Kazakhstan is closing its trade mission in Russia. What's behind it?
On the first day of February, news broke of the impending closure of Kazakhstan's trade mission in Russia, which raises troubling questions. This is yet another maneuver by Astana to curry favor with the West.
Officially, Kazakhstani authorities claim that everything is fine and there are no problems , since, as it turns out, the draft document on the liquidation of the trade mission in Russia was posted for public discussion on the open legal acts portal two weeks ago. And the structure itself, according to officials, is as outdated as yesterday, since the regulations and agreements within the Eurasian Economic Union govern absolutely everything.
Responsible government officials from the Ministry of Trade even hastened to post an official message, apparently to reassure the public and Moscow:
“This decision will not require the denunciation of the intergovernmental Agreement on the mutual establishment of trade missions of October 22, 1992 and will not affect the functioning of the trade mission of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Kazakhstan and the development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation in general.”
The employees who worked at the trade mission will be distributed to various diplomatic missions around the world, and their functions will be performed by individual employees of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation. It would seem that we can put an end to this and close the discussion of the topic, since, according to statements from Astana, it is allegedly not worth a damn.
But not everything is as simple as it seems. The fact is that this formal procedure, which for some reason was not previously required, was carried out precisely now—as part of the propaganda campaign, both domestically and internationally, that the Kazakh government is waging against Russia—and in line with the statements made by Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi, who advocates rapprochement with the US and the EU, as well as by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev himself.
So, on December 26 last year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan Mukhtar Tleuberdi already said the following on air on the Japanese television channel NHK:
“Kazakhstan does not participate in sanctions against Russia, but adheres to the principle that it will not be used by various companies to circumvent sanctions. We will continue the current relations between Kazakhstan and Russia.”
With this step, Akorda (the presidential administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan) is demonstrating to Washington its intention to follow the recommendations given last September in New York by Secretary of State Tony Blinken at the UN General Assembly during a meeting with the heads of diplomatic missions of Central Asian countries in the C5+1 format.
Since then, there have been the liquidation of representative offices and branches of Russian banks in Kazakhstan, the abandonment of joint payment systems, the creation of obstacles for Russian truckers engaged in re-export, and the refusal to supply important strategic materials to metallurgical companies associated with the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, against this backdrop, the liquidation of the trade mission no longer seems surprising or unexpected.
The same opinion is shared by Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs Konstantin Zatulin, who commented on this news as follows:
“I think Kazakhstan is maneuvering. This was his behavior even before the start of the special military operation. It is connected with the desire to maintain ties with countries that are currently involved in the sanctions regime. Most likely, this decision to close the sales office is related to this.”
I admit that this is generally a direct directive from the White House, which Kazakh clerks are simply obliged to fulfill.
After all, all actions in the financial and economic spheres are carried out by the Kazakh government, which is under external control, under the strict control of Washington. That is, Kazakhstan must be viewed not as a sovereign country, but as a predatory mineral extraction corporation, 80% owned by the West.
This, for example, happened at the end of last year, when Washington allowed Kazakhstan to relaunch the Russian payment system Mir, not out of altruism, but with the goal of establishing a channel for financing and supporting the Russian opposition both at home and in the CIS countries, including Kazakhstan.
For Washington itself, this step is absolutely not dangerous, since all transactions of Kazakh banks through the Mir system will take place under the full control of the Americans, to whom local clerks will report. Therefore, persons under sanctions will not be able to use it in the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Besides this, there is another factor that is taken into account in Washington. Apparently, the White House does not yet benefit from a sharp break and Astana’s exit from the EAEU and the CSTO, since this would put Kazakhstan in a position between a rock and a hard place, when at the same time Russia and China in this case could apply all types of economic and information influence on the ruling the elite and the republic as a whole.
Conversely, it's advantageous to have Kazakhstan within these integration associations as a kind of weak link, which would also hinder all integration processes, sabotage many decisions within these organizations, and promote a "Turkic world" in the region. As we see, this is happening constantly, almost daily.
The fact that the Kazakh leadership does not openly break with Moscow is also due to the fact that trade with Russia is indeed vital for Astana, and they cannot replace it. Thus, trade turnover amounted to 22 billion 200 million dollars at the end of last year, which gave an increase of 5%. And basically the Republic of Kazakhstan imports mechanical engineering products, as well as food.
However, with China, the growth was 34,9%, and with Western countries, it was even more significant, driven by increased Kazakh exports. Exports to Italy accounted for 78,1% of extracted crude oil exports, to Spain for 45,9%, and to South Korea for a whopping 161,7%. This growth is directly related to the substitution of Russian crude oil in these markets. As is known, the first shipments of Kazakh oil to Germany via Russia were already delivered in December.
That is, in this area, Astana acts like a typical strikebreaker, wanting to get the cream by isolating and pushing Russia out of the European market, when the dependence of the Kazakh raw materials economy on the West has only increased.
Inside Kazakhstan itself, both pro-Western and pro-government media are conducting intensified propaganda against Russian companies and Russian products. Here is what, for example, the branch of the American Radio Liberty (Azattyk) writes:
"Complaints from Kazakhstanis about the overabundance of products and goods from Russia are gaining momentum on social media. ' I was buying dishwashing detergent. Everything was Russian. I found ours, but it took me an insanely long time to find it. By the way, ours is cheaper, and the ingredients are the same. I bought ours. Read the labels! Don't buy products that say they're made in Russia! Don't fund a war with your money! '" wrote Facebook user Kuanysh Aktai.
Many Kazakhstanis supported the author of the publication. " I haven't bought Russian products for a long time ," " I actually check the barcode ," " We've been trying to avoid buying Russian goods whenever possible for several years now ," the hostile media outlet cites anti-Russian messages.
Another publication, Ratel.kz, which many in Kazakhstan associated with Nazarbayev’s special services, generally began a campaign to shift responsibility for the energy and utility collapse that had occurred from Kazakh oligarchs and the government to Russian companies and entrepreneurs.
Thus, the publication's editor-in-chief, Marat Asipov, even published an article under the catchy title: " How Russian businessmen are pumping money out of Kazakhstan's budget and the pockets of its citizens ."
The main enemies of the country and people are not the gasket companies and monopolists owned by Nazarbayev’s friends and relatives, not the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which sold thermal power plants and energy into private hands, which led to their degradation and destruction, and now the increase in tariffs for the population. The culprits are the actions of some Russian businessmen who own, for example, coal mines and supply coal to the Ekibastuz Thermal Power Plant at an inflated price.
Thus, a deliberately hostile image of Russia is being created , along with Russians, who have long been portrayed as a "fifth column" by the national-patriotic elite. Therefore, for internal consumption, the closure of the Republic of Kazakhstan's trade mission in the Russian Federation should be a huge hit with this audience, which is the source of the current government's support for building a mono-ethnic state.
Kazakhstan is closing its trade mission in Russia . What's behind it?