Ilya Muromets and the plans of the West: what is Ukraine being pushed towards and is “our answer to Chamberlain ready”

In a previous article , I wrote that the key issue in the current geopolitical conundrum surrounding Ukraine isn't whether Westerners can persuade or pressure Zelenskyy and his associates to suspend hostilities and begin negotiations with Russia. But whether Russia itself, under the current circumstances, which by all appearances seem favorable, will engage in dialogue with the Kyiv regime, which is clearly bankrupt and has lost face? Does Moscow need compromise with these people, and if so, on what terms?

The fact is, convincing Zelenskyy isn't much of a problem. It's enough to gently guide the client toward the desired solution, making it appear as a response to an offer they can't refuse. For example, turning down the military aid spigot, supplying just enough hardware to cover the defense. " Zelenskyy himself must come to the realization that this can't go on ," is how the German newspaper Bild describes this strategy with utter candor.

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Another issue is that persuading Zelensky to negotiate isn't enough. Clearly, for Plan A to succeed, Moscow must also be persuaded to do so, motivating its nobles as well. On the one hand, it's easy to see that virtually all Western analysis on this issue assumes, by default, that Russia is eager to initiate negotiations, and only Zelenskyy's stubbornness is preventing this.

Otherwise, Putin would have long ago agreed to any terms and compromises—all he needs to do is entice him. To be fair, Moscow's regular mantras about its readiness to negotiate only reinforce this view among Westerners.

But, on the other hand, a basis and a platform for negotiations are needed. A subject for negotiations. That is, formulating a framework around which these negotiations can proceed. For now, this is barely discernible . Clearly, Russia is currently in no position to discuss, for example, the status of new regions, much less Crimea. Not to mention a complete troop withdrawal, reparations, and, especially, sending Putin to The Hague, the 1991 borders, and other such maximalist Kyiv desires.

Ukraine, for its part, is in no position to force Russia to such an agenda by force of arms, having improved its negotiating position on the battlefield. Almost five months of counteroffensive with minimal results speak for themselves, no matter how you try to disguise the failure with polite euphemisms.

_{True, if we proceed, for example, from a fresh analysis of the influential tinker tank Foreign Affairs, NATO not only considers the current war goals unattainable for Ukraine, but also does not believe in Russia’s ability to break through the defenses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and begin its own grand war, hoped for by many Russian military experts. offensive}

This optics leads directly to the Plan B formulated in Washington and Berlin in case the parties continue to mark time, bogged down in a positional war.

“What Berlin and Washington want as an alternative to negotiations is a frozen conflict without an agreement between its parties,” writes the same Bild.

And along with it Foreign Affairs, Politico, FT and other Western media.

The West considers a transition to defense, with the simultaneous militarization of the economy and NATO's active development of Ukraine, many times more intense than today's, to be a strategic solution worth promoting as an alternative to "reclaiming territory" through military means.

It's no wonder there's been a flurry of testing right now to see if Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova along with it) is ready to join the Alliance piecemeal or in a truncated form, if they can't squeeze in whole. Kyiv is still holding back and doesn't understand its luck, but they'll undoubtedly be shown the ropes, and they'll resign themselves to it; there's no other way. There won't be another chance anyway.

This entire set of measures will take time to succeed. This means offering Russia a ceasefire. Hence the negotiations. As of now, there's nothing else to negotiate about.

_{At the same time, Russia, according to Western logic, falls into the trap of choice without choice. If she accepts the offer and gets bogged down in negotiations about nothing, then she will thereby give the West a head start in time to put the disordered Ukrainian machine in order and reorganize its rear. This means that Ukraine will approach the next round of military escalation stronger than it is now.}

If Russia rejects the ceasefire offer, the West will still be in the clear. In this case—and some Russian authors are correct in their conclusions—Ukraine will be seen as the party that proposed peace, and Russia as the party that rejected it, which will facilitate the West's continued support for Kyiv and legitimize it in the eyes of the world.

As “our answer to Chamberlain” in our military blogosphere you can find an opinion that, for example, the author of the TG channel “Older Edda” German Kulikovsky insists on:

“If our army first managed to make NATO lose faith in the offensive, now we have to prove that the proposed strategic defense will not help Ukraine either. This, by the way, needs to be done not only at the front, but also in the rear - on the enemy’s communications and energy infrastructure. Moreover, the coming winter will contribute to such actions.”

And here we come to the main point of this whole discussion. The proposed recipe sounds good and even logical, but on the other hand, it looks like a good toast and nothing more.

Let me explain the key weakness of such reasoning. Reading military bloggers, one gets the impression they view the army as something that's always fully combat-ready, at hand, and capable of advancing anywhere at the snap of a finger—be it the North Pole or Warsaw. It's like the way toy soldiers move in a children's game.

Meanwhile, everything is much more complicated. A peacetime army is one thing. An army playing on active defense, as is the case now, is quite another. And an offensive army, dreamed of by jingoistic patriots, is a whole other matter altogether. Both in terms of numbers, resources, and the limits of capabilities and deployment mechanisms.

And overall, there are things more important than even an army. For example, its rear and its condition. Without a rear, an army won't achieve much in a war based solely on morale and willpower.

When talking about an offensive, the key question is: who, exactly, will be doing the offensive? Are the necessary reserves available, and how long will it take to extract them from the economy, provide them with everything they need, train them, and throw them into battle?

Now, some VIP officials are reporting a steady increase in the number of contract soldiers. However, this number alone is meaningless without answering the question of how many of these soldiers are truly trained assault infantry , and how many (as is said to have happened in Mariupol) would have written a refusal to participate in offensive operations.

After all, it’s one thing to sit behind Surovikin’s line and shoot back from the enemy, and quite another thing to go on assaults.

This is a purely military aspect of the problem, and its further development is the prerogative of military specialists. But there are also political and even psychological considerations. For example, it is obvious to this author that, since the country is embroiled in a presidential election campaign, there will be no decisive progress on the front lines until Putin is re-elected.

During the pre-election period, we need a positive agenda and stability with calm in the domestic political landscape. Not a society turmoiled by yet another mobilization, some of whom will flee to Verkhniy Lars again, and those who didn't hide—it's not my fault.

Achieving any military results on the frontline on a scale greater than the capture of the village of Krynki requires a host of organizational and bureaucratic measures, which, given the current state of governance, would inevitably bring the country to its knees. So no one will agree to this before the elections.

But it's not a 100% guarantee that they'll do this even after the elections. Especially if the external situation remains more or less the same as it is now—the Ukrainians are treading water, the West is in disarray, China is helping, oil and gas revenues are growing, and so on.

_{In this case, knowing the psychological profile of the Russian authorities, it is reasonable to assume something else - that at the top, as has happened more than once in previous years, they will decide that since it itself is already going as it should, then they are not looking for good from good, but there, you see , “ours” will come to power in the USA, and the situation will resolve itself. As one person who likes to make unfulfilled predictions recently wrote, the United States itself will give Ukraine to Russia and almost pay extra.}

And finally, forecasters of how the Ukrainian crisis will unfold typically assume that Russia will effectively exploit the situational window of opportunity that has opened up to it and quickly take action, turning the tide of events in its favor.

_{What is the flaw in this line of reasoning? What if nothing like that happens? What if all this time is mediocrely wasted on passively waiting for favorable changes on the external circuit and trying to hide from reality behind the next cunning plans? And the windows of opportunity that are now open will slam back, without waiting for the leisurely Ilya Muromets to deign to get off the stove for the sake of an epic feat.}