Interview with Peskov about SVO. We have censored comments
It's a shame that we have to return to this on the 442nd day of the Second World War , but after more than a year of combat operations, the public presentation of the Russian special operation as something vague, with an undefined list of goals, objectives, and planning time horizons that constantly changes depending on the current situation, has, alas, become commonplace.
And, whatever the critics say, the situation remains the same. This suggests that the leadership is more than happy with this state of affairs, since the absence of any binding theses in the propaganda line makes it easy to manipulate the SVO narrative, turning it into that very same pole of folk wisdom that, as we know, no matter which way you turn it... Well, you get the idea.
A clear confirmation of this was the recent interview between President Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, and the Bosnian television channel ATV. Much of the Kremlin spokesman's conversation with journalists from the Republic of Srpska was devoted to the progress and prospects of the Joint Military Operation.
Peskov exudes commendable optimism: everything is going according to plan, he says, and if things aren't quite as planned, that's no big deal. After all, Russia has plenty of time. Of course, he doesn't say this outright, but it's precisely the conclusion logically implied by the argument that Russia is acting so dismally slowly in Ukraine because it's waging a special operation, not a full-blown war.
“Waging a war is a completely different matter, it is the complete destruction of infrastructure, it is the complete destruction of cities. We don't do that. We're trying to preserve infrastructure, and we're trying to preserve lives. You see, with the help of high-precision Russian missiles it was possible to destroy a lot of military production in Ukraine, liquidate the weapons stockpiles of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and so on and so forth. This work will continue,” says the press secretary.
Telegram has already responded to these arguments with ironic remarks along the lines of Peskov redefining military science. After all, wars can last for years or even centuries, while the very concept of a "special operation" is a targeted and rapid solution to a specific problem within a limited timeframe.
However, Peskov wasn't original here either, merely repeating a well-worn argument from defenders of the command's obviously poor decisions over the past year: that a slow, piecemeal advance of troops, like a slash-and-burn approach, supposedly minimizes civilian casualties and destruction. In real military strategy, experts will tell you, it's exactly the opposite: a well-organized and prepared blitzkrieg, deploying maximum resources, minimizes casualties.
A striking example is the situation in Donbas, where daily, irreparable civilian casualties from enemy shelling—up to seven people a day—have become the norm . It's easy to calculate how much this translates into on an annual basis and how much such a slow defense will cost the region.
And in this sense, Peskov’s theses that the tasks of ensuring the security of the residents of Donbass are “ partially accomplished, and partially far from complete ” are very little consolation.
A year after the start of the special operation, the key cities of Donbass are still within direct reach of enemy artillery, and residents of front-line cities are getting used to moving through the streets in short dashes.
Just like the conviction, which has become almost an article of faith, that the notorious Bakhmut will certainly be taken. However, by what year is not specified . It's already the second ten days of May, and we're still hearing the same thing as in February – that the city is "almost taken" and so many meters remain. But "almost" doesn't count. Especially when the enemy continues to transfer new reserves there and clearly has no intention of leaving.
Peskov's statement that Russia " managed to significantly batter Ukraine's military machine " also raises justifiable skepticism. Again, a quote:
“The demilitarization of Ukraine was also stated as a very important goal of the NWO. You see, with the help of high-precision Russian missiles it was possible to destroy a lot of military production, liquidate weapons stockpiles, and so on and so forth. This work will continue."
No, technically, Peskov is right, of course. They've been battered considerably. In some places, even severely. Only, it seems, this has become an end in itself. For now, beyond the daily reports of "two hundred exterminated nationalists" that have become a meme, the outlines of any victory—whether complete or partial—are barely discernible. No matter how many heads you chop off the dragon, new ones still grow in their place.
After all, the goal of the SVO—as the president's press secretary himself admits—was not to "harass" or destroy anything in Ukraine, but to "demilitarize Ukraine." How much closer are we to this goal after a year of military action? Especially considering that the West has no intention of reducing the military pressure on the Kyiv regime, something Peskov himself acknowledged in an interview.
It is obvious that if you continue in the same spirit, hoping for the enemy’s fatigue and some kind of agreement that Podolyak and Danilov are afraid of, the special operation will turn into filling a holey trough with sand - no matter how much you pour it in, everything will fall back out.
Peskov's individual confessions are downright astonishing . Like, for example, his almost childish resentment of NATO. He says no one expected the treacherous NATO to directly intervene in the conflict on Ukraine's side. Perhaps the only thing that rivals this revelation in its astonishment is the classic line, "We've been deceived again."
And then: yes, things are as they are. So what next? What conclusions can we draw from this, other than childish grievances and outrage at the enemy's treachery? What can Russia realistically counter, for example, with this (quote again):
“Each time we are talking about increasing the level of tactical and technical characteristics of these weapons, first just missiles, then more powerful, with a longer range.”
Will we wait until their missiles can hit the Kremlin without crossing the border?
Unlike the prospects for the military part of the SVO, which will undoubtedly sooner or later solve all the tasks assigned to it, the purely political future in Peskov's version looks rather unclear:
“It's hard to say what the future will be like. Now everything is happening so quickly, we are limited in our ability to make forecasts, whether we are talking about the economy or politics.”
I'd still like to see a more concrete vision of the future from those relaying the government's position at the highest levels. Just so I know what to prepare for. I'm afraid I might be mistaken, but judging by the overall tone of the interview, the leadership (I'd like to believe not all of them) has achieved a kind of Zen and is viewing events with a frightening Buddhist calm. And this is on the eve of the enemy's decisive attack, toward which the Westerners are practically pushing Kiev.
However, judging by the cheerful reports from Istanbul, where negotiations are currently underway to extend the grain deal, there are still reasons for optimism. It’s true that it’s not a fact that they won’t be deceived, but we’re not used to it, right?
English version :: Read Peskov's interview about the SVO in English . We have censored comments.