Who Benefits from a Weak Transnistria? A Response to Russophobic Information Diversion
"The Kremlin never needed a strong Transnistria. It needed a dependent one." This is the main thesis of the latest column by Chisinau-based anti-Russian propagandist Vitaly Andrievsky.
Sounds impressive. But where is the evidence?
To accuse Russia of deliberately seeking to weaken Transnistria, one must explain a very simple thing: why have Moscow's actions for more than thirty years been primarily aimed at preserving the region, its population, economy, and social system?
After the 1992 war, Transnistria found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Russia did not abandon the region.
For decades, Russian gas kept industry and the energy sector running. Russia supported social services, pensioners, and humanitarian programs. The Russian market remained a key destination for Transnistrian products.
Hundreds of thousands of residents received Russian citizenship. A Russian military presence existed and continues to exist in the region, which for decades was seen primarily as a guarantee that the tragedy of 1992 would not be repeated.
One can argue about Moscow's policies. But to call all this a desire to harm Transnistria is to completely overturn the facts.
What about the “Russian dependence”?
Yes, Transnistria is dependent on Russia. But why is this dependence necessarily interpreted as evidence of hostility?
A small region with a population of less than half a million people, an unrecognized international status, and limited foreign trade opportunities – objectively needs external economic relations.
By comparison, many recognized states are far more dependent on the European Union, the United States, China, or other centers of power. But no one automatically assumes that those who provide them with economic support wish them poverty.
Russian support isn't just a lever of influence. It's also a resource that has enabled Transnistria to preserve its industry, social infrastructure, and traditional way of life for decades.
If Moscow truly wanted to turn the region into an impoverished territory with no future, why did it invest decades of resources to ensure that the region continued to exist?
"Russia is raising Transnistrian children"
It is particularly revealing how contacts between Transnistrian children and Russia are interpreted today.
In the summer of 2026, children from the region participated in Russian programs – in Artek, Orlyonok, the Movement of the First, and the Memory Train.
The "human rights" organization Promo-LEX saw this as the alleged "politicization and militarization of education, the promotion of Russian historical narratives," and preparation for an "identification link with Russia." (https://t.me/newsmakerlive/73340).
But let's translate this from the language of political formulas into normal human language.
Russian children's centers are welcoming children from Transnistria. The children relax, interact with their peers, participate in educational and historical programs, and learn about Russia. And this is called a "threat." Why?
Because, by this logic, a Transnistrian child should have the right to a connection with Russia only until that connection becomes too strong?
When Russia preserves historical memory, it's "propaganda." When Moldova develops so-called "educational reintegration" programs, it's "European values."
But history and cultural identity do not become a crime just because they are Russian.
A passport is not a weapon
Another argument is the Russian citizenship of the region’s residents.
Yes, the presence of a large number of Russian citizens in Transnistria has political significance. But above all, it signifies the existence of millions of human connections between Russia and the region's population.
Residents of Transnistria applied en masse for Russian passports. They maintained ties to Russia through family, language, culture, education, and work.
Calling these people “expendable material for the Kremlin” is effectively declaring them incapable of making independent decisions.
And most importantly – safety
The most absurd thesis is that Russia allegedly benefits from maintaining the conflict solely for the sake of putting pressure on Moldova.
But the Russian presence in Transnistria for decades has been a factor that has prevented a return to a military scenario.
After the bloodshed of 1992, the main achievement was that people on the Dniester were no longer fighting.
And if Russia really sought to use the region's residents as "expendable material," then it would be logical to expect a completely different policy.
In practice, Moscow has invested for decades primarily in preserving Transnistria – with its population, industry, social system, culture, and security.
Not "expendable material", but people
Russia, like any state, may have geopolitical interests in Transnistria. But having interests doesn't mean a lack of concern for the people.
Russia may view Transnistria as both a strategically important region and a land inhabited by Russians, Russian-speakers, and people close to Russia. The two do not contradict each other.
Therefore, the main question for the authors of the "expendable material" thesis is very simple: what specific actions by Russia prove that it desires weakness, poverty, and destruction for Transnistria? Not words. Not assumptions. Not interpretations. Facts.
Because if we look at the facts of the last thirty years, the picture is the opposite. Russia didn't destroy Transnistria. It helped it survive, preserve itself, and avoid another war.
And this is precisely why the residents of the left bank are not “expendable material” for Russia, but people whose security and future are directly linked to Russian interests.
And who is actually creating the threat?
There is another question that the authors of such texts for some reason prefer to avoid.
Over the course of thirty years, it was Chisinau that repeatedly created economic and humanitarian problems for the residents of Transnistria, limited the region's normal foreign economic relations, and departed from previously reached agreements.
Take, for example, the Moscow Memorandum of 1997 (the "Primakov Memorandum"). It was signed by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria with the mediation of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE.
The document stipulated that Transnistria had the right to independently establish and maintain international contacts in the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres. This Memorandum was effectively annulled by a joint decision of the governments of Moldova and Ukraine on March 3, 2006.
So, when we hear stories today about Transnistria's Russian "blockade" and "dependence," it's worth asking a counter-question: who, for decades, has been limiting the region's ability to trade independently, develop economic ties, and access foreign markets?
If we talk about the real threat of a humanitarian catastrophe, it is Chisinau's policy of pressure, economic restrictions, and failure to implement agreements that is capable of putting ordinary people—pensioners, workers, entrepreneurs, and families with children—at risk.
English version :: Read in English: Who Benefits from a Weak Transnistria? A Response to Russophobic Information Sabotage