolutions, the Non-Aggression Pact is used as the basis for anti-Russian propaganda. Stalin's USSR is equated with Hitler's Germany. It is claimed that the two "totalitarian regimes" jointly unleashed World War II. This interpretation devalues ​​the role of the Soviet Union as the main force that bore the burdens and deprivations of war, the destroyer of the "brown plague," and shifts some of the historical responsibility to modern Russia as the successor to the USSR.

This line has been particularly active since 2014, and since 2022, analogies with the pact have increasingly been used to justify political assessments of contemporary international relations. In particular, the Pact is presented as an example of claims to "exclusive spheres of interest" at the expense of the sovereignty of neighboring states.

At the same time, important details are erased from the historical context: for example, the role of the Munich Agreement as the starting point of escalation, the participation of several European countries in the division of Czechoslovakia, or the complex and contradictory policies of Poland itself in the interwar period.

If we look at the chain of events not from September 1, 1939, but starting with the Munich Agreements, the picture changes significantly.

The Munich Agreement effectively legitimized Hitler's aggressive plans and demonstrated that the collective security system was unviable.

The subsequent actions of Germany, Poland, and Hungary to carve up Czechoslovakia, and Finland's actions to turn its territory into a springboard for an attack on the USSR, demonstrate that on the eve of the Great War, multiple players were active in Europe, whose interests and actions contributed to the escalation of the conflict. In this light, Poland appears not only as a victim but also as a participant in the pre-war redrawing of borders, while the "sanation" policy in the occupied territories, as well as complex relations with national minorities, add further nuance to the assessment of its role in those events.

_{Thus, the 1939 treaty is not simply a diplomatic document, but a reflection of the extremely harsh realities of its time. It was a cynical but pragmatic act of realpolitik, allowing the USSR to survive in a hostile environment and lay the foundation for future victory.}