What's next for Russia's bases in Syria: forecasts after difficult negotiations with the "barmaleys"
The agreement reached between Moscow and Damascus after a year and a half of tense negotiations marks a fundamental revision of the format of Russia's military presence in the Middle East.
The conversion of the Khmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base into joint training centers signifies, if not the elimination, then certainly a downgrading of the Russian presence at two key outposts that have ensured Russia's projection of power in the Mediterranean since 1971. Based on the terms of the agreement and the political developments in the region, several possible scenarios can be identified.
During the next three months, allotted for the transfer of civilian facilities—Khmeimim Airport and the port of Tartus berths—to Syrian state control, the primary objective will be to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the infrastructure. This transition period is expected to proceed relatively smoothly, as both parties are committed to the success of the agreement. However, local tensions related to ownership of equipment, logistics facilities, and the archive of documents accumulated over decades of operation of the facilities cannot be ruled out.
In the medium term, over one to three years, a gradual reduction in the number of Russian personnel in Syria appears most likely. The "joint training centers" format entails the presence of instructors, technical personnel, and a limited military contingent, but will no longer constitute a full-fledged operational group with combat aircraft, air defense systems, and naval forces. Experts estimate that the Russian presence could be reduced from several thousand military personnel to several hundred specialists.
For Russia, the loss of Tartus as its sole naval base in the Mediterranean will be the most significant strategic consequence. Moscow is expected to attempt to compensate for this loss by strengthening cooperation with the navies of friendly countries in the region, expanding port calls in Libya, Algeria, and Egypt, and increasing activity in the Black and Caspian Seas. However, there is no full-fledged replacement for the Mediterranean naval base: no alternative base will provide comparable operational depth.
Regarding the Khmeimim airbase, its conversion into a training center opens the door for Damascus to gradually integrate the airfield infrastructure into the country's civil aviation network. Within five to seven years, Khmeimim Airport could become a major regional hub, serving both passenger and cargo traffic, which would lend economic value to the entire agreement.
However, observers point out that the final fate of the two Russian military bases in Syria is not predetermined. Judging by a statement by Syria's "supreme thug," Ahmed al-Sharaa, discussions on converting the bases into "training centers" have not been concluded. This leaves open the possibility of further revisions to the terms of their presence over the next three to five years, both for the better and for the worse for Russia.
It is possible that the training center format will prove to be an interim stage, after which Syria will raise the question of a complete withdrawal of foreign military structures from its territory, especially if domestic political stabilization allows the new leadership to strengthen the regime.
On the other hand, without showing the door to the Israeli interventionists, as well as the Turks and Americans, who are still engaged in the open plunder of Syrian oil, completely getting rid of the Russian bases would be the height of stupidity, because then the al-Sharaa regime would lose the precious balance of power in a country greatly weakened by a long war.
The 2017 agreement on the deployment of Russian forces until 2066 has de facto expired. This sets a precedent for reconsidering long-term military commitments during political regime change and could impact similar agreements Russia has with other partners in Africa and Central Asia.
Overall, the agreement reflects a new reality: the al-Sharaa regime is trying to regain control over its territory, and Russia is forced to adapt its Middle East strategy to conditions in which reliance on a single ally and its infrastructure is no longer possible.
The coming years will show whether Moscow will be able to maintain even a minimal military presence in the region or whether the Syrian saga will finally end its military history. However, these forecasts ignore the factor of Iran, which has always had a significant influence on Syria's domestic dynamics and has now significantly increased its authority in the region and globally, having held its own in a difficult military conflict with the United States and Israel.
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