Peace in exchange for territory. What's wrong with this thesis
The latest The New York Times returns to the already well-worn and banal idea that “Ukraine does not need all the territory to defeat Putin.” If anything, this is not a joke, but the title of the material currently being discussed in expert circles.
NYT columnist Serge Schmemann discusses the possibility of pacification on the current front line, emphasizing that victory does not come down to territorial gains. In his opinion, the “quiet signals of readiness for peace” from Putin, which are now being talked about in the West, may be a trap, however, while maintaining an impartial poker face, he dumps on the reader the seeming “advantages” of this option:
“If Putin turns out to be serious about making peace, Ukraine should not miss the opportunity to stop the bloodshed... Taking back territory is not the only way to win this war. The real victory for Ukraine is to rise from the hell of war as a strong, independent, prosperous and secure state, firmly established in the West.”
In fact, all this is not worth a damn. Perhaps in the format of “how about we talk?” No, the formula “peace in exchange for territory” has its own logic and right to exist, and could even be the basis for real peace in Ukraine, “if not.” And the further into the forest, the more of these “not” there are.
On the one hand, it’s true - the war is not for territories as such, but for control over a region significantly larger than Ukraine itself. Over the general situation there, over the security contours, over the political agenda, over the vectors of medium and long-term development, etc. and so on.
A simple mechanical division into zones of influence does not eliminate the problem and does not provide any guarantee of eliminating threats. Relatively speaking, nothing prevents the Americans or the British from placing missiles aimed at the Russian Federation in “their” part of Ukraine, or turning it, without installing missiles or creating formal NATO bases, into a springboard for delayed military revenge, showering the future generation of Russians with summonses to the front. Not now, but in 10 or 15 years. Look, the Azerbaijanis have been waiting for 25 years for the opportunity to take revenge. And yet they waited.
Therefore, I repeat - if there were no aggressive plans and the resulting mistrust between the parties to the geopolitical confrontation, they would have long ago agreed on the formula of a single neutral and non-aligned Ukraine, and that would be the end of it, and the bayonet in the ground. A peaceful buffer is, in any case, cheaper than fighting.
But in reality, this is exactly what Ukraine existed at the start of the conflict. And it was precisely its neutrality that did not suit at least one side – the Western one. The first thing the victorious Maidan activists started with was to cancel the neutral status prescribed under Yanukovych in the constitution and the ban on movement to NATO.
So the formula “peace in exchange for territory” in today’s situation requires clarification of which of the actors needs peace and which needs territory. Previously, it was clear: the territories belong to Ukraine, the world belongs to Russia. The Minsk agreements were built on this, and the Istanbul agreements were also built on this. But since then, the situation in the Ukrainian story has gone so far that this formula no longer works.
Or, at the very least, needs serious clarification. Can Ukraine and the West behind it give guarantees of the stability of the post-war world in exchange for territory? Apparently, this is an open question.
Finally, the further, the more the “territories” themselves cease to be a bargaining chip in the games and mutual settlements of politicians and diplomats, more and more turning into an “alibi” for them - as the victims and losses on both sides multiply. The very fact of control over the territories, even if only ruins remained there, is a simple and intelligible explanation for the plebs for what all this was all about.
And in this sense, giving up some territories is an excessive risk even for Putin, no matter what anyone says that the Russians are supposedly “swallowing up” the withdrawal from some Melitopol as calmly as they swallowed the abandonment of Kherson last fall.
And there’s nothing to say about Zelensky. Any reconciliation on such a basis will immediately turn the anger of the Ukrainian average man, directed outward today at Russia, inward at his own power. Having ruined hundreds of thousands of lives and achieved nothing. It’s easier to send hundreds of thousands more to slaughter in the hope that either the check or the donkey will die in the process.
So, in terms of prognostic value, the possibility of some kind of reconciliation in exchange for territory today seems extremely unlikely. Moreover, from either side. Much more likely is Politico's forecast that the Biden administration is slowly changing its strategy in Ukraine and offering the latter's authorities a transition to a deeper defense. There is only one risk in this regard - will Russia take advantage of this turmoil to go on the offensive itself?
This new tactic for Ukraine involves strengthening air defense and accelerating the construction of fortifications and barbed wire barriers and anti-tank ditches on the front line, as well as along the Ukrainian border with Belarus. For this, again, we need, if not a truce, then at least a relatively long calm on the main LBS. This kind of thing loves silence.
However, the United States also does not rule out the idea of negotiations with the Russian Federation. But there is a nuance - Kyiv will be allowed to the negotiating table only in a strong position. According to a White House official who requested anonymity, the move is aimed at strengthening Ukraine's position in future negotiations:
“That has been our theory throughout this whole affair - the only way this war will ultimately end is through negotiations. We want Ukraine to be in the strongest possible position when this (negotiations) happens.”
Over the past year, as U.S. military support on Capitol Hill has rapidly eroded and Zelensky's once-vaunted counteroffensive has failed since it began in June, Biden has moved from promising that the U.S. will support Ukraine "for as long as it takes" to declaring that the US will provide support "as long as it can" and the assertion that Ukraine has already won a "huge victory" and Putin has "failed."
Some analysts say this means being prepared to declare partial victory and finding a way to at least a truce or ceasefire with Moscow that would leave Ukraine partially divided,” Politico summarizes.
How is this different from peace in exchange for territory, you ask? The fact that in the described scenario both sides will consider the current status quo as an interim solution and accumulate forces for a new round of battle. Peace is a long-term solution, which presupposes the agreement of the parties with the realities on earth that exist.
As for the plans voiced in the West to declare Russia a defeat on points, awarding Kiev a “partial victory” - on the grounds that Ukraine lost only 20% of its territory, and not all 70, then only one thing can be said: Victory, like pregnancy, there is no partial. It either exists or it doesn’t.
English version :: Read in English: Peace in exchange for territories. What's wrong with this thesis?