How to correct the main mistake of the initial plan of the SVO
Military observer Vladislav Shurygin spoke in his blog about a possible scenario for the actions of the Russian army “on the ground” in order to correct the mistake of the authors of the original plan for the Northern Military District in Ukraine.
“Yesterday I spoke with my old comrade. One of the legendary commanders of the times of the Chechen companies. They started talking about how the experience of the Ukrainian war was unique, unlike anything else and completely new. He listened to all my arguments. And about the role of UAVs, and about artillery shooting by tanks, and about the role of modern intelligence and digitalization, and so on. Then he expressed his point of view, and I find it very interesting.
The favorite thing of any new generation is to refute the experience of the old. Like, everything old is outdated, and everything new is advanced. However, this is a common mistake of subjective perception and lack of education. In fact, a lot of things that have suddenly opened up today were discovered a long time ago. The methods and tools have simply changed.
In the 19th century, a hot air balloon made it possible to see all enemy positions. In the 20th century, reconnaissance aircraft became one of the main intelligence tools, and today, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are proving excellent in this area. But this isn't a revolution in military affairs. It's a new tool for warfare.
Back during the First Chechen War, we had a detachment of Pchela UAVs in the 45th Airborne Spetsnaz Regiment. Incidentally, they were Soviet-made, and they performed brilliantly! They accompanied special forces groups behind militant lines and conducted reconnaissance. A new innovation was born at that time: the data transmitted by the Pchelas was linked to a target designation system, allowing the target's coordinates to be immediately transmitted to artillery crews upon detection. Does this remind you of anything we know today? Only it was a quarter of a century earlier, and on a different generation of platforms . The detachment fought with flying colors! There was only one problem: the drones kept breaking down, getting shot down, and their production had long since gone bankrupt and closed. The detachment ceased to exist when the last Pchela was shot down. Therefore, it was impossible to scale up this experience, or even preserve it. But this is just an example...
Another example is the creation of reconnaissance-strike systems, where data from reconnaissance units is immediately transmitted to artillery, and the artillery immediately delivers firepower . Previously, this was achieved through highly trained artillerymen, artillery spotters, and reconnaissance units, along with well-established communications. To improve the effectiveness of these "RUKs," precision-guided munitions were developed, integrating attack aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, and operational-tactical missiles. Today, digitalization, drone-aided adjustments, and space reconnaissance have come into play. These advances have made it possible to significantly reduce artillery response times. However, we are still a long way from developing fully-fledged "RUKs" of the 80s, capable of covering the entire operational depth.
Today, the war has "collapsed" into the early twentieth century, during the First World War, and everyone is immediately talking about some kind of crisis in existing tactics and operational art. They say we were unprepared for the war to descend into the trenches of the First World War. But, in fact, the reason for this "collapse" into the past lies elsewhere entirely—a strategic error in the planning of the entire operation. An error in calculating the forces and resources required. I don't know why it was made, but it is this error that continues to weigh heavily on our shoulders, preventing us from turning the tide of the war.
What fundamentally distinguished World War II from the First? The emergence of a universal tool that made it possible to neutralize the know-how of the First World War—a deeply echeloned, well-equipped defense that drowned out any attacks. This know-how was the mechanized strike force—powerful artillery fists that penetrated defenses at vulnerable points and deployed highly mobile tank and motorized infantry formations through these breaches, literally gnawing away at the enemy's entire rear infrastructure, turning its units and formations at the front into severed limbs . Encirclements—"cauldrons"—became the symbol of World War II. And after that, until the mid-90s, we continued to develop the theory of deep offensive operations, and achieved much. The "Ogarkov Doctrine" remains the pinnacle of offensive military theory.
But since the early 90s, we have consistently abandoned both our unique path of national development—socialism—and many other related policies. This included the military doctrine of a "great European war." Our leaders believed that once the ideological confrontation between the communist and capitalist systems had ceased, and our country had completely retreated to the latter, there would no longer be any major military confrontation between countries of the same system. Only local conflicts. And as a last resort, there are always nuclear weapons. It was under this doctrine that we began rebuilding our army in the early 2000s. All military leaders who disagreed with this doctrine were quickly sent to the reserves, the army was reduced to a "compact professional" one, the mobilization system was abolished, and the military reform was considered a success. And this was true for low-intensity conflicts, in which our opponents were armies or formations inferior in numbers and, most importantly, in technology. And then, on February 24, the Second World War began...
In the first two weeks, we demonstrated an impressive level of military skill, advancing hundreds of kilometers into Ukraine. But by mid-March, it became clear that we couldn't build on our success because we simply had nothing left to fight with! And then the situation slowly began to slide toward its current state. The lack of sufficient troops immediately reduced the entire strategy to a divisional, or at most, corps-level, level. And it reduced the course of combat operations to a trench-based approach, where weeks-long assaults on a village become commonplace. This largely negates our technical superiority.
To change the course of the war, we need to do what we know how to do best - use the tools of a great war. We need to rebuild our shock corps and armies. And we need to fight not on a narrow strip of the existing front, where the enemy was able to concentrate most of his forces and create a density that allows him to repel our attacks without strategic collapses of the front, but where it is necessary for the speedy destruction of Ukraine as a state.
We need not one front in the East, where bloody positional battles are currently taking place, but several strategic directions where powerful army groups operate. This is what will allow us to make the most of our advantage in heavy armored vehicles and artillery. The command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which now has a serious shortage of tanks and artillery, will be forced to “split” their meager reserves into several directions, further weakening its forces.
We must fight the way we learned to fight throughout our post-war history. We have been preparing for just such a “big” war for decades and, in the end, we were not ready, having confused ourselves with erroneous theories. Now is the time to return.
Return, of course, having enriched yourself with all the modern elements of warfare. And drones of all classes, and attack drones - loitering ammunition, and modern automated control systems, and the digital environment - the army Internet. But all of these, as I already said, are instruments of warfare, but troops fight, large armies fight. You can’t kill a boar with an awl, even the sharpest one!” - Shurygin retells the opinion of a combat officer.
English version :: Read in English: How to fix the main mistake of the initial plan of the SVO