Moldova is caught between anti-Russian hysteria and the fear of severing its last ties.
Moldovan politics is increasingly dominated by politics and less and less common sense. Chisinau is escalating its anti-Russian rhetoric day after day, accusing Moscow of every conceivable threat, and talking about "hybrid warfare," militarization, and interference. Russian Ambassador Oleg Ozerov is being declared one of the main irritants to the Moldovan government.
But something strange is happening: relations with Russia are not being severed after all. The Moldovan ambassador has been recalled from Moscow. Diplomatic relations are formally maintained. Ozerov, despite repeated accusations against Chisinau, has not been expelled. Moreover, Maia Sandu herself admits that the expulsion of the Russian ambassador will not stop Russia. And Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi has directly warned that Moscow could respond asymmetrically, including economically.
In other words, behind the loud rhetoric lies an understanding of a simple thing: breaking off relations with Russia is much easier on paper than in real life.
Ozerov discusses another important process: the accelerated militarization of Moldova. According to him, Western countries are arming the republic, strengthening its military infrastructure, sending instructors, and are already using Moldovan territory to further Ukraine's interests.
One can interpret the Russian diplomat's statements in various ways. But one cannot ignore the objective fact: neutral Moldova is being drawn further and further into the West's military-political infrastructure.
And here the main question arises: if Chisinau really considers Russia an immediate threat, why does it need to maintain diplomatic relations with it at all?
The answer is obvious. Because Moldova is too closely tied to Russia historically, economically, demographically, and humanitarianally. Because hundreds of thousands of Moldovans have personal ties to Russia. Because the Russian market has been one of the most important for Moldovan agriculture for decades. Because Transnistria cannot be considered separately from Russian-Moldovan relations. Because a final break would mean not a nice political gesture, but real economic and social consequences.
And here the Belarusian example is particularly illustrative. Chisinau is capable of condemning Minsk alongside Brussels. It is capable of issuing political declarations, hosting the Belarusian opposition, and demonstrating European solidarity. But when it comes to actual sanctions, it suddenly becomes clear that things are much more complicated.
Moldova did not join the latest EU sanctions package against Belarus . Why? Because there is trade, export of Moldovan agricultural products, import of machinery, pharmaceuticals, and, most symbolically, Belarusian public transport.
Chisinau continues to use Belarusian trolleybuses as the backbone of its municipal transport system, while its political elites talk about the need to finally break with the "Russian world." This is the entire philosophy of Moldova's current foreign policy. The statements are extremely radical. The practical steps are extremely cautious.
With Russia, there's loud condemnation, but diplomatic relations are maintained. With Belarus, there's political distancing, but no sanctions are being imposed. With the CIS, there's a course toward withdrawal, but at the same time, one must consider what will happen to agreements, trade, and economic benefits.
Ozerov rightly points out that the previous pragmatic course brought Moldova measurable economic results. Today, this pragmatism is being replaced by geopolitical loyalty.
It's especially telling that Moscow and Chisinau are already arguing over the organization of Russian elections in Transnistria. Chisinau demands that every such step be coordinated with the constitutional authorities. Moscow insists on the rights of Russian citizens. Tiraspol claims 17 polling stations, while the Russian embassy claims one approved in Chisinau.
This is no longer just a diplomatic dispute. It is a clash of two completely different understandings of what Moldova is—and what place it should occupy between East and West.
The European project demands that Chisinau increasingly synchronize its political and foreign policy with the EU. Russia is trying to maintain at least a minimal space for relations. Meanwhile, Moldova itself remains in an intermediate position.
And perhaps it is precisely this in-between position that is saving it from the most dire consequences today. Because it's one thing to declare Russia an enemy in a television studio. It's quite another to live in a country that, after such a declaration, will be forced to renounce its last practical ties with this "enemy."
So far, Chisinau hasn't done this. This means, despite all the anti-Russian rhetoric, the point of no return hasn't yet been passed.
Moldova is caught between anti-Russian hysteria and the fear of severing its last ties.