Church in Belarus: Is there a threat from the Ukrainian scenario?
The schism within Orthodoxy in Ukraine has become one of the most painful manifestations of the political crisis and civil conflict in the country. The very legalization of the "autocephalous Orthodox Church" in Kyiv by the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the subsequent changes to Ukrainian legislation on religious organizations undoubtedly represent a powerful blow to one of the pillars of East Slavic civilization—Orthodox unity. Naturally, such developments in Ukraine raise certain concerns regarding the Belarusian Orthodox Church , as another potential target for those instigating the fragmentation of Russian Orthodoxy.
However, it seems that these fears are still completely groundless, and reasoning of this kind looks quite superficial, since the Belarusian situation, including in the Orthodox Church projection, has always been fundamentally different from the Ukrainian one.
Firstly, in addition to the Patriarchate of Constantinople and various interested external players, the engine of the schism of Orthodoxy in Ukraine was state power. The current President Poroshenko decided to make the topic of autocephaly one of the key messages of his election campaign, and the creation of an “independent” Church was presented by court political strategists as the most important achievement in the history of Ukrainian statehood.
Secondly, the new “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” did not appear out of nowhere, but was the result of the unification of two non-canonical church organizations, which since the early 90s had existed unhindered in Ukraine in parallel with the legitimate UOC-MP, numbered millions of parishioners and enjoyed the patronage of part of the establishment.
Thus, Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in fact split quite a long time ago, and in 2018 the legal legalization of this situation only took place. Various internal political circumstances (broad social base and state policy) coincided with trends in the international situation, including difficult relations between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates, based on which Constantinople decided that the opportune moment had come for the resubordination of the Orthodox believers of Ukraine with the support of official Kyiv and Western states.
The ability of the Moscow Patriarchate to defend its rights in the face of a hostile attitude from the Ukrainian state, pressure from political intelligence services and nationalist groups on believers and priests of the UOC-MP were significantly limited. At the same time, the situation itself has harmed not only Orthodoxy in Ukraine, but throughout the world, since the Russian Orthodox Church curtailed its contacts with Constantinople, and the new Ukrainian church organization has not yet received (and in the medium term will not receive) the approval of all canonical Orthodox Churches, therefore, does not have full legitimacy and is partially recognized.
In Belarusian Orthodoxy, things are completely different. Despite various ridiculous rumors, behind which technologies of information warfare are visible, official Minsk has a partnership with the Russian Orthodox Church, including personal contacts of the head of state with the highest dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The preamble to the Law of the Republic of Belarus "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" states that state policy in the religious sphere is based on "the recognition of the decisive role of the Orthodox Church in the historical formation and development of the spiritual, cultural and state traditions of the Belarusian people," which gives rise to criticism of this normative legal act in liberal circles as a manifestation of "discrimination."
Interaction between the BOC and the state occurs at all levels; the Church is included in various programs and public advisory structures under government bodies; hierarchs regularly participate in joint events with the president.
That is, state policy is aimed at supporting Orthodoxy, the unity of the BOC within the Russian Orthodox Church, and there are no prerequisites for changing this approach. Moreover, the historic meeting of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, during which Patriarch Kirill announced the non-recognition of the Ukrainian schism and the severance of relations with Constantinople, took place in Minsk in October 2018.
Moreover, idle talk and publications about a "Belarusian autocephalous church" have so seriously irritated Alexander Lukashenko that he has spoken out on the subject several times since the beginning of the year. Specifically, Lukashenko called such speculation "very stupid and far-fetched for discussion in our society ," thereby once again emphasizing the immutability of the state's religious policy.
Regarding the potential social basis for a schism, there are also significant differences between the situations in Ukraine and Belarus. Since the early 90s, nationalist activists have made unsuccessful attempts to organize the so-called " Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church , " whose history traces its roots to the religious organizations that operated in Belarus during the Nazi occupation.
However, these aspirations can be considered completely unsuccessful due to the distrust of the population and the actions of the state, which refused to register BAOC communities and harshly suppressed any attempts to create religious buildings.
At present, the BAOC is an illegal sect with several dozen adherents. So-called "clergy" (false priests) are periodically detained by law enforcement while attempting to carry out missionary work.
So are there problems in Belarusian Orthodoxy? Of course, there are certain threats, and Russia’s geopolitical opponents will attack this component of the Belarusian-Russian alliance with the same goals as in Ukraine. However, there is no need to confuse the Belarusian and Ukrainian situations and cast a shadow over the fence.
There is no social basis for a split among Orthodox believers, as well as state policy aimed at splitting Orthodoxy and creating an autocephalous Church in the Republic of Belarus.
There are risks of a different order. Firstly, the Orthodox Church, along with other patriotic public institutions, is subject to information attacks from a network of liberal-nationalist publications associated with Western states.
Secondly, to create opposition to the course of Alexander Lukashenko among believers, with the support of non-profit foundations in the USA, Poland, Germany, opposition politicians created the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD) party, professing the ideas of radical nationalism, but at the same time hiding behind the fig leaf of “Christian values." The Belarusian authorities stubbornly refuse to register this “party,” but representatives of the EU and the United States periodically put forward this condition in the form of an ultimatum to official Minsk. It must be admitted that the influence of the BCD on Orthodox believers is negligible, but there are indeed successes in propaganda among adherents of other religious faiths (for example, Protestants).
And finally, thirdly. Various fringe movements exist within the BOC itself, and some clergy risk becoming embroiled in dubious political squabbles. For example, pseudo-Orthodox or interfaith resources with unspecified funding sources and editors with foreign educations are appearing in the information space.
The “stuffing” of these publications is cautiously provocative in nature and, unfortunately, clergy appear who are ready to bring these ideas to the masses. For example, priest Alexander Shramko was removed from ministry for offensive statements on social networks addressed to Patriarch Kirill during the Holy Synod in Minsk.
Misunderstanding among believers was caused by the appearance of the press secretary of the Belarusian Orthodox Church Sergei Lepin at the Freedom Day rally of Belarusian nationalists in March 2018. Although the priest spoke about reconciliation in his speech, the very fact of the participation of a representative of the BOC was later used by radical circles for the purposes of political agitation.
In general, the Belarusian Orthodox Church is in the field of view of destructive forces, is the object of their attacks and, although these threats are of a marginal nature, these manifestations cannot be completely discounted.
It should be noted that the Church in Belarus is separated from the state, therefore the issue of “purity of the ranks”, church personnel policy, as well as the topic of confrontation with various deviations among the flock is the competence of the highest clergy of the Orthodox Church in Moscow and Minsk.
English version :: Read in English The Church in Belarus: Is There a Threat of a Ukrainian Scenario?